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
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Soviet Perceptions OF WAR AND PEACE

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Foreword

In 1835 Alexis de Tocqueville predicted that America and Russia were "marked out by the will of heaven to sway the destinies of half the globe," with the Russians using "the authority of society in a single arm" and the Americans relying "upon personal interest [and] freedom." De Tocqueville was amazingly prescient. A century and a half later the two nations are the most powerful militarily and the most opposed ideologically; each having a different view of an ideal world order and each perceiving the other as a national security threat.

As the authors in this volume suggest, the perceptions one nation has of another must be studied. Soviet perceptions of their political and military imperatives and of US intentions and military force posture directly affect Soviet force developments and deployments. Should the Soviet Union misperceive the intentions of the United States, war could occur through miscalculation or error. Therefore, to the extent that Soviet perceptions of war and peace are understood in the United States, the better able we will be to manage the US-Soviet relationship and forestall the possibility of conflict through misunderstanding.

The value of this compilation is that it focuses on Soviet political and military imperatives and the mechanisms—ideological, political, and military—the Soviets have evolved for promoting their global interests and security needs. It does not purport to be inclusive, but deals with many of the salient features of Soviet views of political and military issues bearing on war and peace. The National Defense University is pleased to publish this volume whose contents reinforce the prediction made by the brilliant French observer so long ago.



R.G. GARD, JR.
Lieutenant General, USA
President

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I wish to gratefully recognize General R.G. Gard, Jr., President, National Defense University; and Colonel Franklin D. Margiotta, Director, Research Directorate, National Defense University, for their support of this volume. The authors who researched and wrote the studies in this book deserve a special note of appreciation as do the publishers of ORBIS, *International Security*, and *Comparative Strategy* who granted permission to reprint articles that appeared in their journals. Of the individuals in the Research Directorate who contributed to the production of this book, I must especially acknowledge the assistance of Evelyn Lakes, editor in charge of production from the manuscript stage through final publication; and the word-processing operators who drafted the final versions of the studies. And finally, but not least, I wish to recognize Don Barry who designed the cover.

Graham D. Vernon

Chapter Synopses

Chapter One

Soviet military doctrine is the Party's guide to the strategic structure and future direction of the military. It is the intellectual and programmatic framework that informs war planning and guides force acquisition. Essentially a Party pronouncement, it dictates the broad guidance for more specific planning and establishes the armament norms and weapons acquisition policies for the Soviet armed forces.

Soviet military doctrine is not the product of an unconstrained military elite chafing at Party restraint and control. Doctrine and associated force structure derive from a fairly rational institutional process, initiated and controlled by the Party, in the pursuit of articulated political objectives. Politics, the Party presence, and Party control overlay the whole military-thought process. The players in that process—the Party, military, industrial, and security organs—are not simply competing institutions fused together through Party punitive measures; their identities are shaded by a fusion which leaves uncertain boundaries. A commonality of interests centered on Party political concerns characterizes these elites. Their principal objectives are perpetuating their exclusive position at society's expense and producing politically useful military power.

Chapter Two

The Soviet Union is a closed society run by a centrally directed Party that is the sole guardian of the single true political, social, and military orthodoxy. *Right thinking* of the military profession is controlled by a well-organized philosophical structure which assures that the decisionmaking process in military affairs supports Party national and international politics. By telling the Soviet military profession what to think and how to think, the philosophical structure guides perceptions of military theory and policy.

Chapter Three

Soviet views on the origins of the Cold War are deeply rooted in historical experience as well as Marxist-Leninist ideology. For the Soviets, the conflict began in 1917 and has not ended. The experiences of the interwar period and World War II confirmed their views concerning fundamental Western hostility.

The foreign policy objectives of the Soviet Union in Europe at the end of World War II were somewhat more limited than often presumed in the West. Yet, increased tensions were almost unavoidable because of the diametrically opposed interests of the Soviet Union and the United States concerning political arrangements in Eastern Europe and other areas. Further, the paranoia of Stalin, who ruled the Soviet Union with absolute power during those critical years, made the period of heightened tensions essentially inevitable.

Chapter Four

The peoples of the Soviet Union view war as a very real possibility. During its long history Russia has suffered invasion, civil war, and military defeat. The modern Russian state was created in the defeat and chaos of World War I and military force has been integral to Communist rule. For most Soviet citizens, war has firsthand meaning; for those too young to remember, there is a constant effort to remind them of the horrors of armed conflict. Russians do not have the luxury of viewing conflict in the detached manner characteristic of Americans. Perhaps Americans do not enjoy that luxury any longer either in this nuclear age; but it is the Russians who have adjusted to the new realities. In this chapter the attitudes behind and the implications of the Soviet perception of war in the nuclear age are examined; the relationship between politics and war, and between hardware and politics are explored; and the doctrinal tenets and predilections resulting from the Soviet view of war are presented. The Soviets do not want war, but should there be one they intend to be prepared to win.

Chapter Five

In attempting to look at Soviet military capabilities from the Soviet point of view, it is useful to examine Soviet perceptions of the threat posed by the United States and its allies to the Soviet Union and the "socialist camp," and Soviet views of the nature of a war between the two superpower coalitions, its political objectives, and how the Soviets would wage such a war.

Given the missions assigned to the Soviet armed forces in the event of a nuclear war between the two superpower coalitions, the capabilities of Soviet forces to perform these missions may be evaluated. Inasmuch as the relationship between missions and capabilities is a dynamic one, it is useful to explore how the Soviets may view the long-term trends in this relationship and the effect thereof on the trends in the military "correlation of forces" between the two superpowers.

Chapter Six

Since the early 1960s the Soviet people have been told that the United States is preparing for a surprise unlimited (neogranichennoye) nuclear strike against the Soviet Union and other socialist nations. In the late 1960s this assertion was revised to admit the possibility that the United States might begin war with conventional weapons only, then proceed to the limited use of nuclear weapons, followed by escalation to world nuclear war. The United States is portrayed as having "unleashed" an arms race, and as possessing forces and weapons systems beyond those needed for its defense.

Many of the Soviet writings about US military strategies and forces appear simply as propaganda, serving to justify Soviet actions, the buildup of Soviet forces, and the heavy defense burden of the Soviet people. Still, the top Soviet leadership, supposedly with access to factual data about the West, appears to hold the same distorted perceptions as those reflected in the Soviet news media. If these represent actual views, there is danger that the Soviet Union might begin a war through misunderstanding and miscalculation of the capabilities of US forces and the intentions of NATO's leaders.

Chapter Seven

Peaceful coexistence, or detente, is a term often used by both US and Soviet leaders, yet with apparently different definitions. Leaders in the United States have suggested that Soviet actions in Africa, for example, are not compatible with detente. The Soviets have argued that there is no conflict. While it might be difficult, given the heterogeneity of American political statements, to accurately define the US concept of peaceful coexistence, the same does not apply to the Soviet Union. In this chapter, peaceful coexistence is traced from its genesis, soon after the Bolshevik revolution, to the present day. Although the policy has received varying emphases depending on the international situation, the rationale behind it and the purpose peaceful coexistence is designed to accomplish have been remarkably consistent.

Chapter Eight

Soviet attitudes have been deeply ambivalent about the emergence of multipolarity in international affairs, a development that explicitly or implicitly has provided the conceptual framework for much of US foreign policy since the beginning of the Nixon administration. At a theoretical level Marxism-Leninism, stressing struggle between classes rather than nation-states, is fundamentally contradictory to concepts of multipolarity, resting on a balance of power approach to international relations.

Nevertheless, Soviet officials have not categorically rejected multipolarity. Instead, they have viewed multipolarity favorably when it has served Soviet interests. The disparity in Soviet attitudes may be seen in Soviet responses to the emergence of Western Europe, Japan, and China as three new power centers in a pentapolar world. To the extent multipolarity serves to divide the capitalist alliance—the United States, Japan, and Western Europe—Moscow has welcomed a more multipolar system. Soviet ambivalence may be seen, however, in apprehensions over the prospect of either a European nuclear force or a militarily more self-reliant Japan. Moscow's discomfort with the implications of multipolarity is more evident respecting China. Soviet leaders foresee the growth of Peking's military power but do not believe China will play the stabilizing role expected by US balance-of-power theorists.

Soviet Perceptions

Graham D. Vernon

Geographically, Washington and Moscow are separated by 4,876 air miles; the US and Soviet leadership are similarly far distant in their perceptions of world events. Although there is no way to close the physical gap between the cities, it is both necessary and desirable to lessen the perceptual one, even while admitting that it can never be eliminated.

The United States and the Soviet Union possess widely different histories, cultures, and ideologies. Hence, it should not be surprising that both the citizens and governments of these two superpowers often approach, discuss, and resolve issues in fundamentally different ways. Although this thesis may be easy to accept in theory, it is often difficult to accept in practice; for example, when the United States is confronted with a specific issue on which the positions of the two nations vary—such as, the Soviet buildup of forces in Eastern Europe.

Many Americans have been perplexed by the extent of the military expansion in Eastern Europe. Yet, it is a logical consequence of Russian and Soviet history, culture, and ideology. It is a history that features invasions by Tartars, Swedes, French, and Germans; a culture that has long placed emphasis on quantity which was available rather than on quality which was not, but now is; and an ideology that perceives a continuing conflict, and an unsatisfactory status quo, between two essentially hostile social systems. Given this perspective, the Soviet buildup is more understandable, and perhaps more bothersome as well.

To suggest that it is useful for the United States to understand why the Soviets adopt a given stance is not to suggest acceptance of that stance, which is an altogether different issue. It is to suggest, however, that because the two countries have contacts in various areas—economic, cultural, military—US interests will be better served if we understand the "why" behind the "what" of Soviet policy. To that end, these studies present Soviet perceptions of certain political and military issues directly affecting the United States.

The first chapter, by John Dziak, provides background for the remaining chapters by examining the institutional foundations of Soviet military doctrine. The remaining chapters focus on Soviet

perceptions of specific military or politico-military issues: William Baxter analyzes Soviet perceptions of the laws of war; Dallas Brown provides a historical perspective on the origins of the Cold War; Steve Kime focuses on the Soviet view of war in the nuclear age; W. T. Lee assesses Soviet military capabilities; William and Harriet Scott examine Soviet military strategies and forces; I address and provide a historical overview of the concept of peaceful coexistence, or detente; and in the last chapter Nils Wessell treats of Soviet views of the emergence of multipolarity in international affairs.

In the belief that the perceptions of the Soviets can best be presented in their own words, these studies are based largely on Soviet sources. It is to be hoped the reader will finish this book with a deeper awareness of the Soviet threat to the United States and a better evaluation of Soviet behavior. In any event, I trust the reader will gain an enhanced understanding of a country whose future is so unavoidably interwoven with that of the United States.

Chapter One

The Institutional Foundations of Soviet Military Doctrine

John J. Dzlak

Many Western impressions of Soviet military affairs stem from propositions that a latent, if not actual, divergence exists between a somewhat moderate political leadership and a clearly hawkish military establishment. Similarly, a number of extant views hold that Soviet military doctrine, with its heavy nuclear focus, is really *morale-building* propaganda or military theory articulated *after* an unfettered industrial-technical bureaucracy has produced copious new weapons systems by virtue of some undefined bureaucratic momentum.

An examination of the institutional structure and processes of the Soviet strategic leadership (party, military, security, and industrial elites) calls such interpretations into serious question. Strong and consistent evidence points to a carefully prepared military doctrine which precedes and undergirds Soviet military power. In a system that prides itself on central planning, a command economy, and centralized hierarchical political control, little happens in the realm of power accretion (political, military, or economic) in an accidental manner. The growth of Soviet power over the last two decades more clearly reflects a highly structured strategic process involving the interaction of political-military theory (military doctrine) with centralized and interlocking institutions. The object of this process is to produce politically

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useful military power in an era when the Soviet leadership perceives that the "correlation of forces" is moving rapidly and inexorably in its favor.

Soviet Military Doctrine

Soviet military doctrine (voyennaya doctrina) attracted much Western analytical notice in the wake of the increasingly evident Soviet military buildup and attendant US efforts to deal with this buildup through the SALT process. Prior to these events little attention was paid to the subject with the exception of scattered efforts by several Western specialists in government and research organizations. However, valuable new sources on Soviet military doctrine and strategy recently have become available providing critical insights into the content and structure of Soviet military thinking.¹

That military doctrine is determined by party policy, there appears little doubt. The structure of Soviet military thought begins with party positions on political strategy, that is, broad theses on domestic and international objectives and how to achieve them. One of the means for achieving these objectives is military power, and the party puts the connection between political strategy and the military factor in the following way:

Theses of Soviet military strategy primarily reflect the political strategy of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union [CPSU]. It is in the interests of political strategy that military strategy makes use of the achievements of scientific-technical progress which materializes in weapons of varying power.... Only political leadership can determine the scale and consistency of bringing to bear the most powerful means of destruction.... Of all factors which affect military strategy, the most important are political factors, which determine the nature and goals of a war and the scale of employment of armed forces. The influence is due essentially to the role played by the military doctrine of the state, which officially consolidates specific principles, methods, and forms of preparing for and waging war in case of an attack by an imperialist enemy.²

Soviet leaders hold that the political strategy of the party is determined by an assessment of the "correlation of forces," which Politburo member M. Suslov saw shifting in Moscow's favor in the late 1960s and the early 1970s with the achievement of strategic

parity.³ Other senior Soviets have claimed that such a shift will result in a greater "external" role for the Soviet armed forces.⁴

On another level, the premier role of the party in determining and guiding military doctrine and overall Soviet military activities can be found in a number of authoritative statements on CPSU Military policy. One *Voyennaya Mysl'* article describes how the CPSU Central Committee developed military doctrine relating to nuclear weapons research during World War II.⁵ General Yepishev, current chief of the Main Political Administration, states that CPSU military policy "defines the goals and tasks of the armed struggle of the working class" and creates "advantageous conditions for the construction of socialism and communism."⁶

Where party political strategy and military policy leave off and military doctrine begins is not altogether clear because of the high political permeation of all spheres of Soviet activity. It appears to this writer that party-military spokesmen are not taken with such concerns other than the major understanding that "politics drives all." At some point where political strategy/party military policy intersect, military doctrine results. In party idiom military doctrine is party writ in the totality of military programs. It is the military-strategic policy of the party-state, worked out by the political leadership on the nature of future war, the methods for waging it, and the preparation and organization of the armed forces and the country for it. It is neither an accident nor the end-product of the momentum of the technical bureaucracies.

Soviet political-military writers make clear that military doctrine comprises two major elements: political and military-technical. They go to great lengths to establish the historical pedigree of this distinction, usually by returning to M.V. Frunze, successor to Trotsky as Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs. (Trotsky's role in the formation of the Red Army is never mentioned.) One recent writer in quoting Frunze, underscores the primacy of the political element in military doctrine, a stress which characterizes all Soviet military writings. This same writer stresses the *planning* character of military doctrine when he quotes from Frunze that doctrine should be built

in the first place, on a clear and precise conception of the character of a future war; in the second place, on a correct and precise computation of the future military capabilities of our potential enemies; in the third place, on a precise, correct computation of our own resources.⁷

Virtually all definitions of military doctrine encompass these

same concerns, that is, the necessity for doctrine to articulate the nature of future wars and enemies so as to prepare properly the country and armed forces for war. The late Marshal Grechko, former Minister of Defense, said that Soviet military doctrine, at the very least, would answer the following basic questions:

- What enemy will have to be faced in a possible war?
- What is the nature of the war in which the state and its armed forces will have to take part; what goals and missions might they be faced with in this war?
- What armed forces are needed to execute the assigned missions, and in what direction must military development be carried out?
- How are preparations for war to be implemented?
- What methods must be used to wage war?⁸

The focus of these questions clearly is on the future, that is, the determination of the direction of military force developments. That this determination is ordained by the party is seconded by another prominent Soviet officer who states that "present-day military doctrine is the political policy of party ... an expression of state military policy, a *directive of political strategy*."⁹ (Emphasis added.)

Military doctrine, therefore, is the party's guide to the strategic structure and future direction of the military. Essentially a party pronouncement, it dictates the broad guidance for more specific planning and establishes the armament norms and weapons acquisition policies for the Soviet armed forces.¹⁰ Issuing from the highest council of the land, it is highly stable and once pronounced, not debatable although it may be changed to accommodate new military scientific developments. Carrying an aura of authority and finality, it is binding not only on the Soviet armed forces but on the Eastern European members of the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact as well, unless higher party authority ordains changes and adjustments. Who controls doctrine controls the direction of military development; hence, there exists still another means of party preeminence over the military beyond the usual political and KGB structures for control.

Since military doctrine flows from political strategy and is the

domain of the party, it is not surprising that some forthright doctrinal statements should issue from party sources. One of these sources, the Lenin Military-Political Academy of the Main Political Administration, produced the book *Marxism-Leninism on War and Army* in five Russian editions, a work cited by the *Great Soviet Encyclopedia* as a fundamental source of military doctrine. Political officers affiliated with this academy tend to publish frequently on the subject of war in the nuclear age. An example of this fixation with the requirements for war is provided by a member of the Academy's Department of Economics:

Strengthening of its defenses is now the foremost political function of the Soviet state.... The significance of the country's military organization for victory in a war is now immeasurably greater. Never before has the internal life of the country been subordinated to war so deeply and thoroughly as at the present time.¹¹

Military affairs and war ultimately are the province of the party, which, in turn, places military questions in the forefront of state objectives. Military power in the Soviet system is not viewed as an unwanted though necessary burden. Rather, its acquisition is clearly articulated by party political strategy, party military policy, and military doctrine, which then subordinates the needs of society to its furtherance. In that sense, it is difficult to view the party as a reluctant object of military pressure. Instead, the party is the initiator and partner in a process intent on harnessing society and the economy to military-oriented goals.

Institutional Sources of Military Doctrine: The Party-Military Amalgam

Claims by the party to preeminence in military affairs could be dismissed as propaganda were it not for its overwhelming presence in all military-related activities. The formulation of political strategy is the exclusive sphere of the Politburo, the Secretariat, and the Central Committee. The staff work is provided by the Central Committee Departments, especially the Foreign Department, when it comes to political strategy. In many respects this department is the true locus of foreign policy, exercising more real authority than the Foreign Ministry.

All major decisions of state, including military ones, are made by

the Politburo, the pinnacle of all authority in the USSR. According to a plethora of sources, the Politburo establishes Soviet military doctrine as the officially accepted position of the Soviet state on the nature of modern war, Soviet objectives in war, and the requirements of the armed forces. However, as a collegial body of twenty-four, full- and candidate-members, the Politburo clearly is not the place where informed discussions of military doctrine and weapons decisions are held and weighed. Indeed, a substantially smaller number of Politburo members are properly equipped by training, experience, and position to pass adequate judgment on critical national security matters. While the Politburo probably does take final votes on major military decisions, it is doubtful that all members are intimately involved in the deliberative process.¹²

The forum for this process is the Defense Council (Sovyet Oborony), the most critical party body for military decision-making.¹³ For years the party and military press had been secretive, or at best opaque, about its existence. In the last several years, however, the Defense Council has received increasing public attention, first in a press series on its World War II predecessor, the State Committee of Defense (GKO), then by an admission in 1976 that the Defense Council did exist, with Brezhnev as its chairman. During World War II the GKO served as *the* single decision point for *all* vital matters of state, be they military, economic, security, or foreign policy. Marshal Grechko has stated that *absolute* power was concentrated in the GKO, while contemporary Soviet spokesmen point to the Defense Council as a necessary mechanism for integrating the political, military, and economic leadership.¹⁴ The late Marshal Sokolovskiy has hinted that the powers of both bodies are analogous:

All leadership of the country and the Armed Forces during wartime will be accomplished by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union with the possible organization of a higher agency of leadership of the country and the Armed Forces. This higher agency of leadership may be given the same powers as the State Committee of Defense during the Great Patriotic War, and will be headed by the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the head of the government to whom the functions of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of all the Armed Forces may also be entrusted.¹⁵

As for Sokolovskiy's last statement, it was announced in 1977 that Brezhnev was indeed the "Supreme Commander-in-Chief" (Verkhovnyi Glavnokomanduyushchiy) of the Soviet armed forces.¹⁶

The intriguing aspect of these recent revelations and Sokolovskiy's comments is that the Soviets themselves are making a strong case for the existence of a special, powerful subset of the Politburo whose duties transcend military affairs in a strictly Western sense. If the GKO literally ran the country in World War II, then its 1970's analogue, the Defense Council, is in a truly powerful position, making decisions on major economic and foreign policy questions as well as military ones. It should not be surprising, therefore, that military priorities continue to override those of the consumer sector so consistently, and that the accumulation of military power should be the principal objective of the leadership.

The probable membership of the Defense Council seems to support such an orientation. Most sources, while varying on two or three personalities, tend to focus on Politburo and Secretariat members from the military, security, industrial, and foreign policy complex.¹⁷ These would include Brezhnev, Tikhonov, Ustinov (Minister of Defense), Gromyko (Foreign Minister), Andropov (KGB Chief), and Kirilenko (touted as Brezhnev's heir). Other names frequently mentioned include Suslov (party boss for ideology and international communism), Shchelokov (MVD Chief), Smirnov (Chief of the Military Industrial Commission or VPK), the party Secretary for Defense Industry Ryabov (until he was dropped in early 1979), Marshals Ogarkov and Kulikov (Chiefs of the General Staff and Warsaw Pact, respectively) and even Baibakov (Chairman of the State Planning Committee, or GOSPLAN).

Even if several of the names proposed above are not members of the Defense Council, it is noteworthy that (1) no name appears from the consumer or agricultural spheres of the system; (2) senior party people have the definitive voice in military-related matters; and (3) all the principals involved in the continuation of the system as devised by Stalin are together in an intimate, integrated body.

Several inferences and conclusions may be drawn therefrom. First, the Defense Council could well be the governing body through which the Brezhnev clique is directing the country, with only pro-forma reference back to the full Politburo on key state decisions. Second, it is hard to sustain a "hawk-dove" factional argument (as some Western commentators attempt) given such an integrated membership. Third, the Brezhnev regime clearly has returned to Stalin's institutional norms and away from Khrushchev's erraticisms. Fourth, the party and *not* the military is in charge, though the military bias of party goals and priorities suggests a condominium of party-military institutional interests. And, finally, it is specious to contend that the party leadership is struggling with unchecked semiautonomous bureaucratic interests. The height of Soviet decision authority, apparently the

Defense Council, makes discrete political-military-economic decisions in line with the strategic objectives, the military doctrine, and the military equipment policy which it also establishes.¹⁸

While the Defense Council is no doubt the decision pinnacle, it accomplishes its mission through a redundant and complex structure of party, state, and military organizations tiered below it. It is from this structure that input for the two sides of military doctrine — political and military-technical — percolate upward.

One of the principal, but often misunderstood, players in this process is the Main Political Administration (MPA) of the Soviet Army and Navy. With a pedigree dating to the Civil War (1918-21), it is normally thought of as the designated agency for party political work in the armed forces; that is, the maintenance of ideological purity and orthodoxy. Functioning with the rights of a Central Committee Department, its officers, though integrated in the military structure, are answerable to the Central Committee through their own channels.

In the formulation of Soviet military doctrine the MPA plays an absolutely critical role. Periodically, it has been alleged by some Westerners that the Soviet military challenges party directives or takes issue with party interpretations through the vehicle of the Soviet military press. Usually implicit in such assessments is a belief that the Soviet military has both an institutional identification unique and separate from that of the party and a separate literary vehicle for expressing its views.

However, the Soviet military press is not an independent organ of either the Minister of Defense or the General Staff. The military press is run by the MPA.¹⁹ Soviet sources are vitally clear on this critical fact:

The Main Political Administration is in charge of the national military newspapers, journals, and other media of mass propaganda, as well as of the military publishing houses.²⁰

Given what we know of the Soviet censorship process, it is difficult to credit the Soviet military with an independent "literary" voice. For instance, nothing reaches publication in the USSR unless it passes a detailed censorship arrangement jointly run by Glavlit (the state censorship agency which is directly under the Central Committee Propaganda Department) and the KGB (the Committee for State Security). Any item for publication that even hints of a connection to "state secrets" is submitted to the KGB by Glavlit.²¹

In the case of the military, the MPA also must submit all materials for publication to Glavlit, even *after* the MPA censors have reviewed

the drafts.²² Here, too, the KGB is involved, for military secrets are "state secrets," subject to the discretionary power of that organ charged by the party with securing its monopoly position in all facets of Soviet life. Hence, it is difficult to grant the military an independent voice in print. If the military is not independent with regard to its own security and counterintelligence (the KGB's Third Directorate has that mandate) nor free to propagate uniquely "military" views in print (the MPA, Glavlit, and KGB are preeminent here), then it manifestly is not a free agent in the formulation of military doctrine, let alone a free agent in the realm of internal political maneuvering. Therefore, one may conclude that, barring bureaucratic mistakes, the message we see in the military press is, at the very least, tacitly approved by the party. This clearly applies to all military literature from *Krasnaya Zvezda* (Red Star) to *Voyennaya Mysl'* (Military Thought), the journal of the General Staff.

The impact of the MPA, however, does not end here. The MPA has its own "think tank," the Lenin Military-Political Academy, for influencing the formulation of military doctrine and thought. Although its staffers train officers for service in the MPA structure throughout the military, they also produce articles for the MPA journal *Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil* (Communist of the Armed Forces, or KVS) and contribute to books on military doctrine and strategy. Frequently these authors collaborate with "professional" military types on joint publication ventures such as, *Scientific-Technical Progress and the Revolution in Military Affairs*. At other times they figure prominently in the authorship of works, such as *Marxism-Leninism on War and Army* (a seminal source on military doctrine) and *The Philosophical Heritage of V.I. Lenin and Problems of Contemporary War*. The tone of these books and the thrust of articles in KVS suggest that these political officers are the frequent source of so-called "hawkish" positions attributed to a unitary military group by many Western observers. In reality, the "political" side of military doctrine makes as strong a case for such doctrinal concepts as "quantitative and qualitative superiority" or "victory" as does the "military-technical" side. But then these themes all emanate initially from party sources, or at least party-blessed sources.

Finally, the MPA's chief since 1962, General of the Army A.A. Yepishev, is a former deputy to Lavrenty Beria, KGB boss at the time of Stalin's death in 1953. It is generally held that he ranks fourth in precedence in the Soviet military establishment after Marshals Ustinov, Ogarkov, and Kulikov.²³

After the MPA, state organizations become more clearly involved in the formulation as well as the implementation of military doctrine.

A major transmission belt from the party to the military and to defense industry is the Military Industrial Commission, or VPK, headed by L.V. Smirnov, Central Committee member and possible Defense Council member. Smirnov's responsibilities are orchestrating military R&D, producing weapons, reviewing new weapons proposals, assigning and policing the highest priorities in the economy to weapons work, and integrating these activities with the rest of the economy.²⁴ Specific party oversight for these duties is believed vested in the Defense Industry Department of the Central Committee, headed since 1958 by I.D. Serbin who in turn answers to the Central Committee Secretary for defense affairs.²⁵ Obviously, their work is closely meshed with that of GOSPLAN, the state planning agency charged with coordinating the unified state economic plan in which defense interests receive the highest priorities.

For specific military input to the doctrinal process the High Command is the first of several military players involved. Foremost here is the Main Military Council, or Collegium, of the Ministry of Defense. In World War II it served as STAVKA (Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, sitting between the GKO and General Staff). Should this role be repeated, Brezhnev would be its chief.²⁶ In peacetime Brezhnev is already a member of the Main Military Council by virtue of his position as Supreme Commander-in-Chief. Other peacetime members include Minister of Defense Ustinov (peacetime Chairman), the Chief of the General Staff and the two First Deputy Ministers of Defense, the Chief of the MPA, and the ten Deputy Ministers of Defense.²⁷ All members of the Council are either Politburo members (Brezhnev and Ustinov) or Central Committee members (the rest), indicative of the thorough interlocking nature of the party-military structure. Given its intermediate position in the party-military hierarchy, it no doubt acts as a board of review before forwarding doctrinal and strategy positions or specific weapons proposals to the Central Committee or Defense Council.

The staffing of these positions and proposals comes from the next tier in the structure, the General Staff headed by Marshal Ogarkov. A highly centralized and powerful organization, it has operational authority over the Soviet armed forces, unlike the US Joint Staff which is prohibited by law from exercising such power. In the field of military doctrine it plays a key role, especially in the formulation of the military-technical side of doctrine. The General Staff has a number of important staffs or institutions whose principal functions are devoted to military theory, military science, military strategy, and the connection of all of these to new technological developments. These include the Military Science Administration,

the Academy of the General Staff, and such other specialized quasi "think tanks" as the Frunze Military Academy. Officers from these institutions have been among the contributors to such famous and revealing works as *Military Strategy*, *The Offensive*, and *Tactics*. They also frequently coauthor works with political officers from the MPA's Lenin Military-Political Academy.

The General Staff's Military Science Administration also is the sponsoring agency of *Voyennaya Mysl'*, a monthly journal specializing in military science topics for consideration by the officer corps. Beginning in 1960, it carried the so-called "Special Collection of Articles," a top-secret discussion in the late 1950s devoted to the problems of future war and the articulation of the new Soviet military doctrine.²⁸ It must be recalled, however, that all these military publishing ventures are under party control through the agency of the MPA. Whatever is carried in *Voyennaya Mysl'*, other military journals, or in published books like Sokolovskiy's *Military Strategy* must be assumed to have the party's imprimatur.

Still, the General Staff and its organs exercise a powerful voice in military affairs. A number of observers with access to Soviet negotiating processes have pointed to the virtual monopoly of the General Staff in the preparation of SALT positions for presentation by Soviet negotiators.²⁹ According to these sources Foreign Ministry personnel are restricted to representational and negotiation duties only, with no meaningful part in the formulation or modification of positions. SALT staff work is the domain of the General Staff. In a very real sense, arms control in the Soviet Union is a party-blessed military prerogative. On the other hand, it is necessary to be mindful of the party-military fusion. Not only are General Staff officers party members, frequently with important party positions, but most General Staff slots are "nomenklatura" slots, appointments which are controlled by the Central Committee.³⁰ Can such an arrangement produce a truly independent military identification?

While there are other institutional participants in the formulation of military doctrine, the most critical players have been identified and briefly discussed. One set of peripheral actors merits mention, if only because of increasing Western attention to their presence. These are the research institutes, such as Arbatov's Institute of the USA and Canada (IUSAC), affiliated with nonmilitary organs like the USSR Academy of Sciences. In spite of periodic pronouncements on military related subjects issuing from their spokesmen, these institutes have no real say in Soviet military affairs. Their military sections deal with *foreign* military developments and arms control, not Soviet military matters. As seen in the case of the Foreign Ministry, the Soviet General Staff views

arms control as its exclusive domain. Prominent members of these institutes are especially adept at vigorous representation of Soviet views on arms control and SALT to Western audiences. Their principal purposes here are propaganda and disinformation aimed at influencing Western decisions. Useful insights into true Soviet military thinking and programs are not part of their message.

"National Security" Elites

It must be recognized that Soviet military doctrine is not the product of an unconstrained military elite chafing at party restraint or control. Nor are doctrine and resultant military programs the consequence of mindless bureaucratic momentum or the pursuit of technology for its own sake. Soviet military doctrine and military force structure derive from a fairly rational institutional process, initiated and controlled by the party, in the pursuit of articulated political objectives.

Politics, the party presence and party control, overlay the whole military thought process. Party reins on military literature are facts of life too frequently ignored by Western observers. It is difficult to imagine frequent or consistent presentation of independent military views in the military press given party control of that press and redundant censorship mechanisms. The latter may be crude and unimaginative but ultimately they work.

More important is the nature of the Soviet "national security" elite. The party, military, industrial, and security organs are not simply competing institutions fused together through party punitive measures. Pluralistic politics are characteristic of Western societies, but not the Soviet Union. The above elements of the Soviet power structure may classify as institutions but their identities are shaded by a fusion which leaves uncertain boundaries. A commonality of interests centered on party political concerns characterizes these elites. The thrust of the whole process of military doctrine and the structure for its formulation and implementation reinforce the continued existence of these elites and the pursuit of their goals. The general welfare of Soviet society is not their principal objective. They are concerned with perpetuating their exclusive position at society's expense and with producing what they view as politically useful military power.

Endnotes

1. For instance, the US Government recently declassified a number of issues which it held of the restricted Soviet General Staff journal *Voyennaya Mysl'*, [Military Thought] for the 1960s and early 1970s. In addition, the US Air Force has made available to the general public a number of important Soviet military works translated and published by the Air Force under its "Soviet Military Thought" series. Finally, the *Sovetskaia Voyennaia Entsiklopediia* [Soviet Military Encyclopedia] began appearing in 1976 adding still another source on Soviet military affairs.
2. Lieutenant General G. Semenov and Major General V. Prokhorov, "Scientific-Technical Progress and Some Questions of Strategy," *Voyennaya Mysl'*, no. 2 (1966), FDP 0060/69, p. 23. Hereafter cited as VM.
3. M. A. Suslov, *Pravda*, 23 April 1975.
4. Marshal A.A. Grechko, "The Leading Role of the CPSU in Building the Army of a Developed Socialist Society," *Voprosy Istorii KPSS*, no. 5 (May 1974), pp. 30-47; General A.A. Yepishev, "The Historic Mission of the Army of the Socialist State," *Kommunist*, (May, 1972), p. 62.
5. Major General Ye. Nikitin and Colonel S. Baranov, "The Revolution in Military Affairs and Measures of the CPSU for Raising the Combat Might of the Armed Forces," VM, no. 6 (1968), FPD 0005/69, pp. 1-14.
6. General A. A. Yepishev, "Voyennaya Politika KPSS," *Sovetskaia Voyennaia Entsiklopediia*, vol. 2, p. 191. Hereafter cited as SVE.
7. Major General V. Zemskov, "Ideological and Theoretical Bases of Soviet Military Doctrine," VM, no. 1 (1972), FPP 0054/73, p. 43.
8. Marshal A.A. Grechko, *Vooruzhennyye Sily Sovetskogo Gosudarstva*, 2d ed. (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1975), pp. 340-341.
9. Major General S. N. Kozlov, *The Officer's Handbook* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1971), trans. US Air Force (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1977), p. 63.
10. For more details on the party, military doctrine, and force developments, see John Erickson, *The Soviet Military System: Doctrine, Technology and Style*, unpublished manuscript, 1978; and John J. Dziak, *Soviet Perceptions of Military Doctrine and Military Power: The Interaction of Theory and Practice*, manuscript (Washington DC: National Defense University, 1979).
11. Major General A. Korniyenko, "The Economic Bases of the State's Military Power," VM, no.8 (1968), FPD 0019/71, p. 3.
12. It is hard to imagine members like Kunayev making meaningful contributions to the discussion of military issues.
13. S. Maksimov, *Osnovy Sovetskogo Voenного Zakonodatelstva* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1978), pp. 50-51.
14. Ibid., p. 52; Grechko, *Vooruzhennyye Sily*, p. 64.

15. Marshal V.D. Sokolovskiy, ed., *Soviet Military Strategy*, 3d ed., edited by Harriet F. Scott (New York: Crane, Russak and Co., 1975), pp. 334-361.
16. Colonel General G. V. Sredin, "Istochnik sily i mognushchestva," *Voyenniy Vestnik* (October 1977), pp. 7-12.
17. See for instance, Harriet and William Scott, *The Armed Forces of the USSR* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1979), p. 100; Arthur J. Alexander, *Decisionmaking in Soviet Weapons Procurement*, Adelphi Paper 147-148 (London: IISS, 1978), p. 15; William T. Lee, *Military Decision Making in the USSR: An Approach to the Problem*, unpublished manuscript (1977), p.12.
18. Major General Ye. Nikitin and Colonel S. Baranov, "The Revolution in Military Affairs and Measures of the CPSU for Raising the Combat Might of the Armed Forces," *VM*, no. 6 (1968), FPD 005/69, pp. 1-13; Colonel B. Trushkin and Colonel M. Gladkov, "The Economic Foundation of the Military-Technical Policy of the Country," *VM*, no. 12 (1968), FPD 0102/69, pp. 23-38. These articles leave no doubt that the upper party levels make such policy decisions, not free-wheeling military and bureaucratic interest groups.
19. V.C. Ryabov, "Voyennoye izdatel'stvo [Military Publishing House] SVE, Vol. 2, pp. 210-211.
20. Lieutenant General A. Khmel, ed., *Education of the Soviet Soldier: Party-Political Work in the Soviet Armed Forces* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1972), p. 38.
21. See Martin Dewhurst and Robert Farrell, eds., *The Soviet Censorship* (Metuchen, NJ: The Scarecrow Press, 1973), pp. 50-75.
22. Ibid.
23. Harriet and William Scott, *The Armed Forces of the USSR* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1979), p. 268.
24. Alexander, *Decisionmaking in Soviet Weapons Procurement*, p. 21.
25. Until March 1979 this post was held by Ya. P. Ryabov, successor to Dmitry Ustinov and allegedly a member of the Defense Council. Ryabov's successor has not been announced.
26. Major General S.N. Kozlov, *Spravochnik Ofitsera* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1971), p. 127.
27. Harriet and William Scott, *The Armed Forces of the USSR* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1979), p. 99.
28. Oleg Penkovskiy, *The Penkovskiy Papers* (New York: Doubleday, 1965), p. 242.
29. John Newhouse, *Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973); Igor S. Glagolev, "The Soviet Decision-Making Process in Arms Control Negotiations," *Orbis* (Winter 1978), pp. 767-776.
30. N. A. Petrovich, ed., *Partinoye Stroitel'stvo* (Moscow: Politizdat, 1976), p. 217; A. G. Gornyy, ed., *Spravochnik po Zakonodatel'stvo Dlya Ofitserov Sovetskoy Armii i Flota* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1970) p. 184.

Chapter Two

Soviet Perceptions of the Laws of War

William P. Baxter

Soviet Military Philosophy

Most observers would accept the proposition that the content of Soviet philosophy—be it military, political, or economic—expresses in large part Soviet perceptions of that subject. It is proposed here that perceptions are expressed not only in *what* the Soviets think about a subject, but in *how* they think about it as well; that is, the philosophical structure the Soviet leadership uses to examine and resolve military problems is in itself an expression of its perception of the role of military power. Therefore, to understand Soviet perceptions of military theory and policy, it is necessary to understand not only content—what they think, but also structure—how they think. It is the purpose of this discussion to examine both of these factors as they relate to the laws of war.

Central to the structure of Soviet military philosophy is the Marxist perception that the historical process is governed by discoverable laws, in much the same way that natural processes are governed by laws of nature. According to this perception, laws are defined as "the essential, stable, or repetitious interrelations according to which the seeming chaos of observable historical phenomena or facts interact."¹ Observed facts and phenomena have a number of interrelationships, but not all are essential or repetitious. Thus, relationships that are unique to a specific event, even if critical to that event, do not qualify as laws and are therefore scientifically unimportant.

In the Soviet view, laws have a character of *necessity*; they determine a certain order, structure, and relationship of phenomena and events. Laws, as written or stated, express the *degree of man's cognition of the essence of the world process.*²

Since an observed phenomenon may comprise a number of facts, some essential and some not, the process of recognizing the essential and discarding the nonessential is a continuous one that, as understanding increases, leads to a better definition of laws. Further, new facts can enter into a phenomenon and revise relationships. For example, the development of air power and nuclear weapons are new facts in this century that have revised relationships in war. Similarly, certain essential relationships can lose significance in the process of history; for instance, the value of a massed, horse-mounted cavalry charge died before the machine guns and barbed wire of World War I. Thus, laws are not fixed; they can and do change gradually in response to reality.

Modern Soviet military philosophy operates on the supposition that war is a social phenomenon which, like other social phenomena, is governed by laws expressing its unique nature.³ Its nature is a function of three parameters: technology, ideology, and history. Technology is a physical parameter, ideology (Marxism-Leninism) is the moral parameter, and history proves the necessary or essential character of the relationships.⁴ Proper application of the laws brings military success; violation of the laws brings military failure and disaster. The laws of war, simply stated, determine the course and outcome of a war.⁵

Historical Roots of the Laws of War

Until Stalin's death in 1953, the point of departure for Soviet military thought was the thesis of "permanently operating factors."⁶ These five factors were generally advertised as Stalin's great discovery in the field of military science, and were his unchallengeable perception of the political course of the Communist Party, Soviet Union (CPSU) in military affairs.⁷

Although no longer given credence in Soviet military writings, the five permanently operating factors are historically important in expressing Stalin's perception of why the Soviet Union was victorious in World War II, and in justifying his conduct of the war. These factors, which also guided Soviet military thinking and policy in the postwar years, were enunciated as: strength of the rear, which refers to the capability to equip and supply the combat forces; moral spirit of the army, which emphasizes military and Party discipline within the ranks; quantity and quality of the divisions, which recognizes the importance of superior mass and training; arms of the army, which refers to firepower and mobility; and organizational capabilities of the military command authority, which pays homage

to Stalin's strict centralized control and authority over military operations.⁸

Post-Stalin Evolution of the Laws of War

Historically, the current laws of war are an outcome of the reexamination of military affairs effected following the death of Stalin. During this period of doctrinal change and intellectual ferment, the military role in the political sphere was under debate. In the first (1962) edition of *Military Strategy*, V.D. Sokolovskiy wrote that "in a war period, the political struggle is transferred from nonmilitary to military form."⁹ In the foreword to the second (1963) edition, the author notes that he

did not find it possible to agree with the recommendations of some viewers to exclude from the scope of military strategy the problems of directing the preparation of the country for war. Such a recommendation was motivated by the idea ... that the military preparation of the country is, as they say, a political matter.¹⁰

The third edition, published in Russian in 1968, also included discussions of "political matters," indicating that the problem had not yet been resolved. However, by 1971, when the following passage defining the Communist Party's leadership role in the armed forces appeared in *The Officer's Handbook*, a decision had apparently been made to exclude military participation in political decisionmaking:

All questions relating to the defense of the Socialist fatherland, military development, theory, and practice are, as they were in the past, resolved in strict accordance with party ideology and policy.¹¹

More to the point, the Soviet book, *The Basic Principles of Operational Art and Tactics* by Y.E. Savkin, published in 1972, contained the following passage that was probably directed at the authors of *Soviet Military Strategy*:

We believe it necessary to stress that military science does not investigate the laws of war in general, but strictly the laws of

armed conflict guided by Marxist-Leninist theory. A more expansive interpretation of the laws of military science proposed by the authors of some theoretical works may lead to an underestimation of the specific nature of war which is included in armed conflict.¹²

Savkin, although admitting that the precise enumeration of the laws of war had not been worked out, suggested the following four laws of war:

- Course and outcome of war waged with unlimited employment of all means of conflict depend primarily on the correlation of available strictly military forces of the combatants at the beginning of the war, especially in nuclear weapons and means of delivery
- Course and outcome of war depend on the correlation of the military potentials of the combatants
- Course and outcome of war depend on its political content
- Course and outcome of war depend on the correlation of moral-political and psychological capabilities of the people and armies of the combatants¹³

The evolution of the laws of war provides an interesting insight into trends in the development of the Soviet leadership's military thinking during the postwar period. Under Stalin, the outcome of war was a product of purely military factors: the skill of commanders, the quantity and quality of arms and troops, and the capability to logistically support operations. Further, these factors were based on conventional—primarily ground—forces.

By 1972, when Savkin published the approved perceptions of the laws of war, a significant change in thinking had occurred. First, a political content had been introduced: Not only morale of the army, but also morale of the civilian population was a critical factor. The political causes of war were seen as critical to its outcome—a point that Stalin largely ignored. Although Stalin's concern with existing military forces was still accepted, Savkin recognized that the military potential behind the standing forces also influences the course and outcome of war. Also, by 1972 the emphasis had shifted from conventional ground forces to nuclear forces, and especially the missile forces.

The laws of war proposed by Savkin differ significantly from Stalin's permanently operating factors, but there are identifiable threads indicating a certain degree of relationship between specific factors and laws. For instance, it appears that Stalin's third and fourth factors roughly correspond to Savkin's first law of war, which may also include Stalin's first factor. Savkin's fourth law absorbs Stalin's second factor and expands it to include the moral strength of the population as well as the army. Stalin's fifth factor concerning the command authority is probably absorbed in Savkin's second and fourth laws.

The Laws of War

By 1977 the definition of the laws of war had evolved through a process of lengthy investigation into six statements that grow out of more general laws describing the operation and function of socio-economic structures. The laws of war and their interpretation were formally published in volume 3 of the *Sovetskaia Voennaia Entsiklopediia*. Although encyclopedias are not generally accepted as primary sources in the West, they are official in the Soviet Union, and this particular issue has been officially praised for its "Partinost," a term roughly meaning that it displays the proper spirit, philosophy, activity, and attitude for a member of the CPSU.¹⁴

The six laws of war currently recognized in Soviet military philosophy and their general meaning are as follows:

1. The dependence of war on its political goals

War is a social function whose essence is determined by the political character of the involved states and social classes. Their policies define its goals, forms, and means, and thus guide the armed forces in the prosecution of war. Political goals are a cause of war.

2. The dependence of the course and outcome of war on the correlation of economic strength of the warring states (coalitions)

In the final instance, the relative military power of the warring sides is a function of their relative ability to use their economic power for the mass production of war material. The emphasis is

not on superior economic strength, but on superior ability to direct existing economic strength to military purposes.

3. *The dependence of the course and outcome of war on the correlation of the scientific potentials of the warring sides*

The level of scientific-technical development and the scale and degree of its application in the armed forces have a significant impact on the military power of a state.

4. *The dependence of the course and outcome of war on the correlation of moral-political strengths and capabilities of the warring states (coalitions)*

The character of the ideologies of the warring sides and the degree of psychological preparation of their armed forces and population for war have a major effect on relative military power.

5. *The dependence of the course and outcome of war on the correlation of military forces (potentials) of the warring sides*

Victory and defeat in war and its length and final results are defined by the relative power of the armed forces and the mobilization potential of the warring sides.

6. *Historically, the side wins that offers and uses the resulting capabilities of a new and more progressive social and economic order*

History demonstrates that, in the end, the new, progressive social and economic structure will win over the older, reactionary structure. War is not only a military struggle, it is also a political struggle.¹⁵

Several interesting and significant changes distinguish these six laws from those proposed in 1972. The first law of war on the 1972 list was dropped by 1977. Apparently the CPSU was no longer certain that the relative strength of available military forces at

the beginning of a general war would determine its outcome. The fifth law of war on correlation of military forces stresses potential as well as standing forces.

Political considerations apparently were given more weight in 1977 than in 1972, as dependence of war on political goals moved from third to first place. Additionally, the political goals of the war were emphasized rather than content. In 1977, the emphasis is upon political goals causing wars rather than on political causes predicting their outcome. Actually, Savkin's third law was split in the 1977 edition. The sixth law of war, addressing progressive social and economic orders, is actually restating the influence of political content on the outcome of war. Savkin's fourth law, addressing moral-political and psychological capabilities, is generally embodied in the fourth law of war.

The present laws of war have added economics and science to those factors that determine the course and outcome of wars; these factors were not included by Savkin.

A new factor in the 1977 laws, not apparent in previous renditions, is an emerging concern for coalitions of forces. It is no longer sufficient to compare the relative capabilities of the leading antagonists; the aggregate capabilities of all participants on both sides of a conflict must be measured.

The Significance of the Laws of War

It is certainly valid at this point to question the practical value of the laws of war. Do they, in fact, state universal truths? If so, are these truths expressed in a manner that guides actions and decisions in a practical way? Finally, do Soviet leaders really believe that these laws are essential and necessary? The first step in answering these questions is to understand how the laws of war are formulated. Interestingly, the investigation of the laws of war is, in the Soviet perception, a province of the physical and social sciences. Because they encompass all of society, the laws of war are neither purely nor even primarily of military concern.¹⁶ Indeed, the highest Soviet military educational institution, the Academy of the General Staff, does not include the laws of war in the discussion of its functions.¹⁷ Investigation of the laws of war is a function of the various institutes of the Academy of Sciences of the Soviet Union.¹⁸ In the Soviet view, the laws of war are a province of the political leadership, not the military leadership. Why examination and discussion of the laws of war might be reserved to the political leadership is apparent in the content of the laws. They essentially

address the economic, political, and social factors that Soviet leaders believe will govern the course and outcome of future wars, areas that are extremely sensitive for political leaders. Each reader can judge the validity and usefulness of the laws. The critical factor, however, is how they are viewed and used by Soviet leaders. If they believe them to be accurate, and act accordingly, the laws of war can assume the nature of a self-fulfilling prophecy. If they are believed, the laws of war should be reflected in some form by Soviet actions. In fact, Soviet writings state this to be the case. General of the Army I. E. Shavrov asserts that:

The impact of the laws of war is concentrated upon Soviet military doctrine which guides the development of strategy, operational art, and tactics.¹⁹

In this sense, the laws of war express the political philosophy of the CPSU in the military sphere, and their application appears in military doctrine.

In a second sense, the laws of war serve as a blueprint for evaluating relative world power in conflict situations. When Soviet leaders assert that the "world correlation of forces" is shifting in their favor, the quantitative and qualitative factors used to calculate relative strengths are probably those outlined in the laws of war. In fact, four of the six laws of war include the term "correlation" in their statement.

In a third sense, the laws of war are predictions of the future. They neither explain the outcome of past wars nor justify the present. They define the factors that will determine the outcome of future wars. In this sense, they meet the two tests of law: *necessity* and *essentiality*. Or, in reverse logic, if they did not predict the future, they could not be laws.

For those of us raised in pluralistic Western societies, it is difficult to define a need for or to attach great significance to general statements of national policy in military affairs such as the Soviet laws of war. In the United States, where diversity is a virtue, it is nearly impossible to establish and enforce a single official government line.

It is naive in the extreme, however, to transfer this perception to the Soviet Union. In a closed society run by a single, centrally directed and controlled party that is the guardian of the only true political and social philosophy, orthodoxy in thinking and unity in action are both desirable and critical. As Peter Vigor has noted, it is necessary for the CPSU, in combating heresy and dissent, to define the correct Party attitude toward everything, to publish those

definitions, and to make them readily available.²⁰ In military affairs, the laws of war are the correct Party attitude. These laws have slowly evolved through an arduous process spanning more than two decades, and future evolution can be expected.

While providing a philosophical framework for developing military policy, the laws of war obviously need much elaboration and definition to govern practical activity. Their elaboration into a definite state view on military questions is the function of military doctrine.

By controlling the formulation of the laws of war, the Soviet leadership has a systematic means of integrating military power into Soviet foreign and domestic policy. At the same time, the right-thinking and orthodoxy of the professional military establishment, the *kadre*, are assured by placing authority for formulation of military theory in the hands of the national leadership. By controlling the formulation and examination of the laws of war, the political leadership of the Soviet Union directs the development of military theory to fit its perceptions of the world.

Endnotes

1. Y.E. Savkin, *The Basic Principles of Operational Art and Tactics* (Moscow: Ministry of Defense Publishing House, 1972), p. 51. Translated and published under the auspices of the US Air Force.

2. V.I. Lenin, *Polnoe Sobranie Sochinenii* 29 (Moscow: Political Literature Publishing House, 1970), p. 135.

3. Savkin, *Basic Principles*, p. 56.

4. *Sovetskaia Voennaia Entsiklopediia* 3 (Moscow: Minister of Defense Publishing House, 1968), p. 493.

5. *Ibid.* p. 375.

6. Sidorov and Lialikov, eds., *O Sovetskoi Voennoi Nauke* (Moscow: Ministry of Defense Publishing House, 1954), p. 55.

7. Roy A. Medvedev, *Let History Judge* (New York: Roy A. Knopf, 1972), p. 512.

8. Sidorov and Lialikov, *O Sovetskoi Voennoi Nauke*, p. 54.

9. V.D. Sokolovskiy, *Soviet Military Strategy*, ed. Harriet F. Scott (New York: Crane Russak & Co., Inc., 1975), p. 19.

10. *Ibid.*, p. xvii.

11. General Major S.N. Kozlov, ed., *The Officers Handbook* (Moscow 1971), p. 15
Published under auspices of the US Air Force
12. Savkin, *Basic Principles*, p. 56
13. Ibid., pp. 89-92
14. Professor Marshal of Armored Forces, O. Losik, "K Vykhotu 6-ogo Toma Sovetskoi Voennoi Entsiklopedii," *Voenno-Istroicheskii Zhurnal*, 2 February 1979, p. 88
15. *Sovetskaia Voennaia Entsiklopediia* 3, pp. 375-378
16. Savkin, *Basic Principles*, p. 56
17. General of the Army V.C. Kulikov, ed., *Akademiia General'nogo Shtaba* (Moscow: Ministry of Defense Publishing House, 1976), p. 5
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Chapter Three

Origins of the Cold War: The Soviet View

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The Cold War, a presumably mortal antagonism, between the United States and the Soviet Union (with various allies on both sides) dominated international affairs from the mid 1940s to at least the 1960s—many, including this observer, maintain that the conflict continues, albeit at a lower level of intensity. This confrontation (with historical overtones) developed immediately after the defeat of Nazi Germany from disagreements over postwar political settlements in Eastern Europe. As a result, the European continent was divided into American and Russian spheres of influence. With the lines firmly drawn in Europe, the two nations competed for influence in other parts of the world—the Middle East, Latin America, Asia, Africa. As a direct consequence of this struggle, the United States fought two very costly wars in Asia. An unchecked arms race between the two rivals culminated in the stockpiling of vast numbers of nuclear weapons and attendant delivery systems. In recent years, with the recognition that communism is in no sense monolithic and a cautious detente between the rivals, much controversy has ensued in the United States about who and what were responsible for the events that brought about the Cold War. My purpose herein is to explore another dimension—the Soviet view.

The orthodox and official American interpretation has attributed the Cold War to the aggressive policies of the Soviet Union in attempting to spread communism beyond its borders in the hope of achieving a "World Revolution" that would cause the final demise of capitalism. This view holds that the Soviets ended the Grand Alliance of World War II and initiated the Cold War by disregarding the various wartime agreements and placing an "Iron Curtain" over Eastern Europe. Thus, when the Soviets began "irresponsibly"

exercising their veto power in the United Nations Security Council and pressuring Greece and Turkey, the United States was forced to respond with the general policy known as "containment." This policy has, of course, been operative in US foreign policy decisions up to the current period—at present US foreign policy appears to be shifting toward a modern-day application of Metternich's "balance of power" theories.

Over the past decade, a loosely defined group of scholars has developed what has been termed the "revisionist" interpretation of the causes of the Cold War. The revisionists hold that both sides are responsible for the Cold War, but that the United States is the primary culprit. They write that the United States erred in several ways, causing the Soviets to view American policy with suspicion and fear. (The delay in the Second Front is often mentioned as one key example). President Truman is regarded as having abruptly abandoned President Roosevelt's efforts at accommodation with the Russians, embarking instead upon a policy which, from the Soviet point of view, appeared offensive. Enjoying sole possession of the atomic bomb, and having superior air and naval power, the United States dominated the Pacific, Western Europe, and Latin America and sought to extend its influence in Eastern Europe. American policy included the abrupt curtailing of lend-lease to the Soviet Union, refusing to grant a postwar reconstruction loan requested by the Soviets, and in the opinion of some revisionists, using the atomic bomb as a means of intimidating the Russians. The "containment" policy, according to this view, was provocative, forcing the Soviets to take countermeasures to protect their interests in Eastern Europe.

Although there are elements of irrefutable fact on both sides of the argument, it is suggested that both sides suffer from a lack of perception of the Soviet viewpoint. The orthodox view attempts to define what was and was not *responsible* in Soviet behavior—most assuredly the Soviet Government perceived its policies to be responsible and in its interests. The revisionist view is even more arrogant. In essence, it holds that the Cold War could have been avoided if the United States had pursued different policies toward the Soviet Union. This implies that Soviet foreign policy was essentially a reaction to US policy and that Soviet leaders had no world view. Further, it essentially eliminates the role of ideology in Soviet thinking. The first two points will be dealt with at length in the course of this chapter. The final point, ideology, can, perhaps, best be dealt with at this stage.

The role of ideology in Soviet behavior has been hotly debated in American intellectual circles for many years. There is certainly no consensus. The basic question is, are the Soviets still bent on

"World Revolution" and the overthrow of capitalism? To me that seems to be the wrong question. I doubt that Lenin, Stalin (as I hope to show), and their successors would be hell-bent on a final conflagration between communism and capitalism if it would imperil the survival of the Soviet Union. Of course they wouldn't. But did Stalin and his successors believe that their interpretation of history is correct and that socialism—finally communism—is the last best hope for mankind? Of course they did, and do; to view it in any other way is patently absurd. It is roughly comparable to wondering if the Pope "believes" in Catholicism or hoping that Arabs in Palestine will, somehow, be converted to Judaism.

I would hazard the proposition that the Soviet Bolsheviks have always believed (or hoped) that the long run of history is on their side. Perhaps it is. It is much too soon to tell. At any rate, the alternative idea that their system will somehow *reform* or converge with ours seems to me bizarre. The Soviets have always believed that their system is ethically, morally, and practically correct and that ours is wrong in the same terms. It is in this sense that one should approach the Cold War from the Soviets' point of view.

My view is that Soviet perceptions and actions leading to the Cold War were shaped by a variety of factors. They include: Stalin's personality, character, and world view; Soviet experiences during the period between World Wars I and II; Soviet perceptions of their vital interests during World War II; and Marxist-Leninist ideology that impinged on the foregoing.

In Search of Stalin

This chapter could well be entitled "Origins of the Cold War—Stalin's View." During the period leading to the Cold War, Stalin's view was the Soviet view. Stalin was virtually immune to the pressures of legislative bodies, public opinion, and even the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). As Khrushchev later stated: "Stalin had never gone out of his way to take other people's advice into account.... The rest of us were just errand boys, and Stalin would snarl threateningly at anyone who overstepped the mark."¹

The period of Stalin's rule in the Soviet Union has been characterized as the "Third Russian Revolution." Its effect on the Russian people and the entire world was much greater than the preceding revolutions of 1917. It resulted in Russia's rapid industrialization and emergence as a major world power in the twentieth century. It prepared the Soviet Union to withstand and

defeat Hitler's legions. It drove perhaps a hundred million peasants to abandon their small farms and join collectives. It forced primitive people to learn the intricacies of a modern tractor or industrial machine. It made millions of illiterates learn to read and write. The achievements of this period, by any rational standard, were impressive. Yet, the costs in terms of human lives and suffering are almost beyond comprehension. (Millions of people died or were murdered, including tens of thousands of presumably loyal Bolshevik veterans of the revolution and civil war). The enormity and complexity of that upheaval are perhaps without parallel in recorded history. The violent reforms of Peter and Ivan are dwarfed in comparison with this period. In this unprecedented historical drama, the central character was of course Stalin who directed or concurred in the excesses. What he did is so well known that it requires no further recitation. The essential questions revolve around his motivation and personality.

A small library could be filled with volumes about Stalin and Stalinism, yet there is no agreement among scholars on the relative significance of various factors influencing Stalin's major decisions. In a notable work, Daniel Bell outlined *ten* major theories that attempt to explain Stalin and Stalinism.² Each of the theories is mutually exclusive and this is reflected in the leading works on the subject. I submit that politics and human beings are too complex to possibly conform to unidimensional theories. For my part, I will attempt to make a brief synthesis.

First, Stalin was a devoted Communist and fully "believed" in the tenets of Marxism-Leninism—a person did not join the hunted bands of revolutionaries in czarist Russia for the salary and fringe benefits. Second, at some point in Stalin's career, he developed a taste for power and began to seek power for its own sake. Further, he almost invariably pursued what he perceived to be the vital interests of the Soviet Union when forced to choose between them and the demands of International Communism. If Stalin ever felt compelled to justify his actions to himself, he probably rationalized that whatever he did, including mass murder, was in the best interest of communism or the Soviet Union, or both. In other words, in a sense, he came to believe that *he* was communism and the Soviet Union. Traits of this type have been common to despotic rulers throughout history.

Another facet of Stalin's personality and outlook requires separate attention since it is central to any serious discussion of the origins of the Cold War. There is a large body of evidence indicating that Stalin suffered from a progressive form of paranoia. A recent book by the Soviet Marxist philosopher Roy Medvedev states:

It is not difficult to detect pathological elements in his behavior. Morbid suspiciousness, noticeable throughout his life and especially intense in his last years, intolerance of criticism, grudge-bearing, an overestimation of himself bordering on megalomania, cruelty approaching sadism—all these traits, it would seem, demonstrate that Stalin was a typical paranoic.³

During his famous "Secret Speech" of 1956, Khrushchev made a point that, in my view, almost demolishes the revisionist view of the origins of the Cold War:

You see to what Stalin's mania for greatness led. He had completely lost consciousness of reality; he demonstrated his suspicion and haughtiness not only in relation to individuals in the USSR, but in relation to whole parties and nations.⁴

It would appear that given Stalin's paranoia and absolute power even the most altruistic US policies would not have significantly influenced Stalin. For this reason alone, the Cold War was perhaps unavoidable.

Soviet Perceptions of Western Hostility 1917-41

Aside from Stalin's personality and the tenets of Marxism-Leninism, Soviet mistrust of the West was and is rooted in hard practical experience. At the end of World War I more than a dozen nations, including the United States, sent troops into the Soviet Union in a vain effort to "strangle the Bolshevik baby at birth." The desperate nature of the struggle and the narrow margin by which victory was won left a distinct imprint on the Soviet mind: the capitalists had once tried to throttle the Soviet Union and might well do so again, given a suitable opportunity. Subsequently, various Western governments spent years trying to collect uncollectible debts, regain nationalized property, and humble the revolutionaries. Churchill, during this period, frequently urged his government to take vigorous measures against the Soviet Union. The United States withheld diplomatic recognition until 1934. Hitler made his intentions toward the Soviet Union perfectly clear even before he gained power in Germany. This hard evidence of Western hostility was no doubt a factor behind this amazingly prophetic formulation by Stalin in 1931:

One feature of the history of old Russia was the continual beatings she suffered because of her backwardness.... We are fifty or a hundred years behind the advanced countries. We must make good this distance in ten years. Either we do it, or we shall be crushed.⁵

The circumstances surrounding the Munich understandings of 1938 are complex and the polemics continue to this day. However, for our purposes here, one uncontested fact is significant. The Soviets had a treaty with Czechoslovakia providing that the Soviet Union was obliged to come to Czechoslovakia's assistance *only* if France did the same. The French, of course, were unwilling to do so for various reasons, many having nothing to do with the Soviet Union. The Soviet view is instructive. It reveals a deep seated Soviet suspicion that the Western powers wished to deflect Hitler toward the Soviet Union. Witness this speech by Stalin after Munich:

Britain and France have rejected the policy of collective security, the policy of collective resistance to aggressors, and have taken up a position of nonintervention.... The policy of nonintervention reveals an eagerness, a desire, not to hinder the aggressors in their nefarious work: not to hinder Japan, say, from embroiling herself in a war with China, or better still, with the Soviet Union; not to hinder Germany, say, from enmeshing herself in European affairs, from embroiling herself in a war with the Soviet Union; to allow all the belligerents to sink deeply into the mire of war; to allow them to weaken and exhaust one another; and then, when they have become weak enough, to appear on the scene with fresh strength, to appear, of course, in the interests of peace, and to dictate conditions to the enfeebled belligerents.⁶

The Hitler-Stalin pact of 1939 arose from the same fear on the part of the Soviets—fear of having to fight Hitler alone. By most accounts, Stalin was willing to guarantee Polish security in concert with Great Britain and France *if* they in turn would guarantee Soviet security. The Western powers were unwilling—primarily, I think, owing to Polish objections to Soviet troops on Polish soil. The Soviets then turned to serious negotiations with Germany. I doubt that their purpose was to make a lasting peace with Hitler or to communize this or that nation. Instead, it was a practical attempt to gain time and space before entering the inevitable conflict with Germany. Molotov dissembled a bit when he explained the pact, but the general thrust is clear:

The decision to conclude a nonaggression pact between the

USSR and Germany was adopted after military negotiations with France and Great Britain had reached an impasse owing to the insuperable differences I have mentioned. As the negotiations had shown that the conclusion of a pact of mutual assistance could not be expected, we could not but explore other possibilities of ensuring peace and eliminating the danger of war between Germany and the USSR. If the British and French Governments refused to reckon with this, that is their affair. It is our duty to think of the interests of the Soviet people, the interests of the USSR.⁷

The Grand Alliance 1941-45

The German-Soviet honeymoon ended abruptly in June 1941, when German panzers invaded the Soviet Union on a vast scale. Help from the West was immediately promised and soon forthcoming—but the relationship from the beginning was uneasy. On the very day of the invasion, Churchill broadcast promises of help and praise for brave Russian soldiers "guarding the fields which their fathers have tilled from time immemorial." But in the same broadcast he said: "No one has been a more consistent opponent of communism than I have for the last twenty-five years. I will unsay no word that I have spoken about it."⁸ I would assume that Stalin, et al., interpreted this as clearly delineating between the Soviet Government and the Russian people.

In the United States, there was a mixed response. Two days after the German attack on the Soviet Union, President Roosevelt announced that the United States would send all possible material aid to Russia, subject to the prior needs of Great Britain. Fair enough from the Soviet point of view, but Senator Harry S. Truman said, at the same time, "if we see that Germany is winning the war we ought to help Russia, and if Russia is winning we ought to help Germany, and in that way let them kill as many as possible." Further, Senator Robert A. Taft declared: "A victory for communism would be far more dangerous to the United States than a victory for fascism."⁹ My purpose here is not to debate the merits of these views—indeed a fine case can be made for them from the American point of view—but what was their probable effect on the Soviet leadership?

To digress slightly, it is instructive to note the confused and frightened behavior of the Soviet leadership at the onset of the German invasion. When the German Ambassador to the Soviet Union read the German declaration of war to a stunned Molotov, the tough old Bolshevik listened in silence and then commented: "It is war. Your aircraft have just bombarded some ten open villages. Do you believe we deserved that?"¹⁰

Khrushchev informs us that Stalin was so pessimistic after the first disasters at the front that he thought the end had come. Stalin at one point said: "All that which Lenin created we have lost forever." He then absented himself from the direction of military actions for several days.¹¹ Other reports have it that Stalin simply drank himself into a stupor and remained that way for a considerable time.¹² The behavior of Stalin and other senior Soviet officials during this period reveals more than character defects and the fact that the Germans surprised them. It reveals a negative, pessimistic, and defensive world view. I believe this attitude derived from historical experience and a feeling of *weakness* when the Soviet Union was compared with other major powers. This perception is significant because it appears to have been one of the operative factors in Soviet foreign policy even after World War II. To put it another way, I doubt that the Soviets ever thought of the Soviet Union as the powerful military colossus that was perceived in the West. From the Soviet point of view, at least until the very recent past, foreign policy has been mostly a question of survival.

This feeling of weakness and defensiveness manifested itself in many ways—large and small—throughout World War II. For example, the Soviets were always reluctant to have American and British military organizations or large numbers of foreign military personnel on Soviet territory or behind their lines. In one case during 1942, Roosevelt offered to send American air units with pilots and crews to fight in the Soviet Union under overall Soviet command. Stalin's reply was: "I should be most grateful if you would expedite the dispatch of aircraft, especially fighters, but without crews, whom you now need badly for use in the areas mentioned.... A feature of the Soviet Air Force is that we have more than enough pilots but suffer from a shortage of machines."¹³ There were many other examples, including the difficulty in arranging for facilities in the Soviet Union to transfer lend-lease supplies and the reluctance of the Soviets to allow Soviet bases to be used for shuttle bombing. There are, no doubt, several reasons for this behavior, including habitual secretiveness and distrust of foreigners; yet I think a major one was that the Soviets did not want Westerners to see the weaknesses inherent in the Soviet political and military system.

The Second Front Issue. In retrospect it is clear that, from the Soviet point of view, the postponement of the Normandy invasion until 1944 was an obvious manifestation of British and American hostility. The Soviets felt that it was a policy designed to let the Germans and Russians bleed each other to death or at best a reluctance on the part of the Americans and British to do their share of the fighting and dying. As to the first notion, recall that this

suspicion had been operative in Soviet thinking well prior to the German invasion in 1941. The British and French diplomatic maneuvers after Munich and various statements by Western political leaders (such as the ones mentioned previously) would certainly support this line of reasoning by the Soviets.

There has been a great deal of argumentation about how firm American and British "promises" were concerning a Second Front in 1942 and 1943. However, one thing is clear; there *were* discussions, correspondence, and tentative plans for an invasion of France, first in 1942, then in 1943, and finally in 1944. The real point is, the Soviets felt they desperately needed the Second Front and that they were entitled to it long before 1944. When Stalin received a communication from Churchill in June 1943 announcing there would be no invasion of France until the Spring of 1944, he was enraged. He replied:

You say you quite understand my disappointment. I must tell you that the point here is not just the disappointment of the Soviet Government, but the preservation of its confidence in its allies, a confidence which is being subjected to severe stress. One should not forget that it is a question of saving millions of lives in the occupied areas of Western Europe and Russia and of reducing the enormous sacrifices of the Soviet armies, compared with which the sacrifices of the Anglo-American armies are insignificant.¹⁴

A few months later at Tehran, this pithy exchange followed an inconclusive discussion between Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin concerning the date of the proposed invasion of France:

Churchill: As for determining the date of Operation Overlord, if it is decided to have an examination of strategic questions in the military committee—(Stalin interrupts)

Stalin: We are not demanding any examination.

Roosevelt: We are all aware that the contradictions between us and the British are small. I object to the postponement of Operation Overlord, while Churchill lays emphasis on the importance of operations in the Mediterranean. The military committee should clear up these questions.

Stalin: We can solve these problems ourselves, because we have more rights than the military committees. If I may permit myself an incautious question, I should like to know whether the British believe in Operation Overlord or simply speak of it to reassure the Russians.

Churchill: Given the conditions which were indicated at the

Moscow Conference, I am quite sure that we shall have to transfer all our available forces against the Germans when Operation Overlord is launched.¹⁵

There were numerous other verbal clashes and acrimonious letters passed back and forth over this question.

At this point, it is perhaps useful to put the Second Front question into some sort of rough perspective from the Soviet point of view. If a successful invasion of France had been completed in 1942, the war probably would have been shortened. Further, it seems reasonable to assume that there would have been fewer Russian and more American and British casualties. That said, I still disagree with the revisionist notion that a Second Front in 1942 or 1943 would have gone a long way toward preventing the Cold War. Given Stalin's world view and personality, I doubt that it would have made much difference in the long run. Khrushchev, who was certainly less rigid in his thinking than Stalin, tends to confirm my thoughts in his book. Being charitable in this instance, Khrushchev allowed that one reason for the delay in the Second Front might have been lack of preparation for a landing, equipment shortages, and so forth. Then, he states that the other reason was "a desire to bleed us dry." He goes on to analyze the motives of both sides:

To look at it from a class position, it was in the Allies' interest to rely on the Soviet Union as a wartime ally, despite the fact that our country was founded on Socialist principles.... But while exerting our collective efforts against the common enemy, each of us remained on his own class position.... England and America, from their class positions, knew that they had to help us to an extent, but they still wanted the Soviet Union to be considerably weaker after the war so that they could dictate their will to us.... For our part, we knew it would be useful to become considerably stronger at the end of the war in order for our voice to carry more weight in the settlement of international questions.¹⁶

If I understand the foregoing correctly, Khrushchev was not, in retrospect, incensed over the delay in the Second Front. In his view, it was simply another manifestation of the ongoing class conflict. If my view is a reasonably accurate interpretation of Soviet perceptions, then a Second Front in, say, 1942 would not have altered the equation, because the above formulation could be applied by the Soviets to most or all of the serious disagreements during and after World War II. In Khrushchev's formulation, then, we see a clear delineation of competing vital interests, albeit couched in ideological terms.

The Italian Surrender—1943. In Stalin's opinion, this was yet another example of British and American perfidy. Excluding the Soviet Union from the negotiations concerning the Italian surrender incensed Stalin—would the United States and Great Britain conduct separate negotiations with German leaders given the appropriate opportunity? Stalin cabled the following to Roosevelt and Churchill:

I have received your message on the negotiations with the Italians and on the new armistice terms for Italy. Thank you for the information.... It should be said that the Soviet Government has not been kept informed of the Anglo-American negotiations with Italians.... I think the time is ripe for us to set up a military-political commission for consideration of problems related to negotiations with various Governments falling away from Germany.... To date it has been like this: The U.S.A and Britain reach agreement between themselves while the U.S.S.R. is informed of the agreements between the two powers as a third party looking passively on. I must say that this situation cannot be tolerated any longer. I propose setting up the commission and making Sicily its seat for the time being.¹⁷

The foregoing was followed by a lively exchange of cables. Roosevelt asked if the Russians could not simply send a representative to Eisenhower's headquarters. Stalin replied brusquely that this would "by no means" substitute for the military-political commission which was needed to direct the negotiations with Italy. He added that much time had passed with little being done. Finally, agreement was reached. However, the commission was located in Algiers and did not have plenary power. Roosevelt insisted that it operate under the Allied Commander in Chief (Eisenhower). The net result was that the commission accomplished little and the Soviets were effectively excluded from a meaningful role in the Italian surrender.¹⁸

Perhaps one could agree that a different approach toward the Italian settlement might have influenced Stalin to pursue different policies in Eastern Europe. I agree that a precedent was established; that is, whoever occupies the territory or nation controls it after hostilities cease. Yet, I doubt that it would have made much difference. There were too many other factors at work. At any rate, as will be shown, Stalin had a good perception of what he wanted in Eastern Europe. He did not need precedents, except perhaps as diplomatic tools.

The Problems in Eastern Europe

Soviet actions in Eastern Europe, culminating in Soviet domination of most of the area, are generally considered (in the West) to be perhaps the primary triggering factors in the initiation of the Cold War. The disagreements between the Soviet Union and the West turned into a political, military, and intellectual football game that has been waged for decades. Western political leaders hurled charges at the Soviet Union, such as "bad faith," "broken agreements," and "World Communism"; the Soviets reciprocated in kind.

Although this chapter is not focused on American foreign policy, a few points in passing seem relevant. American policy, theoretically, at least, was committed to a doctrine of universalism and self-determination. Stalin, on the other hand, thought *only* in terms of spheres of influence, albeit he made an occasional bow in the direction of universalism to please his wartime allies. Herein, I believe, lies the root cause of the donnybrook over Eastern Europe. Further, it appears that Stalin made his intentions and objectives perfectly clear, or at least obvious. I find it impossible to believe that Roosevelt and his advisors were not aware of Stalin's intentions well before the end of World War II. It also appears that Roosevelt intended to deal with Stalin in terms of spheres of interest—some limited evidence will be presented. I would hazard a guess that Roosevelt could not openly acknowledge this because of domestic political considerations—for many years there had been a strong anti-Communist current in the United States.

Soviet War Aims. To return to the other camp, a few generalizations about Soviet foreign policy are appropriate at this point. As far as Europe was concerned Stalin probably had three broad objectives. They were (1) to destroy Hitler's regime and neutralize Germany as a military threat; (2) to secure Soviet borders in Europe through a system of buffer states; and (3) to spread communism when and where feasible, that is, safe to do so. The first objective needs no discussion at this point, since the other allies shared in it—at least in broad terms. The second was the key objective. Above all else, the Soviets were determined to protect their western frontiers. This was not, of itself, a Bolshevik notion. The history of Russia is really a dark and bloody story of invasions across western borders lacking strong natural obstacles. The third objective, the spread of communism, was not essential in the short-run. However, communization of Eastern Europe was necessary to secure the vital second objective. I think one of the major tragedies

of the Cold War is that Truman did not understand this or felt constrained to act as if he did not.

The first indication of Soviet war aims came at the end of 1941 (the timing is interesting because one would not have imagined that Stalin had the time or inclination to work out *postwar* aims during those desperate days when the survival of the Soviet Union was in doubt). At any rate, Stalin revealed his objectives when he offered Churchill a postwar sphere of influence arrangement. The Soviet Union was to absorb Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, part of Finland, eastern Poland, and Bessarabia. Poland would be compensated by receiving East Prussia. In return, the Soviet Union would support any British requirements for bases or security arrangements in Western Europe.¹⁹ There was nothing particularly "communist" about these suggestions; they could have been propounded by one of the czars as well. The proposal was not accepted, but Churchill—and by extension, Roosevelt—was alerted about what to expect.

A similar and enlightening conversation was held between Roosevelt and Stalin at Tehran. Roosevelt mentioned there were six to seven million Americans of Polish extraction and he did not wish to lose their votes. Yet, he went on to state, he personally thought that both Polish borders should be moved to the west. Roosevelt continued, saying that for the sake of public opinion in the United States there should be a referendum in the Baltic States. He jokingly added that when the Soviet armies reoccupied these areas, he did not intend to go to war with the Soviet Union on this point. Stalin replied that the three Baltic Republics had no autonomy under the last czar who was an ally of Great Britain and the United States, and since the question of public opinion was not raised then, he did not quite see why it was being raised now. Roosevelt replied that the truth of the matter was the (US) public neither knew nor understood.²⁰

Stalin and Churchill Divide Europe. It appears that a key element in future Soviet policy lay in the so-called gentlemen's agreement between Churchill and Stalin in 1944 on the division of spheres of influence in Eastern Europe (Roosevelt reluctantly concurred later). According to Churchill the agreement was temporary, to last until a post-war peace settlement—it was not even written in detail nor signed. Churchill simply "wrote out on a half-sheet of paper":²¹

Rumania	
Russia	90%
The others	10%

Greece	
Great Britain (in accord with U.S.A.)	90%
Russia	10%
Yugoslavia	50-50%
Hungary	50-50%
Bulgaria	
Russia	75%
The others	25%

Even by US and British accounts, Stalin initially adhered strictly to this agreement. Most notably, he denied help to the Greek Communists and did not utter a word of protest when they were being subdued by the British Army. Also, it was several years before he ejected non-Communists from the East European governments.

At the same conference, the question of the postwar Polish Government was discussed. There was no agreement reached, but Stalin stressed that the Soviet supported Lublin Committee (Communist-dominated) would have to have the preponderance of power as opposed to the British and American-supported emigre government in London. Churchill later wrote Roosevelt:

Stalin at first replied that he would be content with fifty-fifty (in Poland), but rapidly corrected himself to a worse figure. Meanwhile, Eden took the same line with Molotov, who seemed more comprehending. I do not think the composition of the government will prove an insuperable obstacle if all else is settled.... We also discussed informally the future partition of Germany. U.J. [Uncle Joe] wants Poland, Czeche, and Hungary to form a realm of independent, anti-Nazi, pro-Russian states, the first two of which might join together.²²

The foregoing is yet another signal of Soviet intentions toward Eastern Europe.

Yalta and the Polish Question. The varying interpretations of the agreements concerning Poland are at the very heart of the origins of the Cold War. Accordingly, it is useful to look at some of the key points contained in the agreements. Fortunately for the researcher this is not difficult since the Soviet and American versions of the signed agreements are identical.

In perusing the communique signed by all parties, one word appears repeatedly—that word is democratic or democracy. The general declaration concerning Europe states that the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union will help the various

nations "to solve by *democratic* means their pressing political and economic problems." The section concerning Poland declares: "We reaffirm our common desire to see established a strong, free, independent and *democratic* Poland." It continues with the assertion that "the Provisional Government which is now functioning in Poland should be reorganized on a broader *democratic* basis with the inclusion of *democratic* leaders from Poland itself and from Poles abroad." From the viewpoint of the West these are fine objectives since they embody principles long operative in the United States and Great Britain, but how could a Marxist-Leninist like Stalin possibly sign such a document? The key is in the word "democratic." The Soviets consider their system to be democratic, which is why we see nations with names like German Democratic Republic or Democratic Republic of Vietnam. This is *not* a cynical hoax. A recent Soviet dictionary of the Russian language defines democracy as "the creative participation of the mass of the people in all organs of governmental administration."²³ The operative word in the Soviet definition is "participation." By this they apparently mean the faithful execution of decisions reached by the party hierarchy through participation in the work of such activities as trade unions, agricultural organizations, and youth groups.

Given the differing definitions of "democratic" one might think that a monumental misunderstanding was a prime cause of the Cold War. Stalin, of course, knew what he had in mind when he signed the document. The key question is whether Roosevelt and Churchill understood what the Soviets meant by "democratic" governments in Poland and elsewhere. I submit that they knew quite well what Stalin had in mind. The long difficult series of negotiations over Poland and other East European nations must have made Stalin's intentions obvious.

In retrospect, I believe Roosevelt and Churchill intended either to deal with Stalin in terms of spheres of interest or to postpone the inevitable rift as long as possible. It is not difficult to understand Stalin's reasoning concerning Poland. An exchange between Churchill and Stalin during the Yalta Conference is instructive. Churchill stated that Great Britain was concerned with Poland "because it was a matter of honour for her." Stalin's reply was:

For his part, however, he had to say that for the Russians the question was not only one of honour but of security as well.... The point was not only that Poland was a neighboring country. That, of course, was important, but the essence of the problem lay much deeper. Throughout history, Poland had always been a corridor for an enemy attacking Russia. Suffice it to recall only

the previous 30 years; in that period the Germans twice went across Poland to attack Russia.²⁴

If one can accept the validity of the foregoing, Stalin's reasoning becomes clear. If a strong pro-Russian Poland was a vital security interest of the Soviet Union, how could it be accomplished? There was a vehemently anti-Soviet emigre Polish Government in London. For reasons rooted in historical experience, the Polish people detested Russians (Communist or any other kind). Any sort of free elections in Poland would *not* have elected a pro-Soviet government. There was also a large Polish resistance movement led by anti-Communists. From Stalin's point of view there was but one logical course of action: the establishment of a Moscow-dominated Communist government in Poland. He accomplished this by stages. First, he allowed the retreating Germans to slaughter the anti-Communist resistance movement by not pressing the Soviet advance on Warsaw. Then, after Poland was occupied, he gradually removed anti-Communists from positions of power and substituted Communists.

From the foregoing events, a rather circular argument evolved in the West. The question was, and is, would Stalin have installed Communist governments in Poland and elsewhere if he had held a different perception of the security interests of the Soviet Union or if Great Britain and the United States had *been more agreeable*? My answer is yes, provided such actions had been judged to be feasible; safe in terms of possible countermeasures; and sufficiently inexpensive in terms of competing priorities. The reason is so simple that it escapes many of our intellectuals—Stalin believed that Marxism-Leninism was preferable to capitalism and other systems.

Toward the Abyss

After the Yalta Conference, disagreements large and small seemed to multiply almost geometrically. No useful purpose would be served by attempting to describe all of them. Accordingly, only a representative sample will be presented to further develop the Soviet view.

The death of Roosevelt and the removal from office of Churchill probably affected Stalin's calculations. According to Khrushchev, Stalin liked Roosevelt, respected Churchill, but had "no respect at all for Truman. He considered Truman worthless."²⁵ Yet, too much can possibly be made of the proposition that if Roosevelt had lived

the Cold War might have been prevented. It seems evident that Stalin was driven by his own imperatives. I doubt that Roosevelt or anyone else could have prevented the communization of Eastern Europe—except through armed force. Still, Truman used a tougher approach than Roosevelt and no doubt influenced the timing and nuance of Stalin's foreign policy.

A case in point is the famous April 1945 White House confrontation between Molotov and Truman over the agreements concerning Poland made at Yalta. Truman berated Molotov about Soviet actions in Poland and Molotov replied "I have never been talked to like that in my life." (Given Stalin's method of dealing with subordinates, this is doubtful). Truman replied: "Carry out your agreements and you won't get talked to like that."²⁶ Perhaps Molotov and Stalin were somewhat surprised by this outburst. Stalin probably thought he was carrying out the Yalta agreements or at least not stretching them to the point of provoking a harsh reaction from the United States. Yet, harsh or mild, any US diplomatic reaction would have mattered little in the long run. In any event, Stalin soon responded to the Truman-Molotov confrontation. He ended a curt note with "I am obliged to say that this attitude rules out an agreed decision on the Polish question."²⁷

Reparations and Economic Aid for the Soviet Union. It is possible that different economic policies toward the Soviet Union at the end of World War II might have had a braking effect on the deterioration of relations between the Soviet Union and the West—at least in the short run. As often was the case in his career, Stalin was operating from a position of relative weakness. The United States emerged from World War II actually stronger than before the war, while the Soviet Union was devastated. We now know that upwards of 20 million Russians were killed. Further, the most densely populated, the most wealthy, the most civilized portion of the Soviet Union had been laid waste. Thousands of acres of rubble had to be cleared from many of the major cities. According to Khrushchev, there was famine even in the Ukraine. The collective farm system had broken down—agricultural work was being performed by women, children, and old men laboring with primitive tools. The devastation was such that the bulk of the population in the Ukraine and Belorussia were living in pits dug in the ground and roofed over.²⁸

The Soviets, while glossing over the extent of damage they had incurred *did* make some effort to get assistance from the West. A request for \$6 billion in credit for postwar reconstruction was presented to the United States in August 1946. Unfortunately, it was lost in the US bureaucracy for 7 months, which the Soviets probably could not believe. Another form of direct assistance could have been an extension of lend-lease. For reasons that are still unclear,

lend-lease was abruptly terminated in May 1945. In reaction, Stalin told Harry Hopkins that the United States had every right to terminate the flow of lend-lease to the Soviet Union, but that the manner in which aid had been cut off was "unfortunate and even brutal." If Washington's reluctance to continue lend-lease shipments was intended to pressure the Russians, it was a mistake. Accommodations could be arranged if the Americans approached the Russians on a friendly basis, but reprisals would only have the opposite effect.²⁹

The question of German reparations widened the rift. At Yalta, Stalin demanded \$10 billion. Churchill was against it; Roosevelt was in between. The result was a fuzzy statement in the tripartite protocol on reparations:

With regard to the fixing of the total sum of the reparation as well as the total sum of it...the Soviet and American delegations agreed as follows: The Moscow Reparation Commission should take in its initial studies as a basis for discussion the suggestion of the Soviet Government that the total sum...should be 20 billion dollars and that 50 per cent of it should go to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The British delegation was of the opinion that pending consideration of the reparation question by the Moscow Reparation Commission no figures of reparation should be mentioned.³⁰

The question was not resolved in Moscow. At Potsdam, the end result allowed each power to take what it wished from its *own* occupied zone. This worked to the advantage of the Western powers since the bulk of German industry was in their zones. At any rate, the Soviets proceeded to strip their zone of almost everything portable and useful for rebuilding their economy.

Arthur Schlesinger wrote that the Soviets probably regarded those three events to be respectively: deliberate sabotage (the loan request); blackmail (lend-lease cancellation); and pro-Germanism (reparations).³¹ Schlesinger continues with an analysis of these events:

It is not clear, though, that satisfying Moscow on any of these financial scores would have made much essential difference. It might have persuaded some doves in the Kremlin that the US Government was genuinely friendly; it might have persuaded some hawks that the American anxiety for Soviet friendship was such that Moscow could do as it wished without inviting challenge from the United States. It would, in short, merely have reinforced both sides of the Kremlin debate; it would have hardly reversed deeper tendencies toward the deterioration of political relationships. Economic deals were surely subordinate

to the quality of mutual political confidence; and here, in the months after Yalta, the decay was steady.³²

I agree with the foregoing in that economic arrangements would not have changed the fundamental conflict of interests—except perhaps for timing of various moves and countermoves. However, I doubt that there was much debate in the Kremlin under Stalin. As Khrushchev said, the rest of them were "just errand boys." Further, in Stalin's mind there was no such thing as "mutual political confidence," except in the sense that one's adversary might be either more or less predictable or malleable.

The Beginning of the Cold War. In the year following the Yalta Conference (1945-46), a cascade of additional events impinged on Soviet perceptions and policy. The Soviets were afraid that the West was planning a separate surrender of German armies in Italy. They subsequently resurrected an old fear that Germany might arrange a separate peace with the West and continue the war. Later, the bitter quarrels over the occupation of Germany and related matters began. News of the atomic bomb probably alarmed Stalin, though he accepted the news calmly. The virtual exclusion of the Soviet Union from a postwar role in Japan may have annoyed Stalin, but he probably expected it. As to complaints about Soviet behavior in Eastern Europe, Stalin, by this time, largely disregarded them. Various points of conflict continue to the present time. At any rate, when looking at the events of 1945-48, it is difficult to separate the origins of the Cold War from its manifestations.

Accordingly, it is perhaps now useful to address the question of when the Cold War began. There has been much discussion of this point in the West. One view has it that it began when Stalin made a speech in February 1946 asserting the following:

Actually the war [World War II] was the inevitable result of the development of world economic and political forces on the basis of modern monopoly capitalism. Marxists have declared more than once that the capitalist system of world economy harbors elements of general crises and armed conflicts and that, hence, the development of world capitalism in our time proceeds not in the form of smooth and even progress but through crises and military catastrophes.³³

I doubt that Stalin intended this speech to signal Soviet intentions to heighten the East-West conflict. The foregoing quotation is a lead-in to a speech that runs ten printed pages. The speech is mainly an exhortation to the Soviet people to expend more effort in the reconstruction of the Soviet Union. It stresses the need to surpass

prewar levels of production in industry and agriculture, to raise living standards, et cetera. In sum, it is a plea for the population to work harder, with the capitalist threat thrown in as an incentive.

A few weeks later, in March 1946, Churchill delivered his famous "Iron Curtain" speech in Fulton, Missouri:

From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the continent. From what I have seen of our Russian friends and allies during the war, I am convinced that there is nothing they admire so much as strength and there is nothing for which they have less respect than military weakness.³⁴

Immediate reaction in the United States was mixed. For his part Stalin declared that the speech was "an unfriendly act."³⁵ The delivery of Churchill's speech has often been regarded as the beginning of the Cold War. To me, it seems more like a description of an extant situation.

Yet another event is often afforded the honor of initiating the Cold War. Requesting aid for Greece and Turkey, Truman stated in a March 1947 speech before the US Congress:

It must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.... This can be no more than a frank recognition that totalitarian regimes imposed on free people, by direct or indirect aggression, undermine the foundations of international peace and hence the security of the United States.³⁶

There can be no question that this speech both mobilized and militarized US foreign policy—aid to Greece and Turkey was forthcoming as well as other policies like "containment."

Other events and dates have been advanced as having been the beginning of the Cold War—most notably Molotov's departure from a general conference on European reconstruction in July 1947. That date was certainly significant because it closed out the possibility of Soviet and East European participation in the Marshall Plan for reconstruction of Europe.

The foregoing being said, it seems to me that these perceptions about the initiation of the Cold War are strictly Western. In other words, they are arguments about when the governments and populations of the United States and Great Britain realized that they were in a continuous politico-military conflict with the Soviet Union. Depending on viewpoint, one in the West could pick and choose

from the events mentioned herein, or others. For this essay, it is not vital. What is important is the question of when it began from the Soviet point of view. Conveniently, this leads to a first conclusion.

Was the Cold War Preventable?

The Soviets have perceived Western hostility from the birth of the Soviet state in 1917 to the present. Further, they see the conflict as continuous—the struggle will end when one system or the other prevails. The Soviets now simply see conflict at a lower level of intensity. Nonetheless, during most of the interwar period Germany was perceived to be the major threat. During that period the Soviets must have realized that the United States, though capitalist, was essentially indifferent to the Soviet Union. Until the early years of World War II, Stalin probably did not foresee the likelihood of conflict with the United States.

If a current Soviet leader were asked why and when the Cold War began, he probably would tick off a laundry list of "provocations" by the United States and other Western nations—many of which have been mentioned herein. His response on timing would depend on how candid he wished to be. If he were frank, he would state that the basic conflict began in 1917, and that the level of intensity increased sharply after Truman became President of the United States in 1945. Roosevelt gave Stalin cause to think that they could resolve some of the major differences. To put it another way, Stalin may have believed (hoped) that Roosevelt would acquiesce in Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe. Truman, on the other hand, made it clear that he would strongly oppose such a situation.

Roosevelt has often been criticized for trying to deal with Stalin. Some have said that Roosevelt was naive and had no understanding of communism. Yet, given the absolute power Stalin wielded in the Soviet Union during the critical years, there was no other chance to influence Soviet policy—other than military force. In other words, Roosevelt was trying to use the only available lever, Stalin. The fact that the effort failed is somewhat beside the point.

Stalin's paranoia alone seems to almost answer another vital question. Was the Cold War preventable? There are endless arguments pro and con. Yet, from whichever camp one looks at the question, one fact concerning Stalin is obvious. Stalin distrusted *everyone*, including his closest subordinates. If one of them had suggested attempting to achieve a friendly relationship with the United States, he would have been labeled a "double dealing spy" and deposed. To approach it the other way, no matter what

concessions Roosevelt might have made, Stalin would have remained convinced of fundamental Western hostility.

Another question has been: Was the Cold War a result of bad faith or misunderstandings? On the vital issue of Eastern Europe, I would say definitely not. There were simply irreconcilable political objectives on each side. The Soviet Union required hegemony in Eastern Europe, while the United States could only support independence and self-determination. The Soviet position was dictated mainly by security interests and the US policy was prompted by domestic political considerations.

To conclude with the most interesting and most vigorously debated question: Was Stalin simply advancing the national interests of the Soviet Union or was he attempting to spread communism for its own sake? The short answer is both! He was a devoted Bolshevik all his adult life and saw all questions through a Marxist-Leninist prism. He was also the undisputed ruler of a sovereign nation. So, the real question is which factor dominated his actions? In his own mind, I think he fused the two—whatever was good for the Soviet Union was good for communism. This would, for example, allow him to conclude a treaty with Hitler who had massacred the German Communists and give the British a free hand to combat the Communist-led revolutionary movement in Greece.

As to Stalin's policies at the end of World War II, I doubt that he was trying to do much more than preserve his own power, reconstruct the Soviet Union, and build a protective glacis in Eastern Europe. Naturally, he was interested in the expansion of communism. However, it was secondary in his thinking and only to be attempted in situations where it was necessary—Eastern Europe; or both safe and feasible—the underdeveloped areas of the world. In sum, when he had to opt for either the interests of the Soviet Union or communism per se, it was almost always for the former. If the United States had perceived this at the time and acted accordingly, the Cold War conflict might have been held at a lower and less costly level of intensity.

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Chapter Four

The Soviet View of War

Steve F. Kime

How do Soviet policymakers, and the Soviet populace, perceive war? This question is not asked often enough in the West, perhaps because there is no simple "answer." Westerners have difficulty understanding Soviet affairs in general and even Soviet policymakers would not agree on every aspect of the role of conflict. Soviet citizens would also vary in their experiences and attitudes. But the question deserves attention in the West because, first, the range of differences in attitudes toward war is not as great in the Soviet Union as in the United States and, second, the Soviet view of war is different from the American view of war.

National security concerns are prominent in the consciousness of the Soviet citizenry. War has firsthand meaning for many of them. For those too young to remember, there is a thoroughgoing effort to keep them aware of the danger and horrors of war.¹ The physical security of the homeland is not, for the Soviet citizen, a matter that might in crisis become an immediate problem. It is always an immediate problem. Undoubtedly some Soviets would rather make more butter and build less guns and, for others, there could never be enough guns. But the vast majority of the population appears to support the policies of current leaders. Those policies reflect a very high priority on building and maintaining military power.

For the peoples of the Soviet Union, war is a very real possibility. They live on past battlefields and a future war of any magnitude will probably be visited upon them in spite of their desire to avoid it. Theoretical constructs based upon imponderables like "mutual

destruction" and aimed more at maintaining peace than at dominating the battlefield do not fulfill the Soviet citizen's perceived need for a strong national defense. Americans have a history of delaying hard military posture decisions until confronted with war; they then place their impressive economic and technological machinery in gear and go abroad to smash the enemy. Russians have never had the luxury of viewing conflict in this rather detached way. Perhaps Americans in the nuclear age do not enjoy it any more either, but our attitudes do not reflect the new realities. In the Soviet perception, the possibility of war is a persistent reality.

This chapter will address the conceptual and practical aspects of the Soviet view of war. It will begin with a quick review of attitudes in the Soviet Union toward military power. The tenets and predilections that have evolved in Soviet military thought will then be addressed.

A caveat is in order before proceeding. No one, not even a Soviet citizen, could "prove" his view of the way that the Soviets perceive war. We are dealing with a vast multinational state and a political system not known for the free flow of ideas and information. What follows is the attempt of a single observer of Soviet affairs to report what he has detected about Soviet perceptions of war over several years of study and considerable travel in the country. Hundreds of Soviet citizens from all over the country have been engaged in discussion, and most of the literature available to Westerners has been read. Still, many Western commentators and analysts and many in the Soviet Union would disagree with my perceptions of the way the Soviets view war in the nuclear age. After all, my perceptions, like those of any mythical average Soviet citizen, are in the eye of the beholder.

Attitudes Toward Military Power

The Bolsheviks in 1917 inherited a rich military tradition. The Bolshevik state was created in the chaos of war, and military power has been basic to Soviet rule. Previous history and firsthand experience with war both weigh heavily on the Soviet system.

Western commentators frequently note that Russia has suffered invasion and that the Russian people have often borne the scourge of war.² Less noted, but also true, is that Russians themselves often resorted to force of arms, and the expansion of Russian power was often by means of the sword. Martial values were predominant ones at several important junctures of Russian history. A tradition of wearing uniforms and developing weaponry was established.

Traditional insecurity produced by invasions of Mongols, Poles, Swedes, French, and Germans, and pride in great Russian campaigners like Kutuzov and Suvorov, made Russians more receptive to a positive role for the military in society. The roots of a deep sense of inferiority with respect to the "outside" world were firmly imbedded in the Russian psyche, a siege mentality evolved, and a millennium of Russian history testified that any outward projections of Russian influence were possible only from a position of **military strength**. Even if the new leadership did not understand and value this heritage, it was there.

Certainly the new Bolshevik regime did not plan to make military power one of the linchpins of domestic rule and the most effective element in its foreign policy. There is little evidence that Lenin and his cohorts planned to use the military to help them maintain power once it was won. Their attitudes toward the Russian military were simplistic ones. Disaffected army and naval units could be used to help spark the Revolution, the war had to be stopped even at enormous costs to Russia and Russian security, and the armed forces with their imperial rank structure and noble officers could simply "wither away" as revolution spread westward. Reality quickly descended upon the new regime in military affairs as in all the other aspects of maintaining power in a vast land.

It soon became evident that military force would be integral to Soviet rule. Civil war, foreign military intervention, economic chaos and famine, and persistent and militant internal political opposition called for effective force. As Leninism, with its built-in tendency to concentrate power at the top, produced a one-party dictatorship in Russia, the military became a vital element of Communist Party rule.

The very legitimacy of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union became inextricably intertwined with the achievements of Soviet military power. The regime came to power in a beaten Russia. The Party can and does take credit for the fact that the Soviet Union has become one of two intercontinental nuclear superpowers in the world today. To get there, enormous sacrifices have been made, but the Soviet citizenry does not blame these sacrifices on the Party leadership. From an internal Soviet point of view, the history of the last six decades has been a case of the people, the military, and the Party acting as one to surmount incredible obstacles and emerge victorious.

Westerners should never underestimate the importance of the fact that Soviet military power is the primary medium in which patriotism and the Soviet form of rule are mixed.³ It is not political, social, ideological, or economic development that the Soviet system can point to with pride. The Soviet citizen occasionally notes some progress in these realms, but he is increasingly aware

that, as it has always been, things are better "outside." Perhaps the Soviet Union lags behind in some areas, maybe it always will, but it will not be militarily weak because there is a national preoccupation with physical security and power. Militarily, the Soviet Union is a world power. The Party's role as the developer, promoter, and guardian of Soviet power is one of its primary claims to support from the population.

It is no surprise, given the experiences and attitudes noted above, that military instruments command first claim on Soviet resources,⁴ that one often hears about the "militarization of Soviet society," and that Soviet foreign policy is heavily infused with military elements. All this flows from a broad consensus about the primacy of power in human relationships in general and the positive role of military power in particular.

When Western commentators and analysts claim that Soviet military production is far beyond the needs of Soviet defense, they are correct—but only from a Western perspective. Soviet military production is unfortunately a very real problem for Western strategists and planners, but what is "enough" military power must and will be determined by Soviet views.⁵ As long as those views are dominated by a sense, though exaggerated, of military threat to the homeland and a feeling of impotence or at least inadequacy in all the other elements of power, the Soviet military will project by its policies and its hardware a massive and threatening image.

Politics and War

It is not necessary to present here a taxonomy of the various categories in which Marxism-Leninism and Soviet policymakers have placed various levels and types of armed conflict. This has been done very well elsewhere,⁶ and a lengthy review would not help much to shed light on how the Soviets perceive war in the nuclear age. Suffice it to say that, in the Soviet view, war can be classified according to a political judgement about its nature (it is either "just" or "unjust"), by the class character of the belligerents, by the size of the conflict, or by means (nuclear or nonnuclear) employed.⁷ These broad categories are mentioned because they reflect something fundamental about Soviet notions of conflict: politics, economics, and hardware are fused in official Soviet attitudes toward war.

Peace and war exist on a continuum, as Clausewitz would have had it, but international conflict relationships are far more complex than is suggested by the simple dictum that "war is the continuation

of politics by other means."⁸ Instruments of war in peacetime, even in the nuclear age, are part of the eternal political, social, and economic struggle between rival systems. The Soviets understand the political significance of military superiority short of conflict. In war, at whatever levels of conflict, the political, social, and economic struggle continues and has some influence on the outcome. Stripped of their rhetoric, Soviet pronouncements on politico-military relationships boil down to the proposition that war is politics, but politics is war, too.

There is, therefore, a clear Soviet understanding of the political utility of nuclear superpower status and of a global perception of Soviet momentum in all types of weaponry.⁹ But in adjusting to the realities of the nuclear age, the Soviets have carefully categorized wars and conducted themselves in ways that maximize Soviet opportunity for expansion of influence and minimize the risk of escalation to war on Soviet soil. "Wars of National Liberation," for example, have been relegated to lower, safer levels of conflict. Soviet superpower status is applied, but limited.

Soviet leaders clearly wish to be involved in, and to profit from, the change that is inevitable in the underdeveloped world. Soviet citizens take some pride from events where their country, a global superpower, has acted to effect change in the "right" direction. But Soviet opportunism in the Third World must not endanger the homeland. If faced with the threat of opposition, especially if the stakes involved include potential superpower confrontation, Soviet decisionmakers are likely not to be adventurous. Projection of Soviet power into the Third World is desirable, but this effort is to be kept in the realm of politics, even if Soviet military hardware and advisors are brought to bear. Direct involvement of Soviet troops in distant wars has been avoided.

The Soviet calculus of risk versus opportunity in Third-World conflicts continues to depend on the politics of the intercontinental nuclear relationship, because Soviet leaders have no intention of placing the homeland at risk for some Third-World adventure. It remains to be seen whether Soviet willingness to support clients in Angola and Ethiopia—and to introduce their own forces into Afghanistan—was a product of a changed Soviet calculation of risk due to perceived shifts in the strategic military balance. If so, it is an important development in the Soviet view of the relationship between politics and war, because it means that Soviet power is perceived in the USSR as sufficient to ensure peace at home while pursuing Soviet policy with military force abroad. Such a sense of security about the projection of Soviet military power has never existed in the past.

Hardware and Politics

In the Soviet perception, one must be careful not to confuse the political aspects of military power with the demands of actual conflict. Politics, economics, and military power come together at the level of *doctrine*, the highest conceptual level in the Soviet hierarchy of military thought.¹⁰ In the Soviet system, doctrinal consensus is embodied at the highest level before military strategy is formulated and military forces are planned. Military strategy and planning are therefore subordinate to military doctrine and theoretically subject to the broadest possible political and economic interpretations. This would put the Soviet military at the mercy of the whim of the politician and the economist, if it were not for the fact that there is a clearly prevalent and universal attitude that the success, and even the survival, of the Soviet Union depends on massive Soviet military power.

The Soviet view of war is thus a very "political" one, but it emanates from a simple and practical attitude toward military hardware. Political notions based on military power are not really the concern of the military man. In any case, such notions must flow from the ability to fight effectively. No Soviet military officer would be assigned "deterrence" as his primary mission. His task is to be able to fight and to win. Deterrence, if it flows from military capabilities and the broader political and economic context of international affairs, is the business of the political leadership.

Thus, the Soviets do not choose between deterrence and warfighting. Though Western discussion seems to suggest that the Soviets must accept one or the other, the Soviets understand both. War and military forces remain "instruments of politics" in the nuclear age in spite of the fact that the "scale" and "depth" of nuclear war have caused changes in the relationship between war and politics. But a keen eye is kept on the difference between theoretical concepts, the political effect of the *nonuse* of force, and the requirements for the actual conduct of war. The Soviets clearly have grasped the fact that the *prospect* of war in the nuclear age has political significance, but this has not permitted the peacetime configuration of Soviet military posture to become the plaything of academics and politicians.¹¹

These considerations do not apply only to nuclear weapons. There might well be a nuclear phase in any major conflict, and the use of nuclear weapons will probably be the decisive act in the war. Still, there is no Soviet tendency to make a fetish of nuclear weaponry. In the Soviet view, nuclear weapons are necessary but not necessarily sufficient. Conventional military forces must be

adequate to ensure and consolidate final victory. On the Eurasian landmass this means clear superiority over any potential opponent.

Doctrinal Tenets and Predilections

If there is a war, the Soviet view is that a nation must be able to fight and win. Survival and victory must be assumed possible, even if it is difficult to define or envision "victory" in the nuclear age. There is no time to prepare for conflict after the crisis begins. Forces must be built in peacetime even if that displeases or spurs on the potential adversary.¹² Military security comes first. If it is impossible to be sure what constitutes adequate preparation, it is necessary to have as much as possible. In spite of the costs in terms of consumer goods, for most Russians "too much" will never be quite "enough."

Victory has a distinct continental focus. "Who controls postwar Eurasia" is the question. How to minimize damage to the homeland and retain the initiative on the ground required to dominate the Eurasian landmass are the chief concerns, whether or not the war is an intercontinental nuclear one. Military hardware is developed with these combat objectives in mind. "Punishing" the enemy is not a useful end in itself. To consent tacitly with the potential enemy to maintain forces which would simply ensure that both superpowers are totally destroyed in a major conflict would be to confuse politics with the requirements of combat. The Russian mind understands "mutual assured destruction" (MAD) for its political utility: it is simply not good military strategy.

Forces for *dominating* potential land conflict in Eastern Europe and on the Chinese border are nearly inviolate in the Soviet mind. Germans and Chinese of any political stripe bear watching at all times. Disposition of forces at the periphery of the USSR, in mass sufficient to go on the offensive and structured so as to be quickly reinforceable, is a necessity. The Soviets perceive that, if nuclear weapons are employed, the distinctions between front lines and rear areas might become academic,¹³ but if war erupts they intend to move the battlefield away from their periphery, if possible. The enemy will not be given the choice of moving the battlefield to Soviet soil with impunity again. Whether with conventional or nuclear weaponry, or both, the Soviets intend to attack the territory of the adversary.

Surprise, initiative, shock, and the momentum of a massive, well-coordinated offensive clearly dominate Soviet concepts of theater conflict. Whether the conflict is nuclear or not, Soviet forces will assume an offensive posture. Nuclear weapons will probably be

used at some point, and this will change the character of the conflict and probably be decisive, but it will not remove the need for a combined force effort with an offensive orientation.¹⁴

The Soviet emphasis on surprise and initiative in theater military strategy has worrisome implications for Soviet intercontinental nuclear strategy. Some Western analysts imply that Soviet intent to use overt attack is indicated by these propensities in Soviet doctrine. It is doubtful that Soviet leaders intend to initiate war, and a near certainty that there would be no grass-roots support for initiating major conflict aimed at anything other than protection of the USSR from imminent attack. Certainly, those who base their judgment of Soviet willingness to initiate war on an assumed, perverse Soviet callousness about enormous loss of life are wrong. Such absurdities discredit, however, a legitimate Western concern, because it is not Soviet intent to use intercontinental nuclear war as a means to achieve some global political goal that really counts. It is the Soviet judgment that, if a major East-West war seems unavoidable for *whatever* reasons, the best way to fight and win is to be the first with the most effective attack.

There is a dangerous asymmetry in East-West perceptions on this score. Many Western military analysts seem obsessed with the *politics* of the nuclear balance and focus on how the war might *begin*. Soviet military strategists formulate their plans with a steady eye on how the war might *end*. One does not have to assume predatory Soviet intentions in either the intercontinental nuclear relationship or in the NATO-Warsaw Pact relationship to be concerned about potential Soviet preemption if war seems unavoidable. The danger is that Western leaders, in a crisis, might still be thinking in terms of deterrence when the Soviet leadership is calculating its moves in terms of warfighting and warring.¹⁵

There is a strong emphasis in Soviet thinking on the strategic defensive. This is an outgrowth of the notions that victory and survival must not be viewed as hopeless, even in the nuclear age. Tangible results are a highly publicized civil defense program and an entire service arm, the Troops of National Air Defense (*PVO Strany*). Much of Soviet naval construction has been aimed at strategic defense.¹⁶ It is no exaggeration to say that Soviet strategic force posture is based upon a "quadrad" instead of the "triad" notion that influences US thinking. Strategic defensive measures are viewed by the Soviet citizenry as just as important as the three offensive "legs" of their intercontinental nuclear posture. This is deeply imbedded in the Soviet mindset. War does not happen "over there." Civil defense might be a feckless effort, and victory, even survival, might turn out to be meaningless in nuclear war, but twentieth-century history has taught that war more horrible than

anything understood in the past can occur and be survived. The Communist Party leadership, its legitimacy closely connected with past military experience, would be thought negligent if it did not appear to be taking every defensive measure possible.

Once conflict begins, the Soviet perception of the conduct of war reflects very little appreciation of restraint. Regarding intercontinental nuclear attack forces, there has been open Soviet derision of US concepts like "Limited Nuclear Options" and "Regional Nuclear Options."¹⁷ Such ideas simply do not fit into the Soviet view of fighting to win, once the conflict is unavoidable. "Bargaining" after hostilities have begun but before decisive blows have been struck does not make sense. From the Soviet point of view, these are dangerous attempts to prolong the political utility of nuclear weaponry past the point where warfighting concepts obviously dominate decisionmaking. It is dangerous because, though the Soviet side knows it does not accept the logic of minimum use of the decisive weaponry, the other superpower might be more willing to cross the nuclear threshold in a crisis if it were guided, or misguided, by the idea that nuclear force could be contained. The Soviets' own predilection for surprise and the initiative might thus come into play more often and at lower crisis levels. In believing that limited concepts of intercontinental nuclear war are destabilizing, Russians must fear their own predilections as well as those of the United States.

Similarly, Soviet decisionmakers have difficulty believing that NATO or the United States can constrain the use of nuclear weapons in the European theater once they are used. How could an adversary fail to exploit the weapon that will probably prove decisive, especially if he is inferior in other types of weaponry? Also, because the Russians live on the continent where so-called "tactical" nuclear weaponry is stored and would be deployed, they find it difficult to make the same crisp distinctions between theater nuclear weaponry and intercontinental nuclear weaponry that US planners make. This, combined with the Soviet understanding that it would be hard for the United States to accept defeat in Europe and the loss of thousands of American soldiers without escalating the conflict, makes the Soviet military strategist skeptical about containing any major conflagration in Europe.

There have been some suggestions in the last decade that the Soviets may perceive a distinction between the conventional and nuclear phases of theater conflict. If true, it is not clear whether this is a result of the Soviet view of NATO decisionmaking machinery or of Soviet willingness to pause for a test of the US nuclear guarantees to Europe during a phase where the Soviets, after all, would enjoy superiority on the ground that might well result in

substantial gains before any stalemate. In any case, such a sign of restraint in Soviet policy for the conduct of war is atypical and, if encountered on the battlefield, should be viewed as extremely short-lived.

If there is to be bargaining and restraint once war has begun in Europe, it must come quickly and before the introduction of "weapons of mass destruction." Soviet strategists have taken care to equip their forces for nuclear, biological, and chemical warfare. At all levels, tactics and strategy are attuned to unrestrained warfare. The Soviet soldier is trained for and expects the worst from war. So does the Soviet population.

We have already touched on the familiar Soviet preference for massive forces. There is some truth to the simplistic explanation that mass ameliorates a sense of inferiority. If you can't make it well, make it big and makes lots of it. In fact, mass can help to compensate for technological inferiority. Enormous "throw weight" can compensate for an adversary's MIRVs or one's own poor accuracy. Forty thousand tanks with more on the way is one response to Western advances in antitank weapons. But there is more to the preference for size and numbers than a response to perceived technological inferiority. In the first place, technological lags in weaponry are never accepted as permanent features in the face of war. There are now Soviet MIRVs and antitank weapons. Second, mass, not sophistication, is the Soviet "style" of superiority. Nevertheless, the Soviets never surrender in the technological race, particularly insofar as nuclear missiles are concerned.¹⁶

Parity, essential equivalence, and rough balance are not natural elements in the Soviet view of war. Perhaps they can be imposed on some specific sectors of the military competition, but these concepts cannot be permitted to dictate the overall balance of military power with potential adversaries. Arms control is part of the broad global economic, political, and military competition. It may be, and probably is in the Soviet view, mutually advantageous to limit the competition in some facets of the nuclear arms race, but margins of advantage will continue to be sought. If clear-cut superiority in intercontinental nuclear weaponry could be had, either within the constraints of an agreement or outside such constraints, the Soviets would pay the economic and political prices to attain it. Whether or not clear-cut superiority in the nuclear relationship can be envisioned in the current era, it may be possible to attain it eventually in the broad combination of conventional and nuclear forces which constitute the totality of Soviet global military power. It is clearly possible on the Eurasian landmass.

If war must be fought, it will involve all types of forces and the

totality of the nation's strength. Even if "weapons of mass destruction" are decisive in a war, they determine the outcome only as part of the broad context of the conflict. Timing, location, and the interrelationships between all the elements of a nation's power, especially its military power, will affect this context. There is a preoccupation in Soviet doctrine with the coordination of military forces and with the role of the masses in warfare.

Russians do not believe that war between East and West is inevitable. They would certainly prefer to compete without another global war, and feel that time is on their side in such competition. But theirs is a "big war" mentality. When conflict is contemplated, it is big enough for everyone.

Combined force operations must be tightly integrated and all types of forces must pull together to win. There are no one-and-one-half war notions or "flexible response" strategies which might serve as divisive elements between combat arms competing for resources. All forces are assigned vital missions aimed at attacking the adversary's forces and population and at dominating Eurasia. Soviet forces have indeed been used in "peacetime" in distant places at low levels of risk to the Soviet homeland, but their forces are built for the "big" war where missions are highly specific and well coordinated by centralized command and control.

Emphasis on the role of the masses is a carry-over from the prenuclear age. Even in nuclear war, in the Soviet view, there must be an enormous reserve of strength residing in the population. There is strong reliance on discipline, patriotism, and the maintenance of morale. These emphases are reminiscent of the "permanently operating factors"¹⁹ that Stalin chose to emphasize during the USSR's initial, indisputable nuclear inferiority. But even with the growing Soviet nuclear arsenal there is a persistent tendency to view war as requiring the active involvement of the entire population.²⁰ This strain in Soviet military thought, firmly rooted in history, is a source of strength for the Communist Party leadership and a potent source of support for Soviet military power. By manipulating the perceived danger of war in the population, the Party enhances its prestige and power. Because the need to be prepared is foremost in the Soviet citizen's mind, construction of Soviet military forces will continue to enjoy top priority.

Summary

War is a country-wide preoccupation in the Soviet Union. Historical experience, a domestic political system heavily

dependent upon the perception of external threat, and nuclear age geopolitics combine to make the threat of war and the need for massive military forces persistent realities for the ordinary Soviet citizen. World war, even in the nuclear age, *is* thinkable. It is contemplated often.

They intend to be prepared in every possible way to place the brunt of battle, with or without weapons of mass destruction, on the adversary. But Russians have lived on past battlefields and, though they will do their best to avoid it, they probably live on one of the main battlefields of the next major war. For them it is the battlefield on which the victor, if there is to be a victor, will be determined. War will probably be a global affair, but victory and survival have a distinct continental focus in the Russian mind.

The political implications of Soviet military power are understood and appreciated. New license for the projection of Soviet power and influence exists under the growing Soviet nuclear umbrella. This license is being carefully explored by a leadership mindful that security of the homeland must always enjoy top priority. There is also increasing latitude for productive political and economic accommodations with potential adversaries. This, in the Soviet view, is mostly because of Soviet military achievements.

But the *politics* of military power must never be allowed to interfere with the *requirements* for potential conflicts. Forces must be built for fighting and winning. Political influence can only, in the Soviet view, flow from forces designed to carry the day in combat.

The Soviets' perception of war in the nuclear age by no means concentrates on nuclear weaponry to the detriment of conventional forces. Nuclear weapons may be decisive but *all types* of forces, and a militarized populace, will be required for any hope of survival and victory. A vast panoply of military power, constantly modernized and disposed to secure Soviet territory from "outside" threats, enjoys broad support in the Soviet Union.

The Soviets do not want war. They cannot, however, fail to note that expansion of military power has been their primary claim to superpower status. No observer of Soviet domestic and foreign politics should expect Soviet military power to diminish, but neither should he expect the USSR to deliberately initiate a major war. The security of the USSR far outweighs the goals that any nuclear-age Marxist-Leninist is likely to pursue.

Still, Soviet attitudes toward the conduct of war are unsettling. There is a clear preference for the initiative and the establishment and maintenance of a crushing offensive that, even divorced from Soviet intent to use war for political ends, is frightening in the nuclear age. In the face of massive and growing Soviet military power at all levels of conflict, and the probability that Soviet

decisionmakers would have little appreciation of restraint once the conflict has begun, these preferences for the initiative and offensive are more salient than the judgment that the Soviets do not want war.

Endnotes

1. An example of keeping the horrors of war alive was the naming of two "hero-cities" in the 1970s. Novorossiysk (1973) and Tula (1977) received this award, called by Brezhnev "the highest award of the Motherland," for exploits in the war. See L.I. Brezhnev, "Vydayushchiysya Podvyg Zashchitnikov Tuly" [The Remarkable Exploit of the Defenders of Tula] *Izvestia*, 19 January 1977.
2. See, for example, Ken Booth, "Soviet Defense Policy" in John Baylis et al., *Contemporary Strategy: Theories and Policies* (New York: Holmes and Meier, Inc., 1975), p. 219.
3. "The war provided a convincing demonstration of the mighty power of the Socialist state and political system" (emphasis in the original). A.A. Grechko, Marshal of the Soviet Union and Soviet Minister of Defense, *Vooruzhenniye Sili Sovetskogo Gosudarstva* [The Armed Forces of the Soviet State] (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1974), p. 74.
4. Lenin is quoted in the following: "Everyone will agree that an army that does not train itself to master all arms, all means and methods of warfare that the enemy possesses, or may possess, is behaving in an unwise or even in a criminal manner." A. Lagovsky, *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 25 September 1969.
5. Brezhnev, in the article cited *supra*, states the Soviet response to Western charges of excessive Soviet defense spending without equivocation: "The allegations that the Soviet Union is exceeding what is sufficient for defense and is striving for weapons superiority with the aim of delivering 'the first strike' are absurd and totally unfounded."
6. For an extensive discussion of the various ways the Soviets categorize conflict, see Peter H. Vigor, *The Soviet View of War, Peace and Neutrality* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975), pp. 25-28.
7. These classifications are cogently elaborated in Harriet Scott and William F. Scott, *The Armed Forces of the USSR* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1979), pp. 59-62.
8. The fact that Lenin accepted Clausewitz's basic dictum but that Marxism-Leninism's "views on the essence of war" differ in fundamental ways is discussed in *Marxism-Leninism on War and Army* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1972), pp. 16, 17.
9. It has become commonplace for Soviet commentators to point out that detente would not have been possible without the growth of Soviet military power.
10. The Soviet lexicon includes military doctrine, military science, military art,

military strategy, operational art, and tactics. Military doctrine is defined as "a state's system of views and instructions on the nature of war under specific historical conditions, the definition of the military tasks of the state and the armed forces and the principles of their development, as well as the means and forms of solving all of these tasks, including armed combat, which stem from the war aims and the social-economic and military-technical resources of the country." S. N. Kozlov, *Spravochnik Ofitsera* [Officers Handbook] (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1971), pp. 73-74.

11. In fact the military and the politicians are together on military construction and most issues in the USSR. Attempts to view civil-military conflict as significant and contentious are cases of mirror-imaging by Western analysts. This author agrees with the views of D. O. Graham, a retired lieutenant-general and former Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, presented in "Kremlin Hawks and Doves: A Fallacious Notion," *The Washington Post*, 29 May 1977, p. A15.

12. The recent Annual Report by the US Secretary of Defense recognizes the fact that Soviet forces grow consistently with the overall growth of the Soviet economy. It is noted that "nowhere is there any historical evidence that if we are restrained, the Soviets will reciprocate—except where specific and verifiable arms control agreements are negotiated." Harold Brown, *Department of Defense Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1980* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 25 January 1979), p. 6.

13. "[I]n a modern war, as a consequence of the possible unrestricted use of strategic nuclear weapons by the armed forces of the warring sides, the line between the front and the rear is obliterated." N.A. Lomov, ed., *Nauchno-Tekhnicheskii Progress i Revoliutsiya v Voennom Delo* [Scientific-Technical Progress and the Revolution in Military Affairs] (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1973, translated and published under the auspices of the US Air Force), p. 273.

14. A. A. Sidorenko *Nastupleniye* [The Offensive] (Moscow: Voenizdat 1970, translated and published under the auspices of the US Air Force), p. 41.

15. There is a Russian proverb that says "when the cannons speak, politicians are silent." At some point in a crisis, perhaps when the judgment has been made that conflict cannot be avoided, the matter becomes one for the marshals. Wherever this point is, the Soviets make it clear that political notions take a back seat. Doctrine "recedes somewhat into the background, since armed conflict is guided mainly by military-political and military-strategic ideas, conclusions, and generalizations which flow from concrete conditions. Consequently, war and armed struggle are directed not by doctrine, but by strategy." Kozlov, *Spravochnik Ofitsera*, p. 78.

16. "They [the Soviets] have a doctrine which considers nuclear war as thinkable and they are not only building their offensive forces, but are giving great attention to command and control, civil defense, air defense and all other elements needed to fight a nuclear war." David C. Jones, General, US Air Force and Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, *United States Military Posture For FY 1980* (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1979), p. v.

17. An example of Soviet rejection of "limited" use of nuclear weapons is Lev Semyeyko, "Formi Noviye. Sut'Prezhnyaya" [New Forms, but the Same Content]. *Krasnaya Zvezda* [Red Star], 8 April 1975.

18. "Everyone has seen that the real key to victory on the battlefields is in the hands of he who not only has new weapons but also has the lead in missile production." S. S. Biryuzov, Marshal of the Soviet Union, in P. M. Derevyanko, ed., *Problemy Revolyutsii v Voennoy Delo* [Problems of the Revolution in Military Affairs] (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1965, translated and published by the Joint Publications Research Service [JPRS 073096]), p. 4

19. Stalin's "permanently operating factors" were: 1) The stability of the home front; 2) The morale of the forces; 3) The quality and quantity of divisions; 4) The quality and quantity of armament; and 5) The ability of commanders.

20. "We must always remember that, if a world of nuclear missile war is unleashed by the imperialists, hundreds of millions of people will be dragged into its orbit. Victory in such a war will be attained not only by the operations of massive armed forces, but also by the vigorous activities of the people as a whole, who, in the final analysis, have the last word in matters of war and peace. One of the most important principles of modern warfare is the growth of the role of the general populace in it." M. P. Skirdo, *Narod, Armiya, Polkovodets* [The People, The Army, The Commander] (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1970, translated and published under the auspices of the US Air Force), p. 35

Chapter Five

**Soviet Perceptions
of the Threat and Soviet
Military Capabilities**

William T. Lee

In this chapter I will attempt to look at Soviet strategic military capabilities from the Soviet point of view. It may not be entirely successful. Even a series of frank discussions with the Politburo and the Soviet General Staff probably would reveal some disagreements and would leave some uncertainties and ambiguities as to how the Soviets perceive the military balance. Nevertheless, it is useful to try to look at the view from the other side of the hill. One cannot entirely avoid ethnocentric projection ("mirror imaging"). But if one tries to understand a foreign nation on its own terms, conscious that one's ethnocentric projection is a greater barrier to such understanding than the most rigorous censorship exercised by the other country, one may achieve some degree of success.

It is useful to begin with two areas of Soviet perceptions. First, what kind of threat does the United States and its allies, the "imperialists" in Soviet parlance, present to the Soviet Union and its allies, the "socialist camp"? Second, what would be the nature of war between "imperialism" and "socialism" in the nuclear age? These perceptions largely determine the peacetime objectives of Soviet military policy, the missions assigned to the branches of the Soviet armed forces, and the types of military operations the Soviets expect to conduct in the event of war between the two camps. We can then attempt to simulate Soviet perceptions of how the capabilities of their forces match their military and political objectives, and how the balance of power between the two "camps," the "correlation of forces" in Soviet parlance, has changed over time.

Soviet Perceptions of the "Imperialist" Threat

Politically, the Soviets view the United States and NATO as a dedicated, implacable, devious, and sometimes confused threat. "Imperialists" are dedicated enemies of the Soviet Union by the tautological logic of Marxism-Leninism: by its socio-politico-economic nature "imperialism" is prone to predatory warfare and sees the Soviet Union as its natural enemy because "socialism" is the heir presumptive to the future human social order.

"Imperialists" are implacable enemies of "socialism" because they are "blinded by class hatred" as a result of the basic differences between the two social systems. As one Soviet political officer put it, peace is not something you ask of the "imperialists"; it is something you force on them by your own military power.¹ "Imperialists" are devious, "wicked and crafty" folk because they engage in double talk, because they change their declaratory strategic policies like women's fashions while always harboring the same evil, hostile designs on the Soviet Union and its allies.² To the Soviets, when "imperialists" say "peace," even at a summit, they really mean war. Only fear of the growing power of the "socialist camp" has prevented the "imperialists" from "unleashing" a third world war. When "Imperialists" change their declaratory policy from "massive retaliation" to "assured destruction" to "flexible response" they are just being devious. In part, the "imperialists" are trying to conceal their (unchanged) motives by changing the words; in part they are recognizing the failure of their (prior) aggressive policies due to their own weaknesses and the growing power of the Soviet Union and the "socialist camp."³

The Soviets particularly like to apply the devious reasoning line to Western views that wars often happen, in large part at least, by accident, or perhaps because man is naturally aggressive. To the Soviets, "imperialists" are at their most devious when advancing such arguments rather than recognizing the drive to war inherent in the capitalist system, but, of course, alien to "socialism."⁴

Inasmuch as the Soviets really do fear "imperialists" for their implacable hostility, aggressive designs, and deviousness, one might expect them to welcome pacifists and pacifism in the "imperialist camp." After all, pacifists may be a threat to themselves, but they pose little danger to anyone else. Most revealingly, however, the Soviets regard pacifists as pragmatically useful allies, but ideologically as dangerous as the warmongers. Consider the article, published just before Brezhnev invoked God and signed SALT II, by one of the most articulate political officers in the

department of Mr. Brezhnev's Central Committee known as the "Main Political Administration" of the Ministry of Defense.⁵

Having declared the late Oskar Morgenstern's work on the theory of games as applied to warfare to be "depraved" and "very dangerous" (p. 20), having put Herman Kahn, Thomas Schelling, Henry Kissinger, Bernard Brodie, and Klaus Knorr in the same class as ideological heirs of Morgenstern, Rybkin gets to the pacifists at the end of his article: In accordance with Lenin's legacy and the Party's program, the Soviet Union makes common cause with various types of pacifist movements in the struggle against imperialist aggression, but under no circumstances do the Soviets cease ideological polemics against their erroneous views.

Perhaps the "imperialist" heresy most disturbing to the Soviets is that military power generally, and military superiority specifically, have no political utility in the nuclear age. Here the Soviets run out of ideological epithets. In trying to cope with such inexplicable concepts—voiced by such "imperialist" apologists as Klaus Knorr—one (political) officer was reduced to quoting Marshal Tiukechevskiy, who was executed by Stalin's order, that bourgeois military theorists are given to periods of "fuzzy notions" and "confused thoughts."⁶

Geographically, the Soviets perceive the threat to be very near. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is on one border and the People's Republic of China (PRC) is on the other. To the Soviets, NATO has two centers: the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the United States. In the Soviet view, the FRG is the hot-bed of tension and militarism in Europe. The Soviets perceive the FRG to be using NATO to strengthen German militarism and to gain access to nuclear weapons and the missiles to deliver them. The Kremlin takes a particularly dim view of Germans in high positions in the NATO military structure.⁷

To be sure, the Soviets have moderated their public utterances in the past few years after some two decades of unbridled license, just as they have virtually ceased frank, public discussion of their military doctrine and strategy. But such lapses are simply tactical gambits which are very effective, but which do not represent fundamental changes in perceptions.

In the Soviet perception, any US attack on the Soviet Union is likely to come through NATO. The Soviets do not seem to view the United States as an intercontinental threat *independent* of its European allies. The Soviets also have an interesting, but rather frightening, perception of the consequences of NATO's internal squabbles: the more NATO's internal tensions increase, the stronger the Bonn-Washington axis becomes, hence the more dangerous the FRG becomes and the greater the danger of war.⁸

Belief that the United States and NATO are plotting a surprise nuclear attack on the Soviet Union and its allies is one of the most basic and (apparently) unshakable Soviet perceptions. In the Soviet view, the only reason the "imperialists" have not attempted a surprise nuclear attack on them is fear of failure. Nothing the United States or NATO says or does, or does not do, seems to have the slightest effect on that Soviet perception. Consequently, the Soviets must be ready either to preempt a US/NATO attack, if adequate warning is available, or to retaliate. Preemption is the preferred Soviet option; but the Soviets feel they must be prepared for either alternative and have structured their forces accordingly. In either case the objective of the Soviet strikes is to gain (regain) and keep the initiative in order to "win" the war following the initial nuclear exchange.

The Soviet perception of US and NATO military forces and capabilities appears to be a mixture of sober realism and "worst case" fantasy. On technical characteristics and estimates of weapon effectiveness the Soviets appear to be realistic. They read our literature thoroughly—most Soviet military analysts who write about the United States appear to know English in contrast to their American counterparts who rarely know Russian. Usually, Soviet bean counts of US/NATO divisions, aircraft, missiles, ships, and the like are accurate, but occasionally the Soviets lapse into official (Western) phantasy and talk of NATO having as many divisions as specified in the Lisbon goals.

The budget of US/NATO seems to be an area where the Soviets are prone to worst-case perceptions. Not that they exaggerate the numbers, but they usually treat US/NATO budgets as if inflation did not exist. Thus Politburo (candidate) member Boris Ponomarev noted that NATO's military expenditures increased from \$19.4 billion in 1949 to \$174.7 billion in 1974, clearly in current dollars. He went on to cite NATO's plans to increase defense budgets 3 percent per annum in real terms through 1993, or by some \$80 billion. But the principal thrust of his speech was the sad state of contemporary capitalism.¹¹

As expressed by Ponomarev, the Soviets believe that "socialism" thrives on the "scientific-technical revolution," but "imperialism" cannot cope with it. Here are the highlights of Ponomarev's evaluation of the current status of "imperialism" in this context:

- Use of scientific-technical progress by the imperialists to strengthen their position in the world has increased super profits and modernized exploitation of the toilers.

- Concentration of capital is unprecedented and a new form of monopoly capital has been created—the multinational corporation.
- Internationalization of production and exchange has been accelerated in the form of economic integration, new forms of international division of labor, and specialization of production.
- Unevenness of capitalist economic development has been accentuated and international rivalry has been exacerbated. There are now three centers of imperialism: the United States, Western Europe, and Japan.
- Neocolonial exploitation has been extended and the abyss between the highly developed capitalist states and the countries in the process of liberation has deepened.
- Most importantly, the revolution in the means of conducting warfare has put the question of war and peace on a new plane.
- Capitalist nations are experiencing acute crises in ecology, energy, raw materials, and food resources.
- In general, the contradictions between the social character of *production and capitalist forms of appropriating the results of production* have sharpened, and all social antagonisms have increased in intensity, primarily those between labor and capital.

All in all, Ponomarev saw the 1970s as a period when the perennial crises of capitalism were greatly exacerbated—after the capitalists had convinced themselves in the 1950s and 1960s that they were in a *new age of progress and prosperity and that it was "socialism"* that had been left behind by history. Ponomarev expects "imperialist" attempts to cope with the contemporary scientific-technological revolution to become even more self-destructive in the 1980s.

Soviet perceptions of the People's Republic of China (PRC) are more difficult to sort out. Schismatics usually hate each other far more bitterly than natural enemies do. Soviet fears of the PRC seem to go far beyond China's currently modest military capabilities. Politically, the Chinese are not only heretics but also rivals for leadership of the "socialist camp." Geographically and ethnically, the Soviets obviously are very sensitive to the vulnerability of their exposed borders in Central Asia and Siberia to Chinese incursions.

Militarily, the Soviets probably view the present balance of forces along the Chinese border as satisfactory. They know the Chinese would be hard pressed to provide the necessary logistic support for large scale military operations in Soviet territory, even in the Far Eastern Soviet maritime provinces. The Soviets have their own logistic problems in this area. The Soviets also probably would not want to invade China proper—there are just too many Chinese. Hence, a certain military stability probably now exists in the potentially highly unstable political relationship between the Soviet Union and China.

In the longer run, however, the Soviets probably are much concerned about the potential growth of Chinese strategic nuclear forces, particularly how the Chinese will target their missiles. In the absence of antiballistic missile (ABM) defense, relatively modest nuclear attacks can do immense damage to Soviet urban-industrial areas. On the other hand, if the Chinese were to attack only military targets in the Soviet Union, large forces would be needed to inflict high-damage levels. In any case, the emergence of a pragmatic Chinese regime on good terms with Japan, the United States, and Europe obviously is a nightmare to the Soviets who probably will spare no effort in attempting to break up these emerging relationships.

At the same time, the Soviets may view Japan as an equally serious future threat. A decade ago a serious and talented Soviet military intellectual made his first tour of the United States; in one of his statements he said he had conducted a study of the threat to the Soviet Union in Asia and concluded that Japan rather than China was the more serious threat in the long run. When asked whether Soviet forces along the China border had been reduced as a result of his study, which he said had been well received, he replied something to the effect that, well, marshals will be marshals. It would be interesting to hear what that same Soviet would say today. Perhaps his response would not be much different. After all, Ponomarev now counts Japan as a third center of "imperialist" economic power, along with Europe and the United States.

A comprehensive treatment of the Soviet perception of the "Third World" is well beyond the modest scope of this chapter. Three observations, however, are in order. First, the Soviets are not likely to perceive a serious threat to themselves from any single country or possible coalition, beyond US/NATO, China, and Japan. They do, of course, have serious political problems with any deviant from Soviet orthodoxy. Tiny Albania accounts for a greatly disproportionate share of Politburo adrenalin. Apparently monoliths look at the world from the point of view of an iceberg—

even the slightest crack is apt to go all the way through. So one must heighten vigilance, even if it is only Lilliput at the gates.

Second, nuclear proliferation is probably the chief Soviet security concern in other parts of the world. Three aspects of proliferation probably worry Soviet leaders: terrorism, weapons technology transfer, and escalation. The Soviets probably are concerned about nuclear terrorism as are other nations. After all, the Soviets themselves have had some experience with the use of lesser forms of terrorism. However, they probably think that their defenses against terrorism are effective.

Third, transfer of nuclear weapons technology is a much more serious problem. The Soviets have been very concerned that the FRG's relations with South Africa might give the FRG access to nuclear weapons and a place to test missiles.¹¹ Germans with nuclear weapons and delivery systems probably is the ultimate Soviet nightmare.

Soviet fears of escalation in the event of the use of even one nuclear weapon are of long standing. Any use of nuclear weapons by small nations is likely to involve the superpowers and any use of nuclear weapons by the superpowers almost certainly would escalate to an all-out exchange. Therefore, Brezhnev's statement at the 1979 Vienna summit meeting about the dire consequences of even one nuclear weapon being used was in line with long-held Soviet views.

Certain consequences of Soviet politico-military perceptions deserve comment. First, the Soviets have a very one-sided view of deterrence. Deterrence is something they have to force on the United States and NATO because the Soviets, by definition, are not going to attack us while we, by definition, are looking for an opportunity to attack them. This means that deterrence is less stable when the Soviets are militarily inferior, somewhat more stable when parity prevails, and most stable when the Soviets have military superiority.

In connection with the 1979 Vienna summit between President Carter and Premier Brezhnev, Mr. James Reston reported the following:

The Soviet attitude toward the question of a military balance also interested members of the US team in Vienna. "They seem to have a different idea of what's a proper balance than we do," one US delegate said. "They may feel that if NATO has enough power to repel a Soviet invasion of Western Europe, that is an imbalance. And they may feel the same way about the strategic situation."¹²

Similarly, the Soviets have a very self-righteous view of history. They do not consider themselves responsible for their attack on Finland in 1939 or for providing the North Koreans with all the weapons, ammunition, and fuel required to invade South Korea and to continue fighting. Thus, we read in the Soviet General Staff journal: "All wars which the USSR had occasion to wage were forced, retaliatory and directed against repelling aggression."¹³ Whose idea it was to invade South Korea in the first place may never be known; but the Soviets provided the wherewithal. In a recent book they have even admitted that their Air Force participated in the fighting. But the Soviets continue to insist, and apparently themselves believe, that the United States started the Korean War.

The Soviet attitude toward the creation of NATO and the rearmament of West Germany provides other examples of Soviet self-righteous treatment of history. To be sure, minimum knowledge of Marxism and of Stalin's policies is needed to understand why the Soviets installed Communist regimes in Eastern Europe after World War II. Having liberated these countries from one set of "imperialists," the Soviets hardly could turn them over to another set, at least not unless faced with overwhelming military force. And all that territory provided a highly desirable military buffer zone between Soviet borders and the remaining "imperialist" forces. Nevertheless, the Soviets take no responsibility for their contributions to the advent of the "Cold War" and to the creation of the military forces they fear most. In the Soviet perception it is all the natural manifestation of "imperialism's" innate aggressiveness and hatred of "socialism."

When the Soviets win a war they are not victors or conquerors like others but rather are the agents of history's justice to evil enemies who have outlived their time. Hence, "the class enemy was and remains the same—wicked and crafty, ready to commit any crime for the sake of his mercenary interests. Not having a future, he wants to take the future from all peaceloving peoples, above all from the peoples building a new world—the world of socialism."¹⁴ The Soviet armed forces are not designed for ordinary predatory war but for holy war "against forces which give rise to aggression and war. Victories of the Soviet Army are not simply victories of one force over another, but an expression of the triumph of that which is new and advanced over that which is old and reactionary, a victory of true humanity and humanism over imperialist robbery and atrocity."¹⁵ And the role of Soviet forces in the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 to wipe out the Czech experiment in "socialism with a human face" represented a "clear confirmation of the loyalty of the Soviet armed forces to their noble mission."¹⁶

If the Soviets decide to invade Poland to put down "Solidarity," they will say the same thing. Recently the Soviets have put their 1940 invasion of Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania into the proper (Soviet) historical context:

Soviet forces did not interfere in the domestic affairs of the Baltic countries, strictly observing the stipulations of the mutual aid pacts concluded between them and the USSR. Meanwhile, the presence of Soviet troops on Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian territory protected the Baltic from the interference of foreign imperialists. This demoralized the forces of the bourgeoisie and inspired the revolutionary masses to this struggle for the overthrow of the fascist dictatorship.¹⁷

No doubt the Soviets look forward to the day when they can render similar social services to Western Europe which Stalin regretted the Soviet Union was unable to do after World War II.¹⁸

Soviet Strategic Priorities

Given the Soviet geographic position and perception of their enemies, the Soviet definition of strategic systems as those having a range of 1,000 km or more is not surprising. Understanding the Soviet perception of what is "strategic" is essential to understanding Soviet force structure, priorities, and concepts of military operations. To the Soviets, strategic operations begin at their borders. Viewed from Moscow, there are three theaters of operations (TVDs) in NATO Europe; one or two TVDs in Central Asia and the Far East; and the "transoceanic" TVD—the United States. Soviet strategic nuclear forces are assigned targets in all of these TVDs and will support combined arms operations—ground, air, and naval—in the Eurasian TVDs. Delivery systems with the range of 1,000 km or more are strategic systems assigned to the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF), Long Range Aviation (LRA), and the Red Navy—sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). Unlike the United States, the Soviet Union does not equate "strategic" with missiles having the 10,000 km range needed to reach the "transoceanic" TVD; the SRF's intermediate and medium-range ballistic missiles (IR/MRBMs) are every bit as "strategic" to the Soviets as the intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs); the LRA's medium bombers are just as strategic as the heavy bombers.¹⁹

Because of the Soviet perception of the geographic proximity of the threat, the Soviet objective to occupy Europe in the event of war

with NATO, and the Soviet concept of integrated combined arms "operational-strategic" campaigns in the Eurasian TVDs, the Soviets, when faced with a choice, consistently opt first for Eurasian strategic forces. In the 1950s they equipped the LRA with over 1,000 medium bombers, but less than 200 heavy bombers, and at the end of the 1950s and in the early 1960s they deployed over 700 IR/MRBMs but only some 225 ICBMs. Other factors contributed to limited ICBM deployments until the mid-1960s—the SS-6 ICBM was too clumsy and expensive for large-scale deployment, the SS-7 and SS-8 were too inaccurate to be effective against hardened US missile installations—but strategic systems for operations in the Eurasian TVDs clearly had priority over systems designed for operations in the "transoceanic" TVD. This priority was also evident in the late 1960s when, well before their ICBM buildup was completed, the Soviets deployed SS-11 ICBMs in MRBM fields in response to French deployment of hardened IRBMs—against which the IR/MRBMs were ineffective—and construction of hangarages on NATO airfields. Currently the Soviets are deploying a large number of SS-20s to modernize their IR/MRBM forces. As a result of the modernization of ICBMs and SS-20s, the Soviets will greatly improve their capabilities to defeat and disarm NATO forces and occupy a Europe that is relatively intact, so that European resources can be used to help the Soviet Union recover if there is a nuclear exchange with the "transoceanic" TVD.

Failure of the United States to understand these Soviet perceptions and strategic force priorities has created the conventional wisdom that neither the "bomber gap" nor the "missile gap" existed because the Soviets did not want large strategic forces at that time. In the official parlance of Washington, Soviet strategic forces for operations in the Eurasian TVDs are "peripheral" or "grey area," but not "strategic" if they cannot reach targets in the United States. Such parochial attitudes contribute to official Washington's perennial question, "What are the Soviets up to?" when the Soviets have been very frankly telling us the answer for many years. In SALT they told us how important their Eurasian strategic forces were by defining them out of the negotiations, while constantly trying to include tactical US forces stationed in Eurasia.

From Soviet perceptions that even nuclear weapons do not negate the Marxist teleology of history, that a war between the two superpowers and their allies will be the final decisive clash between the two antithetical social systems,²⁰ flow two basic characteristics of Soviet politico-military thinking and military force planning: a nuclear war must be fought by combined arms offensive campaigns after the initial strategic force exchange; the objective of nuclear war is "victory." To the Soviets, nuclear war is a catastrophe they

very much want to avoid, but it is not apocalypse. Like any other war, nuclear war between the two camps would be a continuation of politics by violent means.²¹ The Soviets expect the initial exchange to be decisive, but also expect the war to continue for two or three weeks until they "win" it.

Objectives of Soviet Military Policy

Soviet military policy objectives are derived from perceptions of the threat and from Soviet military doctrine and strategy for the nuclear age. The latter were formulated in the period 1953-1960 and published widely in the early 1960s. In the mid-1960s the Soviets modified their doctrine to allow for an initial conventional phase in the war with US/NATO.²² Strategy was modified around 1967 when the SRF adopted launch-on-warning of a US attack.²³ Beyond these modifications to doctrine and strategy respectively, the tenets of Soviet military doctrine and strategy have changed little, if at all, since the axial period 1953-1960. Hence, the objectives of Soviet military policy have been relatively stable over the last two decades, particularly since the fall of Khrushchev in 1964. However, because policy objectives are very ambitious, many gaps remain between the *capabilities* of Soviet forces and the *missions* assigned to them despite the steady shift in national priorities to the military establishment that began under Khrushchev and has continued under the Brezhnev regime.

Persistent gaps between Soviet military policy objectives and force capabilities are essentially due to three factors: the challenge posed by US/NATO forces, lagging though it has been in recent years; the explosive growth of military technology, beginning in World War II, when the Soviet Union entered the competition far behind the United States; and the historic lag in the size and technological competence of the Soviet economy. It cannot be emphasized too strongly, however, that the Soviets do not abandon an objective, once adopted, just because it may take them 20 or 30 years, or more, to achieve it. Many Western failures to anticipate Soviet force developments, to understand the motivations for new Soviet weapons, are due in large part to failure to comprehend that the Soviets have not abandoned an objective just because they cannot field the appropriate force overnight.

The first objective of Soviet military policy is to deter a US/NATO attack. The Soviets' fear of such an attack is generated by their reading of the history of the Civil War and World War II, and from the tautological theses of Marxism-Leninism on the nature of

"capitalism" and "imperialism." As previously noted, there is nothing "mutual" about the Soviet concept of deterrence. Soviet forces exist to enforce the peace; US/NATO forces exist to attack the USSR/Pact. As Senator Ribicoff's delegation discovered in 1979, Soviet leaders share this attitude which permeates Soviet literature on doctrine, strategy, and military policy.

The second objective of Soviet military policy is to acquire a total military and economic posture capable of fighting and winning a nuclear war should the Soviet policy of "peaceful coexistence" fail. This requires balanced offensive and defensive forces capable of defeating the enemy while limiting damage to the Soviet Union. Although the Soviets know that they have not had and do not have such capabilities, they have made considerable progress and continue the effort to acquire them. Soviet net assessments of superpower capabilities publicly recognize the gaps between their objectives and capabilities. Reportedly, Brezhnev was candid with Senator Ribicoff's delegation on this point too. On the other hand, this does not mean that Soviet objectives should be sold short because they perceive that neither side can disarm the other or field defenses which could reduce damage to acceptable levels at this time. Realistic Soviet *assessments* of the status quo should not be interpreted as Soviet *acceptance* of the status quo as the preferred permanent strategic relationship between the two superpowers and their allies.²⁴

The third objective of Soviet military policy is to achieve "superiority" over the enemy by fielding larger numbers of more effective weapons systems. As the article on "military-technical superiority" in the *Military Encyclopedia* put it:²⁵

Strengthening the defense capabilities of the USSR and all countries of the socialist camp requires ensuring military-technical superiority over the armed forces of the imperialists, the aggressive blocs.... Soviet military doctrine determines the directions of preparing the country and the armed forces for repulsing aggression, provides a program of action for insuring military-technical superiority over the armed forces of the probable enemies.²⁶

Lately, Brezhnev has been denying that the Soviets are seeking military superiority; but this is an obvious ploy to help the prospects of the SALT II Treaty in the US Senate.

This is only a recent sample of what the Soviets have been saying for a long time. For example, in the late 1960s when so many US analysts and officials believed the Soviets had decided to accept, or could be forced to accept, US superiority in strategic nuclear

forces, a senior Soviet *political* officer wrote: "No lags will be allowed in the military field; maintaining reliable military-technical superiority is a task conditioned by the international duties of the Soviet Union."²⁷

As another political officer put it in the late 1960s, when US conventional wisdom was still euphoric about Soviet military policy objectives, "Strengthening of its defense is now the foremost political function of the Soviet State, which has direct influence on the moral spirit of the people and the armed forces.... *Never before has the internal life of the country been subordinated to a war so deeply and thoroughly as at the present time.*" (emphasis added)²⁸

Soviet Perceptions of Military Operations

In the late 1960s the editors of *Military Thought* asked General Lieutenant G. G. Semenov to define the concept of an "operation" more precisely in response to requests from readers. General Semenov defined a military operation as a combined arms offensive to exploit strategic nuclear strikes with operational-tactical nuclear strikes to completely defeat enemy forces and to capture the enemy's territory.²⁹ This is the classic Soviet concept of a campaign in the NATO TVDs. In the Soviet view, nuclear weapons are to be used to win the war and not for limited, demonstrative purposes. No doubt the Soviets have studied US concepts of limited nuclear operations, and may have experimented with such concepts, but they are not likely to accept them because limited use of nuclear weapons has nothing to do with winning a nuclear war. The Soviets like to cite a dictum from Lenin: "War must be waged seriously or not at all."³⁰

The Soviets envisage three basic types of operations: strategic offensive; strategic defensive; and combined arms—or "operational strategic"—in the Eurasian TVDs. The latter two types are significantly different from their US counterparts.

Strategic Offensive

In all TVDs strategic offensive operations are designed to destroy the enemy's nuclear delivery systems, nuclear weapons stocks, and fabrication facilities, command-control centers, other elements of the enemy's military establishment, and selected industry, transport, and communications facilities to prevent employment

and reconstitution of enemy forces.³¹ Soviet strategic offensive operations are not directed against population and industry as such. Collateral damage in the vicinity of valid targets is unavoidable; but unnecessary casualties are to be avoided by employing the minimum yield required, given target vulnerability, Soviet damage criteria and estimates of nuclear weapons effects, and delivery system CEP (circular error probable). The Soviets do not want to inhibit, much less prevent, "social progress" for decades or even centuries.³² Enemy governments, however, are to be destroyed because, by definition, they will have been responsible for starting the war.

Of all the mirror images the United States has created, one of the most pernicious is that the Soviets have a near insatiable appetite for inflicting fatalities on the general population. On the one hand, this image constitutes a nearly insuperable barrier to understanding Soviet weapon developments; on the other hand, it provides the basis for talking ourselves out of sensible programs. Ironically, the image mirrored is US declaratory policy of the 1960s (mutual assured destruction (MAD)) which (a) was not accepted as the basis for targeting US weapons, and (b) is now officially recognized as an inadequate strategy either for declaratory purposes or for planning and targeting US strategic nuclear forces.³³

Since the early 1960s the SRF has had an effective counterforce capability in the Eurasian TVDs. Deployed in concentrated, mostly soft launchers, the SRF's IR/MRBMs, though vulnerable, provided complete coverage of the fixed targets in the Eurasian TVDs and, because these targets were predominantly soft, could destroy most of them with weapons yielding 50 to 500 kt.³⁴ At the end of the 1960s NATO began to harden its airfields somewhat by installing hangar-ettes designed to reduce vulnerabilities to nonnuclear munitions; French IRBMs also became operational circa 1970. As has been noted, the Soviets responded by deploying hardened ICBMs in MRBM fields and then by modernizing them with more accurate versions. If the Soviets had intended to replace all their aging IR/MRBMs with more accurate, cheaper, and much less vulnerable ICBMs, SALT ceilings eliminated this option. However, the mobile SS-20 was available, and unconstrained by SALT limits.

Development and deployment of the SS-20 to replace the SS-4s and SS-5s raised the usual question of "what are they up to?" amongst Western officials. The answer was and remains: in deploying the SS-20 the Soviets are satisfying straightforward military requirements. Because it is mobile, the SS-20 will be relatively invulnerable; its greater accuracy and MIRVed (multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle) payload increases

effectiveness against the NATO target array while reducing total megatonnage substantially. Whereas the SS-4 and SS-5 missiles required 50 to 500 kt to inflict required levels of damage on most targets in the NATO TVDs, the SS-20, contemporary Soviet ICBMs and the late model SLBMs need deliver only 25 to 150 kt to meet Soviet damage requirements. Consequently, occupation of Europe becomes more feasible, more European assets will survive to assist USSR recovery, and fallout drifting back to the Soviet Union on the prevailing westerlies also will be reduced. Moreover, SS-20 deployments can be expanded to counter the Chinese threat if necessary, without SALT restrictions. There should be no problem in understanding why the Soviets are buying the SS-20.

Meeting requirements for a disarming strike in the "transoceanic" TVD has been much tougher. Whether the Soviets originally thought they could pace US ICBM deployments with the SS-7 and SS-8 in the early 1960s is a moot point to which we are not likely to have the answer for decades, if ever. More importantly, by the time these systems became operational they had been rendered ineffective by US silos and Polaris. The Soviets responded with the SS-9 to attack Minuteman launch-control centers that appeared to be the vulnerable "link" in the Minuteman system—one control center for each ten silos, and the smaller, cheaper SS-11 to attack soft targets. Deploying both the SS-9 and SS-11 in silos reduced Soviet sensitivity as to whether they would succeed in preempting (on warning) or would have to retaliate and then try to regain the initiative.

The SS-9 is a classic example of how the requirements of Soviet doctrine and strategy drive weapon systems design, and also of US inability to comprehend Soviet motivations. Soviet doctrine says nuclear war must be fought and won. Soviet strategy says to do this one must destroy as much of the enemy's nuclear forces on the ground as possible. Technology constrained the accuracy of the SS-9 (designed circa 1960) to about 0.5 nm.³⁵ To kill Minuteman launch-control centers (or silos) a large warhead was needed. The 18 to 25 mt yields reported for the SS-9 were necessary to achieve a single shot probability of kill of around 0.8 to 0.9. In the United States, conventional wisdom always mirror imaging, perceived the SS-9 to be a "super brute" designed to bust cities. Because such large warheads are an inefficient way to maximize fatalities, the SS-9 was perceived by many American analysts and policymakers as "technologically regressive" and "aesthetically contemptible."³⁶ In addition to erroneous perceptions of Soviet strategic nuclear concepts, such US conventional wisdom overlooked the fact that parallel with the SS-9 the Soviets developed and deployed the SS-

11 at a ratio of 3:1 to the SS-9. The SS-11 has a CEP of about 0.7 to 1.0 nm and a yield usually reported at around 1.5 mt, quite comparable to the 1.0 mt reported for Minuteman I and II models.³⁷ (Actually, of course, most SS-11 warheads are likely to be in the 50 to 500 kt range since yields are adequate to destroy soft targets.)

Soviet counterforce aspirations with the SS-9, however, were frustrated. By the time the first SS-9s became operational the United States had introduced airborne command posts which could launch Minuteman missiles from their individual silos even if the launch control centers were destroyed. About the same time the Soviets probably also realized how much redundancy the United States had built into the Minuteman system; that even if nine out of ten command-control "nodes" were destroyed the system could still function. Meanwhile, however, the Soviets had demonstrated the MIRV concept in two 1964 space shots; and the 8th Five Year Plan (1966-1970) included development of the current generation of ICBMs—SS-16 through SS-19.³⁸ As one Soviet writer put it so candidly in 1967, the 8th Five Year Plan provided for larger numbers of more advanced weapons of all types "and for maintaining military superiority over imperialism in the field of principal and decisive types of weapons, and first of all nuclear-rocket weapons."³⁹

The current generation of Soviet ICBMs, with improvements in guidance accuracy already reported, will provide the Soviets with an effective counterforce capability against Minuteman in a few years, after nearly two decades of effort. Accuracy of the initial models of the SS-16, SS-17, SS-18, and SS-19 was reported as 0.25 to 0.3 nm; accuracy of the later models of the SS-18 and SS-19 is reported as 1.0 nm.⁴⁰ Coverage of other military targets will be completed on a worldwide basis, as it has been complete since the early 1960s in the Eurasian TVDs. Warhead yields have declined as accuracy has been improved; hence, total megatonnage delivered, collateral damage, and fallout will be reduced in all TVDs. The US Intelligence Community has revised its yield estimates down to the region indicated by target vulnerability and the Soviet principle of using minimum yields.⁴¹ No doubt the four new ICBMs reported to be under development will improve effectiveness against all types of targets with further reductions in yields and collateral damage. The objective is to "execute the assigned mission with minimum expenditure of explosive power."⁴²

Having negotiated and built up to the 950 launcher limit on SLBMs, the Soviets now have enough of these missiles to fulfill their primary mission of providing a large, secure reserve force, and also to play a significant role in the initial exchange. The Soviets require reserve forces not only for operations after the initial nuclear

exchange but also to enforce the peace if "victory" is achieved.⁴⁴ They will soon begin modernizing their SLBM force with the "Typhoon" system, the Soviet equivalent of Trident. Older SSBNs, as was noted years ago in *Military Thought*, can be converted to other missions where additional boats are needed.⁴⁵

Despite the imminent promise of counterforce capabilities and complete (fixed) target coverage in all TVDs, unless frustrated by multiple aimpoint deployment of Minuteman to which the Soviets are not likely to agree, the Soviets recognize the limits of counterforce operations. As was pointed out in *Military Thought* in passages that some observers have erroneously interpreted as Soviet acceptance of mutual deterrence, neither side can prevent the other from delivering an enormously destructive second strike.⁴⁶ Having themselves adopted launch-on-warning in the mid-1960s, the Soviets probably assume the United States would try to do the same. Moreover, one cannot count on catching the bombers on the ground, or on destroying more than about one-third of the SLBMs in port. Mutual retaliatory capabilities cannot be eliminated by preemptive counterforce operations alone, thus the need for strategic defenses to supplement the offense.

Strategic Defense

Soviet strategic defensive operations consist of air, missile, and space defense against enemy forces. In Soviet usage, the term "air defense" includes all three types of strategic defensive operations. Active defense is supplemented by civil defense to reduce losses to population, industry, and transport; to maintain some level of military production; and to restore essential production and services as rapidly as possible. The bottom line for both strategic offensive and defensive operations is limiting damage to the Soviet Union—military forces, population, and industry—while destroying enemy military capabilities to prosecute the war. This is what "repelling" an enemy attack means to the Soviets.⁴⁷

Whereas the inexorable march of technology has been on the side of the SRF and the Navy's SLBMs in performing their missions, PVO Strany fell far behind in the mid-1960s despite the development of thousands of radars, SAM (surface to air missile) launchers, and interceptors. Essentially, after two decades of effort, by the late 1960s, PVO Strany had fielded a formidable defense against aircraft penetrating at high altitude—although still vulnerable to electronic countermeasures (ECM)—but was unable to respond to low altitude penetration tactics and short-range attack missiles

(SRAMs). According to recent reports, during the next 5 years the Soviets will begin fielding their response to these threats: the SA-10, airborne warning and control system (AWACS), and interceptors with look-down, shoot-down capabilities.⁴⁷ Meanwhile the United States once again has raised the technological ante with cruise missiles against which an advanced version of Foxbat reportedly is being tested. Clearly, PVO Strany will be able to perform its mission better in the next decade than in the past but just how much improvement can be achieved will be a matter of much uncertainty on both sides, and a subject of lusty controversy among US analysts. Nevertheless, cruise missiles notwithstanding, PVO Strany will be gaining rather than losing ground against the aerodynamic threat in the 1980s.⁴⁸

Although precluded by the ABM Treaty, ballistic missile defense continues to be a PVO Strany mission. Maintaining and improving PVO Strany air defenses are not responses to Chinese aerodynamic threats and make no sense, indeed are a complete waste, as long as ballistic missile defenses are lacking. Reported advances in Soviet ABM technology since SALT began in 1969 indicate that by the time PVO Strany acquires a large inventory of new interceptors and SAMs in the mid-1980s, the Soviets probably will have the capability to deploy the kind of ABM defense the United States started to deploy in the late 1960s.⁴⁹ This would include:

- Large over-the-horizon radars for warning of both offensive and defensive forces
- Large phased-array radars for battle management over large areas
- Small phased-array radars for local defense, endo-atmospheric engagement, and discrimination
- High acceleration (sprint type) interceptors for local defense

Construction of the large phased-array, battle-management radars apparently has been underway for several years on the Soviet periphery and another large radar is under construction at Moscow.⁵⁰ Consequently, nationwide ABM deployment could proceed rapidly when the other components are ready. These "conventional" ABM defenses may be supplemented by advanced optical technologies later in the 1980s. Such missile defense probably

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
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would be quite attractive to the Soviets who do not require defense to be foolproof as a condition of deployment. Furthermore, Soviet ABM defenses that might be only 50 percent effective against a maximum US attack would be adequate to preclude damage from attacks by lesser powers.

Few aspects of Soviet defense policy arouse as much controversy and emotion among US defense scholastics as Soviet civil defense programs each time the United States rediscovers them. When even the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) estimates the cost of replicating Soviet civil defense efforts in the United States at \$2 billion annually, and when even the CIA admits that more complete information probably would raise those estimates, it is time to cease denying that the Soviets have such a program and to try coping with it as one of the basic elements in the strategic balance between the two superpower coalitions. The Soviets have been spending a lot of rubles on civil defense for several decades.

By the late 1960s Russian civil defense had the potential to reduce casualties (from prompt effects) to less than 10 percent of the population, according to one Soviet civil defense manual.⁵¹ While credible under some assumptions, this claim was, and remains, subject to many uncertainties. It is one thing to evacuate tens of millions of people and build temporary shelters in summer; it is quite another thing in winter, even if the people are hardy Russians. Very likely the Soviets have done more than we realize to reduce the vulnerability of their economy to nuclear attack; but most of it is increasingly concentrated as economic exigencies force more and more investment into expanding and modernizing existing plants rather than building new facilities in dispersed locations. The uncertainties about civil defense performance are too great to tempt Soviet leaders to rash actions. On the other hand, these uncertainties cut both ways. Defined as destruction of 25 to 30, sometimes even 50 percent of the Soviet population, the US declaratory policy of "assured destruction" was not "assured" even before it was first announced. And the amount of permanent damage we could inflict on Soviet industry may be less than we usually assume, at least in a number of plausible scenarios.

Although often overlooked, the Red Navy has two strategic defensive missions, as previously noted: defense against enemy carrier aviation, and strategic antisubmarine warfare (ASW) against enemy nuclear missile submarines (SSBNs).⁵² Here the balance of missions versus the capabilities is very mixed. The combination of SLCMs, attack submarines, Naval Air Force and LRA medium bombers—both being modernized with Backfire and new missiles—appears to be a match for US and allied carriers. Much would depend on ECM. The carriers probably could defend themselves;

but Soviet forces also probably could keep the carriers from coming to NATO's aid after the SRF, supplemented by the LRA and FA, had carried out successive strikes on NATO airfields. The Red Navy's strategic ASW mission against US and allied SSBNs, however, suffers from even greater technological deficiencies than PVO Strany's air defenses despite two decades of effort. Although strategic ASW is the primary mission of Soviet major open-ocean combatants modernized or constructed since 1960, and of the Victor and Alpha class SSNs, the Soviets have made little progress in terms of effective capabilities to destroy US SSBNs before they launch their missiles. Two decades ago Soviet strategic ASW forces couldn't find a US SSBN, and couldn't kill it if they happened upon it. Presently they still can't find US SSBNs, but could kill some of them if they could find them.

Soviet naval officers writing in *Military Thought* in the mid-1960s described some of the characteristics of an advanced, high-speed ASW submarine capable of operating at depths of 600 to 1,200 meters, "the axis of the deep-water sound channel."⁵³ To operate at such depths an SSN requires a hull fabricated from space-age alloys (probably titanium), obviously an extremely costly program (with long development and production lead times). Largely ignored—as is most Soviet military literature—by US officialdom, these articles have proven prophetic indeed. The Alpha class SSN now is reported to operate at depths of 600m and possibly as deep as 900m or more. Alpha reportedly charges rather noisily around the ocean's depths at 40 knots, has (naturally) a titanium hull, and develops more horsepower per pound from its nuclear reactor than the United States has been able to achieve.⁵⁴ Alpha has been in development for some time, probably for nearly two decades; the first unit was launched about 1970, the second in 1977-78.⁵⁵ Six of these high-performance SSNs have been built and the first—an Alpha class—has completed its first ocean patrol.⁵⁶

Combined Arms (or "Operational Strategic")

Combined arms operations—Ground Forces, Frontal Aviation, Military Transport Aviation, Airborne, and Navy—are to exploit the results of strategic offensive operations in the Eurasian TVDs. The Soviets expect to complete such operations in a few weeks after the initial exchange, but allow for the possibility of a protracted war if their strategic offensive operations do not make it possible to finish off the enemy and occupy his territory (in Europe) quickly. To support the combined arms offensive large stocks of weapons must

be procured in peacetime and located in forward areas because industry and transport probably will be severely disrupted by the initial exchange. Units must be either maintained at combat strength in peacetime or capable of rapid mobilization during a crisis.⁵⁷

Soviet Ground Forces (GF) and Frontal Aviation (FA), supported by Military Transport Aviation, airborne forces, and the Navy, must consummate the operations of strategic forces by defeating the enemy remnants and occupying enemy territory. Given the preponderance of Soviet strategic forces achieved by the early 1960s in the Eurasian TVDs, Soviet Ground Forces have not experienced wide gaps between mission and capabilities. Nevertheless GF and FA capabilities have improved dramatically in the past decade and are still on a rising curve. The turning point came in the mid-1960s with the fall of Khrushchev, the modification of doctrine to allow for a conventional phase in a war with NATO, the experience in the 1967 Mid-East and Vietnam wars, and the massive technology transfer from US forces in Vietnam. These factors combined to raise the relative priority of the GF, FA, and support forces. The reequipment programs instituted then (Research and Development (R&D)) and continued (R&D plus production) through the seventies are providing the GF and FA the capabilities to fight both a nuclear and a conventional war with NATO on terms of Soviet superiority.

A Possible Soviet Net Assessment

Although Soviet paranoia could have it otherwise, Soviet forces along the Soviet border with China appear to be adequate, at the very least, to defend the USSR's territorial integrity. The Soviets are not likely to have any ambitions to penetrate beyond the Great Wall in a war with China. Although China is a threat, Europe is the focus of Soviet ambitions, because Soviet control of Europe would change the "correlation of forces" overwhelmingly in the Soviet's favor.

If we were to imagine the NATO TVDs as "decoupled" from the "transoceanic" TVD, then the Soviets have overwhelming military superiority over their "probable enemies," thanks largely to their strategic missiles (IR/MRBMs, ICBMs, and SLBMs) and the LRA. The Soviets should be able to "fight" and "win" a "decoupled" nuclear war with NATO and seize Europe relatively intact. The Soviets have a conventional weapons edge in the NATO TVD, but this advantage may not be nearly enough for Soviet comfort, at least

not yet. Only US strategic nuclear forces based in the "transoceanic" TVD restore the balance because of the limits of counterforce operations and the remaining gaps in Soviet defenses: air, missile, and ASW. However, the Soviets may see strategic nuclear "decoupling" of NATO Europe from the United States as a feasible objective in the 1980s, thanks to the Soviet margin of superiority in offensive forces embodied in the SALT Treaty and to the greatly expanded Soviet effort on strategic defensive forces already underway and to be accelerated in the 1980s.

Even after several decades of effort, however, the military capabilities of the Soviets are not adequate to achieve their objectives in most scenarios. Unless frustrated by new US missile basing plans, which the Soviets are not likely to accept, Soviet strategic-offensive forces soon will be able to perform all the missions assigned to them, and to be relatively insensitive to the scenario. The crucial remaining gaps between objectives and capabilities are in Soviet strategic-defensive forces: air, missile, and strategic ASW. Since SALT began the Soviets have continued to pour resources into strategic air defense and ASW, and into ABM R&D. As a result they may be able to narrow the air-defense gap in the 1980s and should have the technology to do something about ballistic-missile defense in a few years. Strategic ASW, however, requires a technological breakthrough.

Soviet Military Policy: A Summary Perspective

Although the Soviets no longer are so frank, and lately have resorted to some deception, they stated their military objectives clearly in their literature during the 1960s and into the mid-1970s. They do not intend to start a war with the West; but they do design their military posture to fight and win a nuclear war if it occurs. Justification is lacking both for imputing "surprise attack" designs to the Soviets, and for dismissing "victory" in a nuclear war as a Soviet slogan to keep up the troops' morale. To borrow a phrase from Professor Erickson, realistic appreciation of the Soviet threat is ill served by "freakish notions" such as these from both extremes of the analytical spectrum.

The Soviets perceive acquisition of war-fighting capabilities to be their best deterrent. By the same token, the more the Soviets approach having such capabilities, the more they degrade the US deterrent which is based on the capability to inflict unacceptable punishment for breaking the peace rather than to prosecute the war

after the initial exchange. Soviet damage-limiting policies and forces put less and less at risk while US abstinence from damage-limiting measures put more and more at risk. This asymmetry in strategic concepts coupled with Soviet progress in acquiring the forces required by their concepts increases stability of deterrence as the Soviets view it, but destabilizes deterrence as the United States views it. Consequently, it is difficult to see how the United States can maintain an adequate deterrent posture in the 1980s and 1990s by relying only on strategic-offensive forces.

The rationale for Soviet weapons acquisition has been clearly stated in their literature for years, and also is not difficult to infer from their observed deployments. Bureaucratic inertia and self-serving interests, politics, and action-reaction all play a role but do not dominate Soviet military policy. Viewed deductively, the forces in the field represent a consistent, persistent effort to achieve the objectives specified by doctrine and strategy, subject to technological, economic, and other constraints. Viewed inductively, the tenets and objectives of doctrine and strategy can be inferred from the thrust of observed R&D programs and deployments.

The operative aims of Soviet military policy, like those of Soviet foreign policy, are not to stabilize the status quo but to change the "correlation of forces" in their favor by achieving as much of a military advantage as possible. The justification for a military advantage is its political utility in peacetime, and the potential to win a nuclear war if deterrence fails for any reason. Thus far, SALT has had no effect on the operative aims of Soviet military policy, other than to set certain qualitative limits on about two-thirds of their strategic-offensive forces and to remove the spectre of US ABM deployments that the Soviets could not match.

We do not know who will replace Brezhnev and Tikhonov, nor what their successors' policies may be. Nevertheless, basic changes seem to be the least likely possibility. Pursuing their traditional military policies in the 1980s will become increasingly difficult as the rising military burden combines with slow growth in the labor force to reduce economic growth even further. Despite these and other foreseeable difficulties, however, the Soviet Union probably has some nasty surprises in store for the United States in the eighties, not the least of which will be abrogating the ABM Treaty in the mid-1980s.

Endnotes

1. General Major K. Bochkarev, "An Evaluation of the Results of the June Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR," *Military Thought*, no. 7 (1968), pp. 13-14.
2. Editorial, "The 51st Anniversary of the Soviet Armed Forces," *Military Thought*, no. 2 (1969), p. 2. The editorial charges that the "wicked and crafty...class enemy" is willing to commit any crimes for his mercenary interests.
3. Marshal (SU) K. Moskalenko, "Constant Combat Readiness is a Strategic Category," *Military Thought*, no. 1 (1969), pp. 12, 14, 18; editorial, "The 51st Anniversary of the Soviet Armed Forces," *Military Thought*, no. 2, (1969), pp. 2, 3.
4. Colonel E. Rybkin, "Leninskaya Kontsepiya Voyny i Sovremennost'," *Kommunist Vooruzhennikh Sil'*, no. 20 (1973), pp. 21-22. Rybkin is a political officer who has been mistakenly identified by some Western commentators as a military "hawk." Actually, as an officer in General Yepishev's Main Political Administration and as a faculty member at the Lenin Political-Military Academy, Rybkin speaks for the CPSU Central Committee.
5. Colonel E. Rybkin "Antinauchnost" Burzhuaznykh Kontseptsii Militarizma i Agressii," *Kommunist Vooruzhennikh Sil'*, no. 6 (1979).
6. General Major A. Korniyenko, "The Economic Basis of the State's Military Power," *Military Thought*, no. 8 (1968).
7. Colonel D. Ivanov, "The Hot-bed of Militarism and Tension in Europe," *Military Thought*, no. 7 (1967), pp. 73-77.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 82.
9. For a discussion of these points, see William T. Lee, "The Politico-Military-Industrial Complex of the USSR," *Journal of International Affairs* 26 (1972): 81-83.
10. B.N. Ponomarev (Candidate Member of the Politburo, Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU), "Scientific-technical revolution and deepening of the contradictions of capitalism;" speech to an international congress on this subject held in Moscow, *Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta*, no. 24 (1979).
11. Colonel D. Ivanov, *Military Thought*, no. 2 (1969), p. 76.
12. James Reston "Watching Mr. Brezhnev in Vienna," *Washington Post*, 26 June 1979.
13. Editorial, "The 51st Anniversary of the Soviet Armed Forces," *Military Thought*, no. 2 (1968), p. 3.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 2.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 3.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 4.

17. *Kommunist*, February 1979. The translation is taken from *Soviet World Outlook*, vol. 4, no. 6 (Advanced International Studies Institute, Inc., in association with the University of Miami).
18. *The Soviet-Yugoslav Dispute* (Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1948), p. 51
19. *Sovetskaia Voennaia Entsiklopediia*, vol. 7, p. 49; Var: 'olomeyev and M.I. Kopytov, eds., *Design and Testing of Ballistic Missiles* (1970, JPKS 51810, 19 November 1970), p. 285.
20. For example, General Army S. Ivanov "Soviet Military Doctrine and Strategy," *Military Thought*, no. 5, p. 47. General Ivanov is a line officer and was Commandant of the General Staff Academy from 1968 to 1973.
21. Colonel A. Rybkin, "Leninskaia Kontsepsiia," *Kommunist Vooruzhennikh Sil*, October 1973, p. 26.
22. For the history of this modification through 1970, see W.T. Lee and Harriet Fast Scott, *Evolution of USSR Military Doctrine on the Issue of Non-Nuclear War, 1960-1970* (SRI SSC-TN-8260, 10 July 1970).
23. Marshal (SU) N. Krylov, "The Nuclear-Missile Shield of the Soviet State," *Military Thought*, no. 11 (1967), p. 18. Strictly speaking, this is launch-under-attack, i.e., on tactical warning of enemy missiles launched or in flight. Preemptive launch on learning of strategic intent was adopted in the axial period.
24. This confusion between Soviet assessment and acceptance is the essence of Raymond L. Garthoff's argument, "Mutual Deterrence and Strategic Arms Limitation," *International Security* (Summer 1978) (particularly pp. 125-130 and 146-147) that the Soviets seek to stabilize and to maintain mutual deterrence.
25. *Sovetskaia Voennaia Entsiklopediia*, vol. 2 (1976), p. 253. Until his death, Marshal (SU) A.A. Grechko, Minister of Defense, was chairman of the editorial committee. He was replaced by Marshal (SU) I.V. Ogarkov, Chief of the General Staff, who distinguished himself as the chief military delegate for SALT I.
26. Garthoff, "Mutual Deterrence and Strategic Arms Limitation" (p. 139) says the Soviets ceased to call for strategic superiority after the 24th Party Congress in April 1971. This 1976 citation from the *Military Encyclopedia*, vol. 2, is only one of many references to superiority as the Soviet objective that have appeared since April 1971. Beginning with Brezhnev's speech in Tula in January 1977, cited by Garthoff on p. 140 of his article, the Soviets have been engaged in a bit of strategic deception by denying that they seek superiority. But this is a subject for a chapter by itself.
27. General Major Ye. Nikitin, "The Revolution in Military Affairs and Measures of the CPSU for Raising the Combat Might of the Armed Forces," *Military Thought*, no. 6 (1967), p. 7. For an extensive discussion of the political and military meaning of superiority, see an article by another political officer who, bureaucratically, speaks for the Central Committee, Colonel S. Tiushkevich, "The Methodology of the Correlation of Forces in War," *Military Thought*, no. 6 (1969), especially pp. 32-33.
28. General Major A. Korniyenko, "The Economic Bases of the State's Military Power," *Military Thought*, no. 8 (1968), pp. 2-3.

29. General Lieutenant G.G. Semonov, "The Content of the Concept of an Operation," *Military Thought*, no. 1 (1968), pp. 92-93.

30. Colonel S. Tarn, "Leninist Theoretical Principles of Soviet Military Strategy," *Military Thought*, no. 6 (1971), p. 48. In this particular translation "seriously" is rendered as "right," but the thought is the same.

31. This is the classic Soviet nuclear targeting strategy as formulated circa 1950 and reiterated constantly since then. For a general discussion of Soviet nuclear targeting, see W.T. Lee, "Soviet Nuclear Targeting Strategy and SALT" in *World Communism at the Crossroads*, ed., Steven Rosefielde (Boston, The Hague, London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishing, 1980), pp. 55-88. The listing of targets is found in numerous Soviet publications such as all three editions of Marshal Sokolovsky's (editor) *Military Strategy* (1962, 1964, 1968), and Marshal (SU) Krylov, Commander in Chief, SRF, from 1963 until his death in 1972, in *Nedelia*, no. 36 (September 1967).

32. Some of the principal sources are General Lieutenant G. G. Semenov and General Major V. Prokhorov, "Scientific Technical Progress and Some Questions of Strategy," *Military Thought*, no. 2 (1969); General Major V. Kruchinin, "Contemporary Strategic Theory on the Goals and Missions of Armed Conflict," *Military Thought*, no. 10 (1963); General Major K. Dzhelaukhov, "The Infliction of Deep Strikes," *Military Thought*, no. 2 (1966); Colonel M. Shirokov, "Military Geography at the Present Stage," *Military Thought*, no. 11 (1966); and "The Question of Geographic Influences on the Military and Economic Potential of Warring States," *Military Thought*, no. 4, 1968; General Colonel A.S. Zheltov (chief editor) *Metodologicheskie Problemy Voennoy Teorii i Praktiki* (1969, 2nd ed.), pp. 119-121. Zheltov was the Commandant of the Lenin Political-Military Academy from 1959 to 1971.

33. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, *Annual Report Fiscal Year 1980*, pp. 75, 76. Presumably the promulgation of Presidential Directive (PD) 59 represents the official end to "mutual assured destruction" (MAD) as US declaratory targeting strategy. Ironically, (a) actual US targeting strategy never was in line with the requirements of MAD, and (b) PD 59, although it may provide more targeting option packages for crisis management, brings declaratory US nuclear targeting strategy to where the Soviets started out some 30 years ago—see Lee, "Soviet Nuclear Targeting Strategy" in *World Communism at the Crossroads*, pp. 57-58 and 64-66.

34. For the supporting analysis, see "Soviet Nuclear Targeting Strategy and SALT," and a more comprehensive updated treatment of the subject in W.T. Lee, "Trends in Soviet Strategic Ballistic Missile Forces," paper delivered at the Conference on US Strategic Doctrine for the 1980s sponsored by the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Washington, DC, 4-5 December 1980.

35. For yields and accuracy of the SS-9 and the other ICBMs mentioned in this paragraph, see John M. Collins, *American and Soviet Military Trends Since the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Washington, DC: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, 1978), p. 93; Congressional Budget Office, *Counterforce Issues for the U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1978), pp. 13-16.

36. John Newhouse, *Cold Dawn, The Story of SALT* (New York, Chicago, San Francisco: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973), p. 21. Newhouse writes: "Even now,

American experts regard the SS-9 as technologically regressive; its destructive power is out of all proportion to any rational mission, at least as seen from Washington," (p. 21). On p. 105 Newhouse alleges that the Soviets have "nothing like a rigorous strategic doctrine"!

37. Institutional momentum also does not explain the characteristics and deployment ratios of the SS-9 and SS-11 in the environment of the early 1960s.

38. Charles S. Sheldon et al., *Soviet Space Programs, 1966-1970*, staff report for the Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences of the United States Senate (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 9 December 1971), p. 168.

39. Colonel A. Aleksandrov, "The Bases and Principles of Soviet Military Organization," *Military Thought*, no. 12 (1967), p. 27.

40. Collins, *American and Soviet Military Trends*, p. 93 and footnote 69, p. 120.

41. Walter Pincus, "US Downgrades Estimates of Power of Soviet Missiles," *Washington Post*, 31 June 1979.

42. General Major Kruchinin, "Contemporary Strategic Theory," p. 17.

43. General Major K. Dzhelaukov, "Combatting Strategic Reserves in a Theatre of Military Operations," *Military Thought*, no. 11 (1964).

44. Admiral H. Kharlamov, "Some Trends in the Development of Navies," *Military Thought*, no. 10 (1967), p. 67.

45. General Major N. Vasendin and Colonel N. Kuznetsov, "Modern Warfare and Surprise Attack," *Military Thought*, no. 6 (1968), p. 43. General Army S. Ivanov, "Soviet Military Doctrine," p. 48. Many of the citations Garthoff uses to support his argument that the Soviets have accepted strategic stability based on mutual second strike deterrence and parity are simply Soviet recognitions of the limits of the contribution counterforce strikes can make to a damage-limiting, war-fighting strategy—"Mutual Deterrence" in *International Security* (Summer 1978) 126-132.

46. General Major A. Vasendin and Colonel N. Kuznetsov, "Modern Warfare and Surprise Attack," *Military Thought*, no. 6 (1968), p. 47. General Major I. Zavialov, "An Answer to Opponents," *Military Thought*, no. 10 (1965), p. 53. General Army S. Ivanov, "Soviet Military Doctrine and Strategy," *Military Thought*, no. 5 (1969). Ivanov is a senior officer who headed a Directorate of the General Staff as a Deputy Chief of Staff and was the Commandant of the General Staff Academy in 1968-1973. Marshal V.D. Sokolovskiy, *Voennia Strategia* (1962, 1964, and 1968), ch. 7.

47. Central Intelligence Agency, "Estimated Soviet Defense Spending: Trends and Prospects," SR 78-10121, June 1978, p. 12; according to the *Washington Post*, 24 October 1978, the SA-10 was being installed on Red Navy ships, so its deployment with PVO Strany must be imminent. Since this chapter was written in the first half of 1979, much additional information has appeared on PVO modernization with these and other new weapon systems in the 1980s.

48. One estimate by Dr. William Perry, US Undersecretary of Defense for Research

and Engineering, puts cost of Soviet Air Defenses that could shoot down 1,500 of 3,000 US cruise missiles at the dollar equivalent of \$50 billion—*International Defense Review* 1 (1979).

49. Henry S. Bradsher, "Soviet ABM Defense Setup has Pentagon Concerned," *Washington Star*, 16 February 1978; *Armed Forces Journal*, March 1979, p. 17.

50. Edgar Ulsamer, "Moscow's Goal is Military Superiority," *Air Force Magazine*, March 1980, reports four peripheral battle-management radars, apparently complete or nearly so. Walter Pincus, "Soviets Update Anti-ballistic Missile Systems with New Radar," *Washington Post*, 14 September 1980, reports that the new Moscow radar will be completed in about one year, which means construction of this radar probably began in 1978-79 (or even earlier). A smaller radar of the so-called X-3 ABM-system apparently has been operating against Soviet ICBMs since 1975, and the X-3 system, except for the battle-management radars which apparently will be complete in 1981, or thereabouts, is reported to be suitable for rapid deployment—Clarence A. Robinson, Jr., "Soviets Grasping Strategic Lead," *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, 30 October 1975; Henry S. Bradsher, *Washington Star*, 16 February 1978.

Other sources—e.g., "Soviets' Nuclear Arsenal Continues to Proliferate," *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, 16 June 1980, p. 75—describe what appear to be the same four large, new phased-array radars as early warning systems having the capability to provide a better track assessment and tracking of ICBMs. Evidently, intelligence and technical analysts disagree about both the missions and the capabilities of these new radars.

51. N. E. Akimov, ed., *Grazhdanskaya Oborona* (1969).

52. For an extended discussion of the Red Navy's missions and shipbuilding programs, see the compendium edited by Paul J. Murphy, *Naval Power in Soviet Policy* (US Air Force, Studies on Communist Affairs, vol. 2, 1978), particularly ch. 1, pp. 6-13; and chs. 2.3.5 and 6. For the latest in Soviet anticarrier weapon systems see the "Oscar" class SSN described by Edgar Ulsamer, "In Focus," *Air Force Magazine*, December 1980, p. 26. According to Ulsamer, "Oscar" displaces some 30,000 tons and steams at up to 55 knots. This seems a little large and a little fast, but we shall see.

53. Admiral N. Kharlamov, "Some Trends in the Development of Navies," *Military Thought*, no. 10 (1967), pp. 66-67; Admiral A. Chabenko, "Combat Rocket Carrying Atomic Submarines," *Military Thought*, no. 12 (1967), pp. 46-47.

54. George C. Wilson, "Soviet Navy Has Faster, Lighter Sub," *Washington Post*, 18 May 1979. If the new "Oscar" class cruise missile submarine can do anywhere near the 55 knots initially reported—Ulsamer, *Air Force*, December 1980—it represents a dramatic advance over Alpha class technology which already has US intelligence analysts agog.

55. *Jane's Fighting Ships 1974-75 and 1977-78*. In the 1977-78 edition of *Jane's*, Alpha's speed was put at 16 knots surfaced and 18 knots submerged. The latter edition of *Jane's* (p. 68) evaluated Alpha as "a program which apparently has come to a halt and whose purpose is unclear."

56. *International Defense Review*, no. 2 (1980), p. 164.

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57. Marshal (SU) V.D. Sokolovskiy, *Voennia Strategiia* (1962, 1964, and 1968), ch. 7. Designated "General Purpose Forces" by the United States, the primary missions of these forces are political, to "defend the conquests of socialism" in Eastern Europe and Afghanistan, and "operational-strategic" as described above—see the entry under "OB'EDINEME" in vol. 5 of the *Sovetskaia Voennaia Entsiklopediia*, p. 679.

Chapter Six

Soviet Perceptions of US Military Strategies and Forces

William F. Scott and Harriet Fast Scott

Both in peace and in war the perceptions one nation has of another nation's military might are of vital importance, especially if the nations concerned are military superpowers. In time of crisis the decision of the Soviet leadership to commit or not to commit its strategic nuclear forces would be largely determined by the Kremlin's perceptions of the correlation of Soviet and US forces. In time of peace Soviet leaders' understanding of US military strategy and weapons systems significantly influences Soviet force development.

It is critical in this nuclear-missile age that the perceptions each military superpower has of the other's military doctrine, strategy, and armed forces be as realistic as possible. An error in judging the reaction of the opposing side could bring about a nuclear exchange, or escalation on a battlefield from conventional to nuclear weapons. Obviously, the evaluations each side makes of the other's military intentions should be *objective, based on factual data*. A thorough understanding of the military doctrine of the other might lessen the danger of an accidental outbreak of war. Yet, as warned by Colonel Oleg Penkovskiy, the Soviet officer who in 1961 passed information about the new Soviet military doctrine to the West, the Soviet concept of Western military doctrine is completely different from what Westerners consider their own military doctrine to be.¹

There is little excuse for error in Soviet understanding of the military forces of the United States. Official Soviet representatives in the United States can, and do, obtain quantities of data published

both by government and industry about military manpower, organization, and weapons systems. Soviet visitors, as well as Soviet citizens assigned to the United Nations, have almost unlimited access to key individuals in and out of government, and can travel throughout the nation with few if any restrictions.²

The vast amount of data collected by Soviet representatives about the military forces of the United States is put to a variety of uses. In any major bookstore in the Soviet Union, and frequently in the bookstalls of larger airports and railway stations, it is possible to find books and journals describing US military forces and concepts in detail. One Soviet military journal even provides a listing of senior military personnel changes in the NATO nations.³ Much of the data is factual, especially that describing deployed weapons systems and the location of military units. But when discussing the intentions of Western governments, and their military strategy in particular, Soviet authors often significantly distort their readers' understanding of the West.

Largely because of these distortions, Soviet writings about US military strategy and forces seldom are taken seriously in the West, and generally are dismissed as propaganda. Indeed, such works rarely are read by Western analysts, and few are translated. However, when these writings are examined in any detail and compared with what is known about the Soviet armed forces, one conclusion emerges: Soviet military forces, training, exercises, and weapons systems are a logical means to combat the armed forces of their probable opponents—the "imperialist" powers—as portrayed by Soviet spokesmen. Therefore, an understanding of Soviet perceptions of US military forces, whether these perceptions be accurate or not, provides valuable insight into Soviet military doctrine, strategy, and force posture.

Publications for a Purpose

The first and most obvious reason for the mass of Soviet writings on the military forces of the "imperialist" powers is to inform members of the Soviet armed forces about the weapons systems, organization, strategy, doctrine, and tactics of their probable opponents. This is an intelligence function and a practice of most nations. Western military concepts also are studied for the purpose of developing counterstrategies or tactics, or to investigate new military principles.

With very few exceptions, information about new *Soviet* weapons systems is classified. In order for the Kremlin to maintain internal security about its latest weapons, and at the same time teach military personnel about the construction and use of these

weapons, Soviet authorities substitute modern Western weapons systems that are roughly comparable, as they are described in Western publications. The Soviet Air Force Museum in Moscow even uses wall posters of US missiles and air defense systems to illustrate how such systems look and how they are constructed.

Western weapons systems that may be in any stage from study to development are displayed in the Soviet press as if the systems already were in operational use. One reason for this practice may be to justify the development, production, or deployment of a similar Soviet weapons system. In the early 1960s, for example, the publicity given in the Soviet press to proposed US missile defense systems helped prepare the Soviet populace for the appearance of the huge Soviet antiballistic missile radars on the roads from Moscow to Leningrad and Minsk.⁴

Soviet writings on the capabilities and employment of tactical nuclear weapons by US forces often have little to do with actual US military concepts. It may be that Soviet strategists deliberately attribute to the United States certain of their own views and plans for the tactical use of nuclear weapons as an instructional technique for their own forces. This would help maintain secrecy for the planned use of tactical weapons by Soviet strategists. At the same time, writings about NATO's nuclear strategy may implant in the minds of the Soviet people that any nonnuclear conflict would rapidly escalate to general nuclear war, and therefore support the party line that civil defense training is essential.

Another major purpose of Soviet writings about US military forces is to provide a basis for "agitation and propaganda" (agitprop) instruction, directed at both the Soviet military forces and the civilian population. Magnification of the size and capabilities of Western military forces is used as a means of justifying the size, cost, and continued buildup of Soviet forces. The heavy military burden borne by the Soviet people can better be maintained if the population is convinced that the "imperialists" are planning aggressive actions, including a surprise nuclear strike.

Soviet leaders have found that propaganda attacks can be made against specific proposed US weapons systems, with considerable effect upon NATO governments and peoples. The massive Soviet campaign launched against the neutron bomb apparently was a major factor in the US Presidential decision to cease production of this weapon, as well as the nonsupport of our NATO allies. Similar campaigns were directed against the B-1 bomber and cruise missiles. If such campaigns are not fully successful in getting the United States to stop completely production of the system under attack, they may at least serve to slow production and deployment

to give Soviet scientists time to develop comparable or better Soviet systems.

In this era of arms control negotiations, Soviet writings about Western military forces may be a means of conducting an indirect dialogue with the West, by presenting possible positions for future discussions. Generally, writings of this type are published in the monthly journals of the two major Soviet social science research institutes: the Institute of the USA and Canada, and the Institute of World Economy and International Relations. At times, articles for this purpose also may appear in *Pravda* or in other major publications that are known to be carefully studied in the United States.

This Soviet attention to the armed forces of Western nations is not new. In the early days of the Soviet state, military textbooks and manuals from Europe and America were translated and used for instruction by the Red Army.⁵ In the 1950s and 1960s writings of leading foreign strategists were translated into Russian and republished. Among these were works of Henry Kissinger, Bernard Brodie, Robert Osgood, Maxwell Taylor, and others.⁶ Some of these works may have been more widely read in the Soviet Union than in the United States. Major Soviet military books, such as Marshal Sokolovskiy's *Military Strategy*⁷ and Colonel Sidorenko's *The Offensive*, generally have lengthy presentations on foreign military forces.

The emphasis given to Western military affairs is a result of deliberate Soviet policy. In the later 1950s a special department was established at the Academy of the General Staff to study the military doctrine, strategy, forces, and weapons systems of the "imperialist" nations. Judging from the cautiously worded description of this department in Soviet military publications, its first head was General Lieutenant M.A. Milshteyn, who in the late 1970s was still regarded as one of the leading Soviet military "Amerikanist." In 1957 Milshteyn coauthored a book, *On Bourgeois Military Science*,⁸ describing in detail the "war in the Pentagon" of the late 1940s and 1950s, wherein the services competed for roles and missions. The book ended with the following paragraph:

By all accounts it is everywhere necessary to study and to constantly watch for the state of bourgeois military science and the tendencies of its development. This permits a more purposeful and successful development of our own Soviet military science and the preparation of our armed forces to defeat any aggressor, possessing any weapons.⁹

Eighteen years later, the late Soviet Minister of Defense, Marshal A.A. Grechko, expressed the same theme in his discussion of military science. One of its tasks

is to be attentive to the status of military affairs abroad and to analyze deeply the changes taking place in armies of capitalist states—in the organization, weaponry, political-moral state, military doctrine, strategy, tactics, and in other questions connected with the preparation for war.¹⁰

Continuity and Change in Soviet Perceptions

The 1957 work by General Milshteyn, *On Bourgeois Military Science*, was one of the first Soviet writings, openly published, that attempted to cover the impact in the West of nuclear weapons, which "led to the beginning of a new era in the conduct of war," and showed that "concepts of strategy, as well as tactics, must undergo major reappraisal."¹¹ It may have been coincidental that the book appeared in the same year the Soviets successfully tested the world's first ICBM and launched the world's first artificial earth satellite. As later revealed, at that very time, in secret, senior Soviet officers were directed to study what impact the nuclear weapon would have upon each of the Soviet military services.¹² There are a number of similarities between Milshteyn's perceptions of US concepts of nuclear war and the views presented in the Soviet studies on doctrinal issues, and how their own forces should be reorganized.

Military Strategy, edited by Marshal V.D. Sokolovskiy, appeared in Moscow bookstores in the summer of 1962, only a few months before the Cuban missile confrontation. The second chapter of this book, "Military Strategy of Imperialist Countries and Their Preparation of New Wars," stated that the strategy of "massive retaliation" had been adopted by the United States in 1954; however, Soviet advances in nuclear-rocket weapons had forced military theoreticians in the United States to alter this concept. Sokolovskiy claimed that various research groups in the United States, such as RAND, The Johns Hopkins Washington Center of International Studies, and a number of universities and special committees were charged with developing a new strategy. As a result of the conclusions reached by these groups, the political-military leadership of the United States recognized that the strategy of "massive retaliation" was no longer valid.¹³

In view of Khrushchev's attempt that same year to place nuclear rockets in Cuba, it is of interest that Sokolovskiy paid particular

attention to the US concept of flexible response, which President John Kennedy had outlined only in March 1961. Sokolovskiy asserted that under this concept the United States was preparing for both general nuclear war and limited war. He gave specific attention to the advantages accruing to the side which launched the first strike. In his view, the Soviet Union must prepare first of all for the possibility of general nuclear war, and be ready to "repulse" a surprise nuclear attack.¹⁴ One might speculate on the relationship of Soviet perceptions of US military strategy, as presented by Sokolovskiy, and Khrushchev's decision to undertake his Cuban missile adventure.

In the mid-1960s other Soviet writers claimed that when the Soviet Union "created nuclear weapons of great power, intercontinental and global rockets, and Soviet science and technology made possible the launch of artificial satellites," the United States was *forced* to drop its concept of massive retaliation. However, in the Soviet view, the United States still placed primary emphasis on "central war," in which "the primary means of destruction will be the nuclear weapon and the rocket will be the basic means of delivering it to the target."¹⁵

Writing in 1969, General Major V. Zemskov, editor of the General Staff's restricted journal, *Military Thought*, asserted that the US concept of flexible response was based on the following goals:¹⁶

- Nuclear survival
- Counterforce targeting
- Damage limitation
- Guaranteed destruction

According to Zemskov, a basic objective of the concept of flexible response

is to insure supremacy of the United States in nuclear forces, and to inflict against the Soviet Union a preemptive strike, when conditions are favorable, ensuring at the same time maximum conditions for the survival of the United States in the event of a retaliatory strike.

But, he continued, because of the power of the Soviet strategic nuclear forces, the United States will seek to avoid a strategic nuclear exchange with the Soviet Union; nevertheless, the

Pentagon is planning a number of different methods of launching surprise nuclear attacks, which includes the following possibilities:

- A strike by nuclear forces on the alert
- A strike by ICBMs, with long-range aircraft and nuclear submarines withheld
- A strike by ICBMs and nuclear submarines on patrol
- A strike by all the US strategic nuclear forces during a period of tension¹⁷

In another article published in *Military Thought* the same year, Zemskov stated that in nuclear war "the combatants will use from the very beginning all available forces and means at their disposal, above all strategic nuclear means." However, he added, studies in the West "have stated more and more often that a world nuclear war, should it break out, would lead to collapse of the social structure, to an undermining of the entire social system, and to the total destruction of mankind. The opinion exists that in such a war there will be no victor." He lists "those holding such views" to be B. Russell, C. Lamont, D. Fleming, L. Pauling, and J.P. Sartre. Zemskov then stated that if a nuclear war does begin, "it cannot be localized by anyone. Without fail, it will envelop the entire world and capitalism as a socioeconomic structure will perish once and for all in its fire."¹⁸ He did not dwell on what might happen to communism.

In 1969, General S.P. Ivanov, Commandant of the Academy of the General Staff, published an article in *Military Thought* on "Soviet Military Doctrine and Strategy." Previously, Ivanov had served as head of the Operations Directorate of the General Staff, a position he held at the time of the Cuban missile crisis. He gave the usual Soviet view of how the United States is planning for a nuclear war against the Soviet Union, beginning with a surprise nuclear attack:

In the West the problem of the duration of a nuclear war is associated primarily with a surprise attack on the USSR. Many military ideologists of imperialism have spoken out on the necessity for initiating a preventive war against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries by means of a surprise infliction of massive nuclear strikes for the purpose of eliminating or sharply reducing the possibility of retaliatory actions from our side. However, the more sober military men and theoreticians have already long ago become convinced that even such a beginning will not save them from inevitable defeat. Nuclear retaliation from the side of the Soviet Union will inevitably follow.¹⁹

Ivanov then brings up the possibility of the "imperialists" waging war with the use of conventional weapons, and of the risks of escalation to the use of nuclear weapons:

The availability of the tremendous nuclear potential of the United States and the Soviet Union has had a great influence on changing the views relative to the possible character of a war between the two coalitions. There is too great a risk of the destruction of one's own government, and the responsibility to humanity for the fatal consequences of the nuclear war is too heavy, for an aggressor to make an easy decision on the immediate employment of nuclear weapons from the very beginning of a war without having used all other means for the attainment of its objective.²⁰

In the last sentence of the above paragraph, Ivanov speaks of the "fatal consequences" facing "an aggressor" who makes the decision to employ nuclear weapons. This would appear to be a warning to the leadership of the Soviet Union as well as to the United States. He then gives his opinion of selected nuclear strikes, making theoretical assumptions that would apply to nuclear powers in general. In light of the attention given to selected nuclear options in 1974 by the United States, Ivanov's following paragraph is of particular importance.

It can be assumed that for the purpose of scaring one another the belligerents will limit themselves to inflicting some selected nuclear strikes on secondary objectives, but will not dare expand the nuclear conflict any further. But such an exchange of individual nuclear attacks, even if it should take place, cannot characterize the war in its entirety.²¹

It is seldom that Soviet spokesmen speculate whether or not individual nuclear strikes, or even selected nuclear attacks, will trigger an all-out, uncontrollable nuclear war. Further, it may not have been coincidental that at the time the article appeared the Soviets were starting discussions with the United States on limitations of strategic arms.

Soviet Perceptions of Realistic Deterrence

According to Soviet spokesmen, the US strategy of realistic deterrence, adopted in 1971, differed little from the previous

concept of flexible response. In his 1974 book, *The Armed Forces of the Soviet State*, the late Soviet Minister of Defense, Marshal A.A. Grechko, gave an official view of realistic deterrence, describing what he considered its three main principles:

- Superiority in strategic forces
- Partnership with allies, with increase in their military contributions
- Negotiations with the Soviet Union based on US military strength²²

Grechko added, however, that "on a military plane, the strategy of realistic deterrence presumes the creation of forces which would ensure the guaranteed destruction of the enemy. Thus, in comparison, this concept is even more aggressive than the strategy of flexible response."

In 1976 General Major R. Simonyan, the "Amerikanist" on the faculty of the Frunze Military Academy, discussed in some detail his view of the US concept of realistic deterrence. He claimed that in the early 1970s President Nixon recognized that "the United States has come to an end of its superiority in terms of strategic power. It has been replaced with a strategic equilibrium in which the nuclear forces of the US and USSR are comparable."²³ This fact, according to Simonyan, "forces" Washington to reexamine its military doctrine, and as a result "the strategy of realistic deterrence" emerged. However, regardless of the terms used, Simonyan claimed that the basic military doctrine of the United States remained unchanged—Washington's intent still was to achieve military superiority. He added that the concept of strategic sufficiency, although a more "diplomatic" expression than superiority, still is "really nothing more than a screen to cover up the strategic arms race that is now being promoted."

The supposedly authoritative *Soviet Military Encyclopedia* gave the same views of the concept of realistic deterrence as had previously been presented by Marshal Grechko and General Simonyan. According to this publication, the US doctrine of realistic deterrence is based on three principles:

- Superiority in strategic forces
- "Partnership"—greater participation of allies
- Negotiations from "a position of strength"²⁴

The similarity between Marshal Grechko's statements on realistic deterrence, and those published later in the *Soviet Military Encyclopedia*, provides yet another indication that everything written in the Soviet Union about US military forces must follow the Party-approved position. This should not be surprising. In the 1930s it was recognized in the West that Communist parties and Communist-front organizations throughout the world received direction from Moscow. This coordination of policy became known as the "Party Line." There is no open discussion among Soviet spokesmen of different points of view, nor should such be expected.

Limited Nuclear Options

In January 1974, the then US Secretary of Defense, James Schlesinger, made a statement concerning the possible use of selected nuclear options, or the "limited" use of nuclear weapons. This provoked a loud outcry in the tightly controlled Soviet press, and may have resulted in certain modifications to the Soviet defense structure. Schlesinger's statement apparently was so unexpected that Soviet spokesmen did not comment on his concept for almost a 4-month period, suggesting that the Kremlin first had to consider its implications and determine what response should be made.

Among the first Soviets designated to discuss the limited nuclear options concept was Colonel V.V. Larionov, one of the most articulate and best known of the Soviet military strategists. He had been the composing editor of all three editions of Marshal Sokolovskiy's *Military Strategy*. About 1970 he doffed his uniform and became head of the "military-technical" section of Dr. Georgiy Arbatov's Institute of the USA and Canada. At approximately the same time he wrote his report on limited nuclear options, he transferred back to the Academy of the General Staff, and soon thereafter was promoted to general major. His article was published in *Pravda*, the official newspaper of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. This provides an excellent example of the close coordination of Soviet elite groups—a noted military strategist, assigned to Dr. Arbatov's Institute of the USA and Canada, preparing the first major Soviet analysis of a new US military concept, with his article being published in *Pravda*, the Party's own newspaper.

According to Larionov, Schlesinger's statement indicated a major change in the employment of US strategic nuclear forces.²⁵ This meant a revised strategy of nuclear targeting, and also increased the possibility of the tactical use of nuclear weapons by NATO. His

second article on the same subject made references to "appropriate measures" the Kremlin leadership was taking in response to the new US strategy, but he never specified what these measures might be. He related the concept to an earlier US strategy:

Not so long ago, in the sixties, the imperialist circles preached the formula of "controlled" limited nuclear war. The essence of this formula is the same as before: "regulation" of the methods of war and the fixing of rules for waging it, although it was clear even then what a nuclear war would mean for mankind.... Perfectly understandably the Soviet Union resolutely opposed this approach to the problem.²⁶

Another Soviet member of the Institute of the USA and Canada stated that the concept of limited nuclear options, perceived in the United States as modifying the forms and scale of nuclear conflict, and thought to make nuclear warfare more "humane," is in reality something much different. The aim of Washington is to legalize the use of nuclear weapons in crisis situations, and then to use them as a means of political pressure. This Soviet strategist went on to state that another purpose of limited nuclear options, of even greater importance, is to create highly accurate nuclear warheads which can strike Soviet military targets, primarily missile launchers, nuclear weapon stockpiles, and strategic command centers. The author concluded that the United States is attempting to develop a capability to seriously weaken Soviet military power through a surprise nuclear attack.²⁷

Marshal Grechko called the Pentagon's limited nuclear options a strategy of "target selectivity." He restated the assertions noted above that the United States is planning to attack Soviet nuclear missile launching sites, nuclear weapons stockpiles, airfields from which nuclear-armed aircraft might fly, troop concentrations, and other important military objectives. United States military planners, the marshal wrote, are hoping that such strikes will be sufficient to prevent the Soviet Union from making a retaliatory nuclear attack.²⁸

General Simonyan repeated Grechko's claim that limited nuclear options are simply a US designation for the concept of "selective targeting." This, he stated, is the basis of the Pentagon's plan for a surprise massive strike by strategic offensive forces against Soviet military targets only. Selection of these targets would be a departure from the targeting principles for a general nuclear war, in which economic, political, and administrative targets would be subjected to nuclear strikes, along with purely military targets. Further, in Simonyan's view, the US leadership recognizes that if it unleashes general nuclear war, the "inevitable retaliatory strike" will follow.

Therefore, the Pentagon has sought to find a strategic nuclear war scenario which would enable it to accomplish its "global aggressive aims" without risking its own annihilation. He stated that the capability for limited nuclear options had emerged only in recent years, primarily as a result of highly accurate MIRV warheads on strategic missiles. These weapons give US planners, "in their opinion," an opportunity to "force an enemy" not to attack US cities and thus to prevent mass destruction even under nuclear war conditions. Also, according to Simonyan, the United States hopes to convince any potential enemy of the "acceptability of limited nuclear war." He concluded his article by listing the identical targeting Grechko had given earlier.²⁹

It is interesting to note that none of the Soviet authors, when discussing the US concept of limited nuclear options, ever mention the possibility of strikes being used on "choke points." Under this option, as discussed in the United States, strikes would be made on the Soviet electric power industry, for example, after warnings of the targets to be attacked were given so that workers could leave the plants. In the published Soviet view limited nuclear options essentially are a return to the concept of targeting against military objectives only, considered in the United States as counterforce.

Despite what Soviet spokesmen claim, there are some indications that the Kremlin may take seriously the concept of limited nuclear options. In the early 1960s Soviet leaders concentrated on building shelters as a means of protecting the population from nuclear attack. By the mid-1960s, in view of the heavier weapons that might be employed against cities, primary emphasis was placed on evacuation of the population. Following Schlesinger's announcement on the possibility of limited nuclear options, Soviet civil defense manuals began to again stress the need for shelters.³⁰ Such a redirection of civil defense would be a logical move if the Kremlin leaders considered selective targeting against military objectives as the primary threat.

Perceptions of US Naval Forces and Strategies

Most of the Soviet military "Amerikanisti" are from the Soviet Ground Forces, Strategic Rocket Forces, Troops of National PVO, or Air Forces. Admiral S.G. Gorshkov, the famed commander in chief of the Soviet Navy, views US strategy and forces from a somewhat different perspective than do other Soviet spokesmen. However, there are no basic disagreements in the views presented, only a different emphasis.

According to Gorshkov, NATO was formed as a union of maritime states, many of which had large navies and occupied strategic positions in the world oceans. The United States found allies for itself both in the Atlantic and Pacific Ocean regions, thus making possible the formation of a worldwide base system that sought to encircle the Soviet Union, and to use the world oceans as launch areas for US strategic nuclear weapons.³¹

Gorshkov described the US concept of massive retaliation as having been based on strategic aviation. The Pentagon's naval chiefs had combined the fleet and aviation into an "air-sea hybrid"—the strike aircraft carrier. This weapons system, combined with strategic aviation, became the "sword" of US foreign policy. The "shield" was the US military force in Europe. When the Soviet Union developed its own strategic nuclear capability, the United States was forced to change this concept and adopt the doctrine of flexible response. A third stage in US strategy occurred in 1971, with the adoption of realistic deterrence. In Gorshkov's view, this concept simply was a modernization of the strategy of flexible response, and, like it, provided both for general nuclear war and limited war.

Regardless of the US strategy at any particular time, the Pentagon is placing "the basic might of its strategic offensive forces in the world oceans," according to Gorshkov. This is to provide a dispersed system of armaments capable of striking the territory of socialist nations from all directions. Placing "launch positions" at sea, aboard nuclear submarines, also gets potential targets for Soviet strikes away from US territory, claims the Soviet admiral. He further states that such underwater nuclear forces have greater viability, "hiddenness," and mobility than land-based systems.³²

As a deputy minister of defense, a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, and commander in chief of the Soviet Navy, Gorshkov's publicly stated views represent basic Kremlin policies. What he writes of the United States may be an indication of future roles and missions for his own forces as new weapons systems are deployed.

The Value of Study of Soviet Perceptions

Unfortunately, certain aspects of Soviet perceptions of Western military forces appear to be formed more by Marxist-Leninist ideology than by a realistic appraisal of factual data. This ideology precludes the Soviet leadership from regarding the non-Communist world in other than a hostile light. To a large extent the

Kremlin leaders use the threat of encirclement by the "imperialists" to justify their totalitarian control over the Soviet populace.

Ideology aside, there is little justification for Soviet perceptions of US military forces to be in error. Descriptions of Western weapons systems, generally written by professional officers, are normally factual. Almost always these descriptions are based directly on Western publications. On the other hand, interpretations of US military doctrine and strategy are, with few exceptions, misleading. A large part of these interpretations is the work of members of two major research institutes under the Soviet Academy of Sciences: the Institute of World Economy and International Relations and the Institute of the USA and Canada. On the surface, at least, there is little reason for members of these institutes not to have all the data necessary to make accurate assessments. In the United States they are treated as honored visiting scholars, with virtually all doors open and seldom any restrictions on travel. (There is no reciprocal treatment of visiting Americans in the Soviet Union.) It must be assumed, therefore, that members of these institutes write to serve "agitation and propaganda" purposes, rather than to provide objective data.

Despite the distortions found in Soviet perceptions, it is important that Soviet writings on US military forces be carefully studied. There is a danger that what is said about US military intentions is merely a cover to justify, and in a sense conceal, actions that the Kremlin itself may plan against the West. If these written perceptions do represent the true views of the Kremlin leaders, there is an even greater danger they might begin a war, or precipitate a surprise nuclear attack, through miscalculation of the intentions of the United States.

Endnotes

1. Oleg Penkovskiy, *The Penkovskiy Papers* (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1965), p. 255.
2. In contrast to the freedom of movement that Soviet citizens have in the United States, approximately 325 of the largest 400 Soviet cities are closed to foreigners.
3. The last section of *Zarubezhnoye Voennoye Oborreniye* [Foreign Military Review] gives a summary of current events in foreign military forces, including assignments of commanders.
4. Large antiballistic missile radars were installed within a 100-kilometer radius of Moscow in the early 1960s, and two of them could be seen from the Moscow-Minsk and Moscow-Leningrad highways.

5. See, for example, *Taktika Bombardirovochnoy Aviatsii* [Tactics of Bombardment Aviation] (Moscow: Avioizdatel' stvo, 1926). This is a direct translation of a 1920 US Army manual prepared at Ellington Field, Texas.

6. A number of the translations issued by the Soviet Military Publishing House were in five thousand or more copies, and were available in Soviet bookstores.

7. See V.D. Sokolovskiy, *Soviet Military Strategy*, 3d, ed., trans., with commentary and analysis by Harriet Fast Scott (New York: Crane, Russak & Company, 1975). Chapter 2 of this book is devoted entirely to the armed forces of the "imperialist" nations.

8. M.A. Milshteyn and A.K. Slobodenko, *O Burzhuaznoy Voennoy Nauke* [On Bourgeois Military Science] (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1957). Even in the late 1970s this book was listed in the *Soviet Military Encyclopedia* as a basic source of US military doctrine.

9. Ibid., p. 280.

10. A.A. Grechko, *Vooruzhennyye Sily Sovetskogo Gosudarstva* [Armed Forces of the Soviet State] (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1975), p. 358.

11. Milshteyn and Slobodenko, *Bourgeois Military Science*, p. 243.

12. See M.V. Zakharov, *50 Let Vooruzhennykh Sil SSR* [50 Years of the Soviet Armed Forces] (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1968), p. 521. Also see: Penkovskiy, *Penkovskiy Papers*, p. 251.

13. Sokolovskiy, *Soviet Military Strategy*, p. 58.

14. Ibid. "Preparing a Country for the Repulsion of Aggression," pp. 304-334, ch. 7.

15. G.A. Trofimenko, *Strategiya Global'noy Voyny* [Strategy of Global War] (Moscow: International Relations Publishing House, 1968), p. 4.

16. V. Zemskov, "Wars of the Modern Era," *Voyennaya Mysl'* [Military Thought], May, 1969. Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) translation, p. 59.

17. Ibid., p. 61.

18. V. Zemskov, "Characteristic Features of Modern Wars and Possible Methods of Conducting Them," *Voyennaya Mysl'*, July 1969. FBIS translation, p. 21.

19. S.P. Ivanov, "Soviet Military Doctrine and Strategy," *Voyennaya Mysl'*, May 1969. FBIS translation, p. 48.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid., p. 49.

22. Grechko, *Armed Forces of the Soviet State*, p. 343.

23. R. Simonyan, "The Concept of Strategic Sufficiency," *Krasnaya Zvezda* [Red Star] 28 May 1976.

24. *Sovetskaia Voyennaia Ensiklopediia* [Soviet Military Encyclopedia], vol. 3 (Moscow, Voenizdat, 1977), p. 227.
25. V.V. Larionov, "Arms Limitations and Its Enemies," *Pravda*, 7 April 1974.
26. V.V. Larionov, "The Relaxation of Tension and the Principle of Equal Security," *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 18 July 1974.
27. L. Semeyko, "The Form is New, the Essence is as Before," *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 8 April 1975.
28. Grechko, *Armed Forces of the Soviet State*, p. 344.
29. R. Simonyan, "The Concept of Selective Targeting," *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 28 September 1976.
30. K.G. Kotlukov et al., *Grazhdanskaya Oborona Vchera i Segodnya* [Civil Defense Yesterday and Today] (Moscow: Atomizdat, 1975), p. 90.
31. S.G. Gorshkov, *Morskaya Moshch' Gosudarstva* [Sea Power of a State] (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1976), p. 260.
32. *Ibid.*, p. 273.

Chapter Seven

Controlled Conflict: Soviet Perceptions of Peaceful Coexistence

Graham D. Vernon

Differences between the United States and the Soviet Union are both real and deep enough that neither side needs the additional burden of terminological ambiguity. Yet it is apparent, even to the casual observer of world events, that US and Soviet interpretations of the "rules" of peaceful coexistence or of detente—the terms have essentially the same meaning for the Soviets—are widely divergent. (For Soviet definitions of "peaceful coexistence" and "detente," see Appendixes A and B, below.) While it is true that in diplomacy it is sometimes useful to perpetuate ambiguities in order to conceal differences, the technique tends to be more useful when the differences are peripheral. Because peaceful coexistence is central to US-Soviet relations, it is essential that we should understand, though not necessarily accept, the Soviet view of that policy and how it fits into their view of our relationship. As the Soviets have written and spoken about the issues openly, consistently, and in detail, the task should not be difficult. Yet the outcry, from a variety of official and unofficial sources in the United States, that the Soviets have "broken the rules of detente" suggests either that the Soviets have in fact broken the rules or that they are playing by different rules.

The difference is more than semantic. If the Soviets have modified mutually agreed guidelines, then there is hope they can be persuaded to conform to the earlier terms. If, however, the fundamental US and Soviet concepts of detente are at odds, the problem is more difficult and the search for common ground will be more arduous.

In this chapter, I shall examine the Soviet concept of peaceful coexistence: its origins, its dimensions, and its role in Soviet policy. Soviet sources will be used almost exclusively so that Soviet logic and Soviet perceptions may be grasped. When writing from the Soviet viewpoint, one inevitably runs the risk of appearing to support Soviet positions. That, of course, is not my intent. To twist a once popular phrase, my purpose is to tell it like the Soviets say it is, not to tell it like it is. There is sometimes a difference. Only after one understands the Soviet approach to peaceful coexistence and the depth of their commitment can the implications for US security be assessed.

The Genesis of Peaceful Coexistence

Peaceful coexistence, as a concept in Soviet foreign policy, goes back nearly to the birth of the Soviet Union and, according to the Soviets, originated with Lenin.¹ Whatever its origins, the policy was in part a product of the failure of the Russian Revolution to spark similar revolutions throughout Western Europe as Lenin and the Bolsheviks had anticipated it would. As a consequence of that failure, the Soviet Union, rather than being in the vanguard of a general uprising against capitalism, found itself surrounded. The Soviets also found themselves with a host of internal problems, including a rather ineffective army, active opposition from the Whites, and the armed intervention of the Entente.

Adding to the urgency of the situation was the Soviet belief that war between the USSR and the capitalists was imminent and inevitable. As expressed by Lenin at the Eighth Party Congress in 1919, "we are living not only in a state but in a system of states, and it is inconceivable for the Soviet Republic to exist alongside of the imperialist states for any length of time. One or the other must triumph in the end and before that end comes there will have to be a series of frightful collisions between the Soviet Republic and the bourgeois states."² If war with the imperialists was unavoidable, the timing of that war was not. The need was to buy time, and the policy pursued to gain that time was peaceful coexistence. Foreign Commissar George Chicherin was probably first to use the term when he called (in 1920) for "peaceful coexistence with other governments, no matter who they are."³ As developed in this early stage, the policy had as its goal the avoidance of war and took several forms. A "peace offensive" was directed toward exploitation of differences among capitalist states. The 1922 Rapallo Treaty between Germany and Russia was one of the more successful fruits

of the policy. Attempts were also made to woo those portions of the capitalist world inclined toward pacificism. According to Maxim Litvinov, "between 1918 and 1921, we made no less [sic] than twenty peace proposals to different powers."⁴ Finally, through the Comintern, the Soviets promoted revolution in the imperialist world, and the uprisings in Hungary (1919) and Germany (1920) were at least partly attributable to that effort.

After Lenin's death in 1924, Stalin endorsed the essence of peaceful coexistence and prescribed its continuation: "Hence our task is to pay attention to the contradictions in the capitalist camp, to delay war by buying off the capitalists and to apply all measures to maintain peaceful relations....The basis of our relations with capitalist countries consists of admitting the coexistence of the two opposing systems. It has been fully verified by practice."⁵ Stalin continued this theme into the thirties. It crops up, for example, in a speech that clearly reveals both the Soviet sense of inferiority and the intensity of their feelings. Stalin's words, in fact, are reminiscent of Knute Rockne and Vince Lombardi:

It is sometimes asked whether it is not possible to slow down the tempo somewhat, to put a check on the movement. No, comrades, it is not possible! The tempo must not be reduced!...

To slacken the tempo would mean falling behind. And those who fall behind get beaten. But we do not want to get beaten. No, we refuse to be beaten. One feature of the history of old Russia was the continual beatings she suffered because of her backwardness. She was beaten by the Swedish feudal lords. She was beaten by the Polish and Lithuanian gentry. She was beaten by the British and French capitalists. She was beaten by the Japanese barons. All beat her—because of her backwardness, because of her military backwardness, cultural backwardness, political backwardness, industrial backwardness, agricultural backwardness. They beat her because to do so was profitable and could be done with impunity....Such is the law of the exploiters—to beat the backward and the weak. It is the principal law of capitalism. You are backward, you are weak—therefore you are wrong; hence you can be beaten and enslaved....

Do you want our socialist fatherland to be beaten and to lose its independence? If you do not want this, you must put an end to its backwardness in the shortest possible time and develop a genuine Bolshevik tempo in building up its socialist economy. There is no other way. That is why Lenin said on the eve of the October Revolution: "Either perish, or overtake and outstrip the advanced capitalist countries."

We are fifty or a hundred years behind the advanced countries. We must make good the distance in ten years. Either we do it, or we shall go under.⁶

Stalin gave this speech in 1931, ten years before Germany attacked the Soviet Union.

Thus, peaceful coexistence as a Soviet policy was developed by a leadership which perceived it needed time to prepare for an "inevitable" war. The implementation of that policy was characterized by (a) efforts to divide potential opponents, (b) a peace offensive designed to appeal directly to the peoples of the world, and (c) Comintern efforts to strengthen non-Soviet Communist parties.

Peaceful Coexistence and Internationalism

Peaceful coexistence continued as an integral part of Soviet foreign policy following World War II, albeit with varying emphases. In tracing the course of postwar peaceful coexistence, Communist Party congresses serve as useful bench marks. It is at these party congresses that the world situation is reviewed, past accomplishments evaluated, and future policies announced, usually in a keynote address by the general secretary of the party. For that reason, it may be helpful to examine briefly the party line on peaceful coexistence, as reflected from the Nineteenth Party Congress in 1952 through the Twenty-fifth Party Congress in 1976. Party congresses are usually held every five years, although this rhythm was broken when congresses were held in 1958, 1959, and 1961. In addition, particularly useful statements other than those from congresses will be cited to highlight shifts and trends in Soviet policy.

To understand the party line on peaceful coexistence, one must also consider the development of a second thread of Soviet foreign policy during the postwar period: "internationalism," or "proletarian internationalism." Applying to Soviet relations with other socialist countries and with selected revolutionary efforts in the Third World, this concept is purported by the Soviets to have originated in the early days of communism, when economic class was thought to be a more binding force among people than nationality, a time when the cry Workers of the World, Unite reflected what many thought was an achievable goal. The theory foundered on the rocks of reality, and, in the twenties, the Soviets were forced to forgo immediate world revolution and adopt a policy of "socialism in one country." Today, internationalism is stressed internally as one of the many links between the leadership and its revolutionary past. It tends to legitimize the role of what is (at least within the USSR) a status quo, conservative party.

Externally, internationalism is largely an ideological fig leaf, an attempt to disguise a classic great-power expansionist policy: it rationalizes Soviet intervention, both in the Third World and within the socialist camp. The so-called Brezhnev Doctrine, invoked in support of the Czechoslovakian intervention, is an example of proletarian internationalism in action.⁷ The line has also proved useful in the Soviet battle with China over ideological leadership, encouraging Third World Marxist (and not so Marxist) movements to look to the Soviet Union for aid. Thus, it is partly under the rubric of proletarian internationalism that the USSR claims its role as a superpower. As Brezhnev proudly maintained at the Twenty-fifth Party Congress: "In today's conditions, our Party's activities in the international arena are unusually broad and diversified; there is probably no spot on earth in which the state of affairs does not have to be taken into consideration, in one way or another, in the formation of our foreign policy."⁸

The interacting roles of peaceful coexistence and proletarian internationalism were put forth succinctly in the Soviet journal *International Affairs*:

Throughout the existence of the Soviet state, all of its foreign policy acts have adhered to two main principles, originally elaborated by Lenin. First, there is the principle of internationalism, which is the starting premise in relations between the Soviet Union and the socialist countries, and the countries fighting for the national liberation. Second, there is the principle of peaceful coexistence, for the establishment of which in relations with the capitalist states, the Soviet Union, and the other fraternal countries have always stood.⁹

The two lines, then, complement one another and guide Soviet policy in two separate areas: relations with the capitalist world and relations with the Communist and selected Third World nations.

Immediately after World War II, peaceful coexistence was a low-key element of Soviet foreign policy. Traces of it can be found in Malenkov's speech to the Nineteenth Congress in 1952: "The Soviet Union is seeking to prevent any war between states; it advocates the peaceful settlement of international conflicts and differences."¹⁰ But it was Khrushchev, in his 1956 speech to the Twentieth Party Congress, who again made the line a central theme of Soviet foreign policy. In his presentation, Khrushchev stated that "if the well-known five principles of peaceful coexistence were to underlie the relations between the USSR and the USA, that would truly be of great importance to all mankind." He went on to list the five principles: mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty;

nonaggression; noninterference in each other's internal affairs; equality and mutual benefit; peaceful coexistence and economic cooperation."¹¹ Khrushchev further stated that "the Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems has always been and remains the general line of our country's foreign policy.... It is not a tactical move but a fundamental principle of Soviet foreign policy.... Indeed, there are only two ways: either peaceful coexistence or the most destructive war in history. There is no third way."¹² Other than to deny that "victory will be achieved through armed interference by the socialist countries in the internal affairs of capitalist countries" and to assert that socialist freedom "is not brought in from abroad in baggage trains, like Bourbons," Khrushchev made little mention of proletarian internationalism.¹³ In all of this, Khrushchev does not assert that peaceful coexistence has been achieved: he makes it a goal of Soviet foreign policy rather than an accomplished fact.

At this same Twentieth Party Congress, Khrushchev dramatically changed the party's position on the inevitability of war. Now, according to Khrushchev, "as long as capitalism survives in the world, reactionary forces, representing the interests of capitalist monopolies, will continue their drive toward military gambles and aggressions and may try to unleash war. But war is not a fatalistic inevitability."¹⁴ This fundamental change had the effect of converting peaceful coexistence from a tactic devised to gain time before the inevitable holocaust into an open-ended, long-term strategy. The Brezhnev leadership has continued the Khrushchev line in this regard.

Khrushchev maintained that war was no longer inevitable because communism had grown so strong that imperialism, although as predatory as ever, was reluctant to risk an attack.¹⁵ Possibly he believed this, in spite of the nuclear inferiority of the Soviet Union at the time. It is certainly true, however, that an ideology promising eventual nuclear war leaves something to be desired. In all likelihood, the force behind both the resurgence of the doctrine of peaceful coexistence and the shift away from the inevitability-of-war doctrine is one and the same: the realization that a nuclear war would be ruinous.

The Twenty-first Party Congress, which ran from 27 January to 5 February 1959, dealt primarily with economic matters, but Khrushchev, as he had done at the Twentieth Party Congress, referred to the policy of peaceful coexistence: "We act upon the principle that relations among states with different social systems must be based on peaceful coexistence."¹⁶ He also made a tempered reference to internationalism, maintaining that "our

country, like the other socialist countries, has supported and will support the national liberation movement."¹⁷

In a speech on the international situation and Soviet foreign policy—a speech made to the Supreme Soviet, not to a party congress, on 31 October 1959—Khrushchev saw progress: "The recent period has been marked by a conspicuous improvement in the international atmosphere." Then he asked and answered a question: Why the improvement? "What are the principal reasons for the recent changes in the international situation? The chief reason is the growth of the power and the international influence of the Soviet Union and of all the countries in the world socialist system." He concluded: "The truth of the matter is that these days peaceful coexistence is a real fact, and not someone's plea or desire. It is an objective necessity, deriving from the present situation in the world, from the contemporary stage in the development of human society." Then Khrushchev drove home the point: "The question now at hand is not whether or not there should be peaceful coexistence. It exists and will continue to exist, unless we want the lunacy of a nuclear-missile war."¹⁸

There is no reference in the speech to Soviet responsibilities regarding "internationalism" or the support of Third World revolutionary movements. In fact, Khrushchev mentioned the struggle taking place in Laos and said that "the main point is for the great powers not to intrude into the *internal affairs* of other states; otherwise there may be undesirable consequences."¹⁹

Nonintervention, however, was a policy that the Soviets saw as applying only to the "reactionary" states. In a speech to the Moscow Conference of eighty-one Communist parties, held in January 1961, Khrushchev elevated proletarian internationalism to a lofty position in Soviet foreign policy. After differentiating the types of wars that could occur (world wars, local wars, and wars of liberation), he addressed wars of liberation in particular: "What attitude do Marxists have toward such uprisings? The most favorable.... These are uprisings against rotten reactionary regimes and against colonialists. Communists fully and unreservedly support such wars and march in the vanguard of the peoples fighting wars of liberation." In the same speech, he asserted: "Thus, in terms of social content the policy of peaceful coexistence is a form of intensive economic, political, and ideological struggle of the proletariat against the aggressive forces of imperialism in the international arena."²⁰

In a generally hard-line speech to the Twenty-second Party Congress in October 1961, Khrushchev maintained that "the principles of peaceful coexistence worked out by V.I. Lenin and developed in our party's documents remain unalterably the general

course of Soviet foreign policy." His views on the internationalist aspects of Soviet policy were uncompromising:

Throughout all these years the Soviet Union, unswervingly fulfilling its internationalist duty, has been helping people who are fighting against colonialism and imperialism. Some people do not like this stand. Too bad. Such are our convictions.... We believe it is the inalienable right of peoples to put an end to foreign oppression, and we shall support their just fight. Colonialism is dead and a stake will be driven into its grave. Such is the will of the people, such is the course of history.²¹

Brezhnev made his party congress debut as general secretary at the Twenty-third Party Congress in March 1966 and devoted considerable attention to the international situation. Concerning peaceful coexistence, he said:

The Soviet Union, together with the other countries of socialism, has pursued its policy under the banner of struggle for the relaxation of tension, for the strengthening of peace, for the peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems, for the establishment of such conditions in international life as will enable each people to develop fully along the path of *national and social progress*.

Turning to proletarian internationalism, he went on to assert that

our party and the Soviet people support that struggle [against colonialism] actively, gives and will continue to give tangible all-round assistance to the peoples who are fighting against foreign invaders, for their freedom and independence. We know for certain: The day is not far distant when the last hotbeds of colonialism will be destroyed and the people will raise the banner of national freedom over the liberated lands. This is the verdict of history, and it is irreversible.

Later in his speech, Brezhnev addressed the link between the two policies:

Comrades! In exposing the aggressive policy of imperialism, we at the same time consistently and unswervingly pursue a course of the peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems. This means that the Soviet Union, while it regards the coexistence of states with different social systems as a form of the class struggle between socialism and

capitalism, at the same time consistently advocates the maintenance of normal, peaceful relations with the capitalist countries, the solution of controversial interstate issues through negotiations and not through war. The Soviet Union firmly stands for noninterference in the internal affairs of all states, for respect for their sovereign rights and the inviolability of their territories.

Naturally, there can be no peaceful coexistence when it comes to internal processes of the class and national liberation struggle in the capitalist countries or in the colonies. The principle of peaceful coexistence is not applicable to the relations between the oppressors and the oppressed, between the colonialists and the victims of colonial oppression.²²

The Twenty-fourth Party Congress continued this general line, though Brezhnev did not use the term "peaceful coexistence." A possible explanation for this can be found in a comment he made to the effect that the United States had recently taken a tougher stand on a number of international issues. In any event, Brezhnev endorsed the dual line and policy. After asserting that the Soviet Union would continue the "policy of the active defense of peace," and after detailing the main tasks in that policy, he ended by saying: "We declare that, consistently pursuing a policy of peace and friendship among peoples, the Soviet Union will continue to wage a resolute struggle against imperialism and will administer a firm rebuff to the intrigues and sabotage of aggressors. We shall continue, as in the past, steadfastly to support the struggle of people for democracy, national liberation and socialism."²³

In 1972, after this party congress, a summit meeting took place between Nixon and Brezhnev. One of the results was a document entitled "Basic Principles of Relations Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America." (For the full text, see Appendix C.) The first of twelve articles specifies that "they [the United States and the USSR] will proceed from the common determination that in the nuclear age there is no alternative to conducting their mutual relations on the basis of peaceful coexistence." The document is historic in that the leaders of the opposing blocs agreed to conduct their relations "on the basis of peaceful coexistence." A long-sought goal of Soviet foreign policy had been achieved, at least on paper.

The most recent party congress, the twenty-fifth, was held from 24 February to 5 March 1976. There the two-pronged character of Soviet policy, articulated by Brezhnev, was explicit in regard to peaceful coexistence: "The main element in our policy with respect to the capitalist states has been and remains the struggle for the affirmation of the principles of peaceful coexistence, for lasting peace, and for lessening and in the long run eliminating the danger that a new world war will break out." Addressing the internationalist

aspect of Soviet policy, Brezhnev stated: "Our party supports and will continue to support peoples who are fighting for their freedom." Further: "I should like to place special emphasis on the importance of proletarian internationalism in our time. This is one of the main principles of Marxism-Leninism.... From our point of view the renunciation of proletarian internationalism would mean depriving the Communist Parties and the workers' movement in general of a powerful and tested weapon." Brezhnev then explained the relationship of the two lines:

Some bourgeois politicians affect amazement and raise a howl over the solidarity of Soviet Communists and the Soviet people with the struggle of other people for freedom and progress. This is either naivete or, more likely, deliberate obfuscation. After all, it could not be clearer that detente and peaceful coexistence refer to relations between states. This means above all that disputes and conflicts between countries must not be settled by means of war or by means of the use of force or the threat of force. Detente does not in the slightest abolish, and it cannot abolish or alter, the laws of the class struggle. We don't conceal that we see in detente a way to the creation of more advantageous conditions for peaceful socialist Communist construction.¹⁴

The foregoing sketch of postwar Soviet statements on peaceful coexistence and international proletarianism suggests several trends. *First*, both policies have become increasingly central to Soviet foreign policy—one governing Soviet relations with capitalist states, the other with socialists and selected Third World states. *Second*, as these policies have moved to center stage—and as they have raised questions in the West—the Soviets have taken pains to define them explicitly and to articulate their relationship to one another. *Finally*, these trends have occurred simultaneously with a third, perhaps not unrelated, trend: that of growing Soviet military might.

Why Peaceful Coexistence?

While Soviet support for a policy of peaceful coexistence has historical continuity, the rationale supporting that policy does not. As noted above, the policy's principal prewar justification was the need for a time of peace that would enable the young Soviet state to consolidate its power and build its defenses. That time has long since passed, yet the policy remains. Why? The answer to this question defines the depth of Moscow's commitment to the policy.

The evidence suggests that the Soviets' commitment to the policy—as they define it—is fundamental. They use it as a means of minimizing the danger of a catastrophic nuclear war.

The Soviet Union has often expressed the idea that the alternative to a policy of peaceful coexistence is nuclear war. Brezhnev commented on this in his 1977 speech commemorating the sixtieth anniversary of the October Revolution: "International relations are now at a crossroads, as it were. The road we take will lead either to growth in trust and cooperation or to growth in mutual fears, suspicion and weapons stockpiles. It will lead eventually either to lasting peace or, at best, to teetering on the brink of war. Detente offers the opportunity of choosing the road of peace. To miss the opportunity would be a crime."²⁵ It can be argued that rhetoric of this kind is designed to influence world opinion rather than to serve as an accurate reflection of Soviet belief. In truth, it most probably serves both purposes.

Almost certainly the Soviets have a deep-seated fear of nuclear war and believe that such a war is not "unthinkable" but, rather, a very real possibility. Motivated in part by their history—having suffered the atrocities of Genghis Khan, Tamerlane, and Adolf Hitler—and in part by their logic, the Soviets have taken concrete steps to prepare for the nuclear war they do not want. They have a large military organization backed by considerable funding for civil defense. Their military doctrine emphasizes a war-fighting capability rather than deterrence. The percentage of their GNP committed to defense has averaged around 11-13 percent over the past few years.²⁶ These facts, coupled with the Soviet statements cited above, lead to the conclusion that (1) Soviet leaders are enormously concerned about the dangers of nuclear war, (2) they are not very optimistic about the possibility of avoiding nuclear war, and (3) they believe that their policy of peaceful coexistence offers the most likely means of avoiding such a war. This is not to suggest that the current Soviet military build-up and considerable civil defense efforts do not spring from other motivations, as well. Whatever Moscow's thoughts on nuclear war, a demonstrated Soviet superiority in nuclear and conventional weapons will serve as a tremendously useful political tool, both in peacetime and in crisis situations.

Peaceful coexistence is a linchpin in Soviet foreign policy—not because the Soviets are benign, not because they confuse friendship and peaceful coexistence, but because they believe it offers the only reasonable alternative to a nuclear holocaust. They recognize, as Khrushchev aptly expressed it in response to Chinese attacks against the policy of peaceful coexistence, that "the atomic bomb does not adhere to the class principle."²⁷

Peaceful coexistence serves a second purpose. It fits well with Soviet efforts to portray themselves as the champions of world peace, to persuade the world that the Soviet Union, along with all "progressive and peace-loving" people, is working to reduce the threat of war. It is interesting that the aforementioned five principles of peaceful coexistence, enumerated by Khrushchev at the Twentieth Party Congress, had already been adopted at the 1955 Bandung Conference of nonaligned states. These efforts, say the Soviets, are being thwarted by "influential circles" in the West who retain a "cold-war psychology" and seek to impede Soviet efforts to achieve genuine peace.²⁸ Those familiar with Soviet political statements are aware that they include few shades of gray: the position of the USSR is correct; opposing positions are incorrect. While this largely one-dimensional approach may appear unsophisticated, it has generated considerable sympathy around the world, and Soviet statements that nuclear war is the alternative to peaceful coexistence are a part of the campaign.

Besides offering an alternative to nuclear war and aside from its utility as propaganda, peaceful coexistence, according to the Soviets, abets the expansion of communism. Brezhnev, in his speech to the Twenty-fifth Party Congress, made his point explicitly:

We make no secret of the fact that we see detente as a path leading to the creation of more favorable conditions for peaceful socialist and communist construction. This only confirms that socialism and peace are indivisible [applause]. When we are reproached for saying this, it is hard to keep from thinking that those who reproach us lack confidence that capitalism is capable of existing without resorting to aggression and threat of arms, without encroaching on the independence and interests of other people.²⁹

There is an element of defensiveness in Brezhnev's statement, suggesting that in part he was answering critics, external or internal, who were attacking him and the policy of peaceful coexistence as being "soft on capitalism." Nonetheless, from this and similar statements, it can be argued that one justification for peaceful coexistence, in the Soviet view, is that it creates a more favorable climate for the worldwide advancement of communism.

Finally, peaceful coexistence is a means of increasing contacts. (See, for example, Appendixes A and B, below.) While these contacts include cultural and scientific exchanges, trade contacts are probably more important to the Soviets. Samuel Huntington, a Sovietologist and a former member of the National Security

Council, has commented on this point: "During the past five or six years, the expanded trade with the West has been one of the principal benefits of detente to the Soviet Union, which has imported up to 30 billion worth of machinery and equipment."³⁰ According to Soviet sources, the volume of the USSR's foreign trade with industrial capitalist countries increased by nearly four times in the period 1970-76; that is, from 4.7 to 18.7 billion roubles.³¹ And the trade component of detente is likely to become still more important to the Soviets in the future. As Huntington notes, "They are now confronting great economic problems because the way they have expanded their economy in the past 20 years is no longer going to work. They now confront labor shortages and have to shift toward capital intensive technology."³² In sum, the Soviets answer the question "Why peaceful coexistence?" with the argument that it is the alternative to nuclear war, that it furnishes propaganda advantages, that it furthers the expansion of communism, and that it facilitates the widening of contacts, including trade. Among these, the first is most important by far.

The Soviets are no less explicit in explaining why the West has accepted peaceful coexistence. In their view, the policy has been forced on a reluctant imperialist bloc by a shift in the "correlation of forces." The West, which once advocated a policy of "massive retaliation" and, later, a policy of "flexible response," has now been forced, reluctantly and with heels dragging, by the increasing might of the socialist countries, to accept peaceful coexistence. This general line is usually expressed in terms such as those found in the Resolution of the CPSU Central Committee of 31 January 1977:

The radical changes in the balance of world forces are the basis of a profound restructuring of the entire system of international relations.

Over the past few years there has been a positive change in the development of international relations, a change from "cold war" to detente, to the affirmation of the principles of peaceful coexistence among states with different social systems in international practice. The threat of a world thermonuclear war has been reduced. There are more favorable international conditions for peacefully building socialism and communism, for the advance of the peoples' struggle for social progress.³³

The successes in making the world political climate "healthier," continued the resolution,

have become possible above all because of the greater might of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, because of their

consistent peace policy and because of the persistent struggle for peace which broad popular masses on all continents are waging. The ruling circles in capitalist countries now have to recognize that designs for a military victory are hopeless and senseless. In the foreign policy of a number of capitalist countries more realistic trends are coming to the fore and their leaders are coming to realize the need for peaceful coexistence among states with different social systems.

Military Detente

Brezhnev added another dimension to detente in his Twenty-fifth Party Congress speech, when he noted that "political detente needs to be backed up by military detente."³⁴ Military detente, as pointed out in a document entitled "On the Results of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe," is the top priority today. According to the Soviet author A. Yefinov, the main components of military detente are "a reduction and subsequent ending of the arms race; advancement along the road leading to general and complete disarmament; reduction of military confrontation in Europe; [and a] gradual overcoming of the division of Europe into opposing military blocs."³⁵

Dimitry Proektor, a member of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), Moscow, outlined the issue of military detente in somewhat greater detail in an article entitled "Military Detente: Primary Task."³⁶ The main points of the article are summarized below:

- (1) The basic content of military detente must be a quantitative and qualitative restraint of the arms race, a gradual cutback of armed forces, and eventually general and complete disarmament.
- (2) Military detente cannot come about without substantial improvements in the political climate; but once military detente does begin, it can have a favorable influence on political detente.
- (3) The Soviet Union must be careful to distinguish between those proposals designed to achieve genuine detente and those designed "to camouflage qualitative technological improvements that are in the pipeline, and that are, in effect, aimed not at reducing but raising the combat strength of the armed forces. That is the kind of intentions that have over a number of years inspired the various NATO concepts which were presented to the public as proposals for military detente."

- (4) It is not probable that an agreement can be achieved which will balance out armed forces in all components; for this reason, political compromises are necessary.
- (5) Because capitalists attempt to achieve advantage through qualitative improvements of weapons and military hardware, reductions in personnel without reductions in weaponry and hardware do "not yet" amount to military detente.
- (6) One of the "central elements" of military detente is the problem of limiting and subsequently reducing the strategic nuclear arms of both sides.
- (7) The Vladivostok summit meeting in November 1974 was a milestone on the road toward military detente. The meeting made it possible (a) to achieve a total quantitative ceiling on the basis of an equivalence of forces and (b) to put a partial limit on qualitative improvements. "Consequently, it has been most forcefully demonstrated that political decisions taken at the summit level, and mutual understanding and reasonable compromise, which are best achieved at such meetings, are of crucial importance for the military detente."
- (8) The mutual reduction of armed forces and armaments in central Europe is another important area of military detente. Western efforts to secure unilateral military advantages have been the principal stumbling block in these negotiations, and little progress has been made.

In summary, Proektor says that while gains have been made toward achieving military detente, it remains at a lower level than political detente. Among the prime reasons for this is the Western tendency to look upon military strength as an absolute, to believe that a relaxation of tensions should naturally be played out against a sustained build-up of such strength. From this misconception, he continues, follow the theories of a "balance of forces," "balance of fear," "mutual deterrence" and so on, which Western leaders consider the basis of political stability: "Such conceptions rest on the totally incorrect premise that aggressiveness is inherent in the attitude of either side and that it can be 'contained' only by the threat of annihilation."

The one-sided cant of the Proektor article notwithstanding, it appears that the Soviets have chosen to make a separate issue of military detente, as opposed, for example, to economic detente. Assignment of "top priority" to military detente is another indication of the Soviets' overriding concern about nuclear war. As noted in Point 6, above, one of the "central elements" of military detente involves the limitation of nuclear weapons. A second key

element is the reduction of forces in central Europe, an area that could very well suffer from the use of nuclear weapons should a war break out in that area.

Linkage

The term "linkage" has been used to relate apparently unrelated US-Soviet issues. The Jackson-Vanik Amendment, for example, was an attempt to link the granting of most-favored-nation status with the freedom of Soviet Jews to emigrate. The Soviets have publicly resisted the concept of linkage, and, perhaps most troubling to Americans, have asserted (see above) that there is no contradiction between Soviet support of wars of liberation and peaceful coexistence. Their actions have conformed to this policy. The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks began in 1969, when the United States was heavily engaged in the Vietnam War; the first SALT agreement was signed in 1972, before the end of that war. Perhaps the most dramatic example of Soviet unwillingness to introduce linkage was furnished in May 1973. It was then, fourteen days before a summit meeting in Moscow, that Nixon announced the blockage of Haiphong Harbor and stepped up the bombing of North Vietnam. Although there was considerable speculation that the Soviets would cancel the meeting because of the bombing—according to Nixon, Kissinger believed the probability of cancellation was 75 percent—the summit was held as scheduled.³⁷

The Soviets also resisted public linkage of Jewish emigration with trade questions. According to Nixon, a quiet, nonpublic and "unlinked" approach by him and Kissinger was successful in increasing emigration. Emigration of Soviet Jews rose from 15,000 in the period 1968-1971 to 31,400 in 1972 and 35,000 in 1973; in addition, the high exit tax formerly charged those emigres was lowered to a nominal fee. In December 1973, the US House of Representatives, with much publicity, passed the above-noted Jackson-Vanik Amendment, denying the Soviet Union most-favored-nation status because of its emigration policies; in 1974, 27,700 Jews were allowed to emigrate; in 1975, Jewish emigration from the USSR fell to 13,200.³⁸

Brezhnev, speaking at a session of the US-Soviet Trade and Economic Council in Moscow, directly attacked economic linkage: "Finally, attempts to put conditions on the development of trade and economic ties by making demands on the Soviet Union concerning questions that have nothing in common with the field and fall wholly and completely within the internal jurisdiction of states are

completely inappropriate and unacceptable. It is time to realize clearly that such attempts at interference in internal affairs can bring nothing but harm, including harm to trade and economic relations between our countries."³⁹ Later, congressional restrictions on the activities of the US Export-Import Bank led to Western speculation that this move might cause the Soviets to moderate their policies. Brezhnev's response was again direct: "In rejecting the insulting conditions set by Congress, the Soviet Government has taken the only sensible, the only correct step. This is not because the 'Kremlin' has reconsidered the importance of detente. It is because detente cannot be based on political blackmail—it requires mutual respect and a conversation between equals. It requires that words not be at variance with deeds."⁴⁰ He sounded the same theme at the Twenty-fifth Party Congress: "As is known, there have also been attempts at interference in our internal affairs in connection with the adoption by the US of discriminatory measures in the field of trade. Needless to say, we could not tolerate this, and we will not tolerate it. This is not the kind of language one can use with the Soviet Union. I think that now this is clear to everyone."⁴¹

The Soviets, then, appear sensitive to public, as opposed to private, pressure. Not only did Nixon comment on this, but Brezhnev alluded to it in the above statement when he spoke of "the kind of language one can use" when dealing with the USSR. Along the same lines, the angry Soviet rejection of Carter's initial SALT effort in the spring of 1977 stemmed in part from the fact that the US negotiating position was made public. This is not to suggest that the Soviets would have found the proposals any more acceptable had they been put forward privately but it is probable that their rejection would have been more tempered. Thus, linkage per se may be acceptable to the Soviet Union, but not when accompanied by public threats, which the Soviets tend to view as efforts to humiliate them. An old Russian proverb, *Tishe yedish, dal'she bydish* ("Go quietly, go farther") applies here. The secretiveness, at least by Washington standards, of the current SALT negotiations suggests that the Carter administration agrees.

Psychological Warfare

While rejecting the concept of linking the components of peaceful coexistence one to another, the Soviets have linked "psychological warfare" with the survival of the entire concept of peaceful coexistence. As argued by Arbatov in 1977, the worsening of US-

Soviet relations had been caused by a US-led campaign "under the slogan of 'the defense of human rights.'" ⁴² As Arbatov put it, "ideological struggle is the comparison of ideas and facts and a dispute over the intrinsic values of one or another system and must not be turned into a conscious incitement of distrust and hostility, the falsification of reality, or, even worse, subversive activity." ⁴³

Brezhnev, in an interview with *Le Monde*, argued the same point, adding this rather sober threat: "The ideological struggle should not develop into 'psychological warfare' and should not be used as a means of interference in the internal affairs of state and peoples or lead to political and military confrontation. Otherwise this ideological dispute may develop into a catastrophe in which, along with millions of people, their concepts, too, so to speak, may perish." ⁴⁴ The Soviets, then, have linked psychological warfare with the success or failure of peaceful coexistence. This, in their view, is quite different from what the United States has attempted: viz., linkage of the components of detente to each other.

Conclusion: A New Rule Book?

Several conclusions may be drawn from the foregoing review. First of all, complaints that the Soviets have "broken the rules of detente" are ill-founded. The highest Soviet leadership has publicly, clearly, consistently, and repeatedly articulated its policy. Moreover, Soviet deeds have been in harmony with their words. There may well be excellent grounds for disagreeing with that policy or with the way the United States is responding to some aspects of it, but those criticisms should be directed toward specific issues. To levy accusations that are demonstrably in error aids no one's credibility, nor does it contribute to a better understanding of the issue.

The advent of nuclear weapons ordained the Soviets' renunciation of the thesis that war was inevitable and made mandatory their search for a policy that would minimize the possibility of nuclear war. To meet that requirement, the Soviets resurrected a policy designed originally for essentially the same goal (the avoidance of war). Moscow's postwar policy of peaceful coexistence springs directly from the Soviets' belief that nuclear war would be ruinous. From this it follows that the USSR is committed not only to reducing the possibility of such a war, through arms reductions, trade and other means, but also to the idea that opportunities exist for progress of historic consequence.

This is not to suggest that collateral benefits may not flow to the

Soviets from this policy. They may. Nor should it be thought that the Soviet desire to reduce the danger of nuclear war is tantamount to a policy of "peace at any price." As has been repeatedly demonstrated in SALT and other negotiations, the Soviets will drive as tough a bargain as they can, take advantage of existing loopholes and, in general, do what they can to secure an advantage over the West. This should come as no surprise. Moreover, it can be argued that the United States, as an open society, suffers from certain intrinsic disadvantages when negotiating with the USSR. Some might say, also, that these facts are reason enough to disavow peaceful coexistence as a policy and to reduce negotiations to a minimum. Yet, to pursue such a course would almost certainly result in a return to Cold War relations and increased spending on arms. Worse yet, it might lead to diminished, rather than increased, security.

Far better, it would seem, if the United States were to understand peaceful coexistence as the Soviets do: as a possible means of averting nuclear war. Such an understanding, however, must not be allowed to obscure the fact that the Soviet Union is fundamentally hostile to the United States, and that a return to the open hostility of the Cold War is better than risking the security of the United States through disadvantageous agreements. Peaceful coexistence is not friendship.

Because peaceful coexistence is designed to protect the USSR from the horrors of a nuclear war, it follows that should these horrors become "tolerable" in their view, the policy could change. "Tolerable," of course, is a subjective term, but it is possible that a technological breakthrough or gross changes in the nuclear balance might prompt the Soviets to reevaluate their policy of peaceful coexistence and might put them on a course where certain gains could be worth the risk of nuclear war. Two conclusions can be drawn from this: *first*, the situation that today makes it feasible to reduce the possibility of nuclear war is not necessarily permanent; *second*, it is essential that the West keep the balance relatively stable and not allow the Soviets to achieve what they would call a "position of strength." That time has not yet, and may never, come. Today, were it possible to view the policy of peaceful coexistence in isolation, it would seem to be a reasonable and mutually advantageous basis on which to pursue relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. The past shows that compromises are achievable in trade, Jewish emigration, and SALT.

The problem, however, is that peaceful coexistence cannot be viewed in isolation. It comes, part and parcel, with the Soviet policy of proletarian internationalism. The USSR claims a Leninist

heritage for that policy also, but in this case the claim is specious. The Soviets' internationalist policy, however, does serve as a rationale for exercising what they perceive as their rights as a world power. For a long time, the United States has claimed and exercised the right, as the leader of the Free World, to influence decisions around the globe; the Soviet Union, under the banner of proletarian internationalism, is following the same path. The Soviet record is spotty, and they are, more and more, accepting as "international brothers" leaders whose knowledge and practice of Marxism-Leninism is, at best, distant. A degree of conflict, sometimes approaching crisis proportions, will almost inevitably remain a part of US-Soviet relations, even with peaceful coexistence. Nevertheless, it is difficult to accept a situation in which US-Soviet bilateral relations are governed by the concept of peaceful coexistence, permitting Moscow to support revolutions, freely and blatantly, or to intervene against governments friendly to the United States.

The issue, then, is whether the United States and the Soviet Union can expand their common ground in an effort to reduce the possibility of nuclear war. The Basic Principles agreed to by both powers in 1972 established a framework to guide bilateral relations but did little to resolve the points of conflict that unavoidably develop between world powers, particularly those with opposed ideologies. Can US pressure, coupled with Soviet reluctance to jeopardize peaceful coexistence, move the Soviets to abandon or, more realistic, to moderate their policy of proletarian internationalism? Or will the Soviets continue to insist the game be played by their own rules—rules that allow them to use peaceful coexistence as a shield for warding off nuclear war and to use proletarian internationalism as a sword to move forward in other areas?

Appendix A

The following definition is from *A Short Dictionary—Reference Book for Agitators and Political Information Officers* (Moscow: 1977). (Author's translation.)

Peaceful Coexistence—The basic principle of the foreign policy of the USSR and other socialist countries in their relations with states with different social systems. "Chief in our policies with relation to capitalistic states was and remains the struggle for the affirmation of the principles of peaceful coexistence, for stable peace, for the lessening and eventual elimination of the danger of the occurrence of a new world war." (Materials of the XXV Congress, Communist Party of the Soviet Union [CPSU], p. 16.)

A firm rebuff to imperialism, support of the revolutionary liberation movement on the principle of internationalism is immutably combined in the foreign policy of the CPSU of the Soviet state with the constructive line of peaceful coexistence as a direct result of the victory of the socialist revolution, initially in one separate country. The existence side by side of socialist and capitalist countries became objectively unavoidable, and that historically conditional necessity will remain throughout the period of change from capitalism to socialism on a worldwide scale. In modern historical conditions, peaceful coexistence is the only rational and acceptable alternative to a nuclear world war.

As a result of important and positive improvements occurring in current international relations, appearing as a result of undeviating change in the correlation of forces in the world arena in favor of socialism, the Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence received further strengthening, as for example the bilateral international treaties and other documents signed in recent years between the Soviet Union and France, the FRG, USA, Great Britain, Italy, [and] Canada, and also multilateral treaties between a number of countries, such as the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, signed 1 August 1975 in Helsinki by leading representatives of 35 states. The Final Act, as was noted in the report of the Central Committee [CC], CPSU at the XXV Party Congress, "developed a code of principles of international cooperation—completely, both in letter and in spirit—which answers the demands of peaceful coexistence." (Material from the XXV Party Congress, p. 18)

Peaceful coexistence includes a group of general democratic principles of international relations that obligate in particular the leadership of the European Conference who signed the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

In the policy of the CPSU and the Soviet state, peaceful coexistence is not an opportunistic, tactical ploy. It is a long-term strategic line, during the conduct of which firm adherence to principles is combined with required flexibility and wise, necessary compromises.

Peaceful coexistence does not extend to the class [struggle], and consequently, [does not extend to] the ideological struggle of the two systems. "In the struggle of the two world views there cannot be a place for neutralism and compromises. High political awareness is needed, a timely rebuff to antagonistic ideological diversions." (Material from the XXV CPSU Congress.)

The specific manifestation in modern conditions of the policy of peaceful coexistence was developed at the XXIV CPSU Congress *Program of Peace*, and the *Program for the Further Struggle for Peace and International*

Cooperation, for Freedom and Independence of Peoples [italics in original], advanced by the XXV Party Congress, is an organic continuation of this policy. Thanks to the strength of the Soviet Union and [the] countries of the socialist commonwealth, the principles of peaceful coexistence are being more firmly put into practice in today's international relations. On the basis of wider cooperation of states with various social systems, [those principles] are widening in the most diverse areas—in the areas of politics, economics, science, technology, and culture. Strengthening and widening the material basis for the policy of peaceful coexistence does the same for detente.

"The whole world sees: the USSR is on the road to peace and peaceful coexistence," announced the General Secretary of the CC CPSU, L.I. Brezhnev at the October [1976] plenum of the CC CPSU—and "the whole world must know we will go forward on that road."

Appendix B

The following definition is from *A Short Dictionary—Reference Book for Agitators and Political Information Officers* (Moscow: 1977). (Author's translation.)

Detente—The process of reorganizing the modern system of international relations on the basis of peaceful coexistence, a gradual shift from confrontation of states of the two systems to a mutually advantageous working relationship.

"Detente," said General Secretary of the Central Committee (CC) of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) L.I. Brezhnev in a speech in Tula, 18 January 1977, "is first of all an overcoming of the 'cold war,' a change to normal, regular relations between states. Detente is a readiness to decide differences and quarrels not with strength, not with threats and rattling of weapons, but by peaceful means, behind the negotiating table. Detente is a definite trust and ability to consider the legal interest of one another."

Detente is the principal, dominating tendency of modern public development. A change from the "cold war," from explosively dangerous confrontation of the two systems to detente, as was pointed out at the 25th Party Congress, is connected first of all with the changes in the correlation of forces in the world in favor of communism. Detente is a result of the steady increase in the strength and power of socialism, [of] the growth of its influence and authority in the international arena. This is the result of the actions in the struggle of the working class [of the] broad mass of working people against the system of capitalistic exploitation, of the successes of the national-liberation movement, the growth of the world revolutionary process. It is also the result of a definite turning to realism of the ruling circles of the leading capitalist countries, forced to cope with the changing correlations of forces in the world.

The foreign policy of the CPSU and the Soviet state, the broad and constructive program of peace, developed by the 24th Party Congress, played an important role in the liquidation of the "cold war" and the transition to detente. The successful realization of the main thesis of that program, in spite of serious difficulties and obstacles, showed that achievement of lasting peace in modern conditions is not a happy wish but an entirely practicable task. The most important direction of the struggle for strengthening peace in the current phase, for deepening the process of detente, is mentioned in the 25th Party Congress Program for the Further Struggle for Peace and International Cooperation, for Freedom and Independence of Peoples. Since the 25th Party Congress, as was mentioned in the October [1976] plenum of the CP USSR, a good deal of useful work has been accomplished.

In a political and international legal sense, detente relies on a complex of bilateral treaties and agreements signed in past years between the Soviet Union and France, the FRG, USA, Great Britain, Italy, Canada, and other states, between a number of socialist and capitalist countries, and on such important documents as the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Assuming a still more broad character, economic and scientific-technical cooperation between states with differing social systems assists the strengthening of the material basis of detente.

Detente—A mutually advantageous process, fully answering the

fundamental interests of all countries and peoples insofar as it represents, in modern conditions, the only acceptable alternative to world nuclear war. For that reason, participants in the "Conference of Communist[s] and Workers' Partner[s] of Europe," which took place in Berlin in 1976, announced clearly that the policy of peaceful coexistence, active cooperation of states regardless of their social system, and detente contributes both to the interest of each people and to the progress of all humanity.

At the same time, detente in no way abolishes and cannot abolish or change the laws of the class struggle. On the contrary, it creates better conditions for the growth of the struggle of the working class and all democratic forces, for the inalienable right of each people to select freely the path of their development, for the struggle against the domination of monopolies, for [the] socialism [that] the process of detente is successfully developing. Giving a decisive rebuff to all the intrigue of the enemies of peace and socialism, a resolution of the CP USSR on the 60th Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution noted that the Soviet Union and other socialist countries are striving for a further development of a favorable change in international conditions for peace and social progress, for the conversion of detente into an uninterrupted general process.

They also work so that the process will assume a more concrete, material form, and that military detente will be added to political detente.

The fraternal countries again declared the need to augment the force of the struggle for deepening detente at the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact in Bucharest, 25-26 November 1976.

In order to achieve detente it is necessary to overcome the bitter opposition of its enemies—primarily the more aggressive powers of imperialism, with whom are lined up the current leaders of China.

Speaking at the XVI Congress of Unions, USSR, L.I. Brezhnev underscored: "We want detente to continue. We will assist in all ways, for it answers the interest of the people."

Appendix C

Basic Principles of Relations Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, guided by their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations and by a desire to strengthen peaceful relations with each other and to place these relations on the firmest possible basis,

aware of the need to make every effort to remove the threat of war and to create conditions which promote the reduction of tensions in the world and the strengthening of universal security and international cooperation,

believing that the improvement of Soviet-American relations and their mutually advantageous development in such areas as economics, science and culture will meet these objectives and contribute to better mutual understanding and businesslike cooperation, without in any way prejudicing the interests of third countries,

conscious that these objectives reflect the interests of the peoples of both countries,

have agreed as follows:

First. They will proceed from the common determination that in the nuclear age there is no alternative to conducting their mutual relations on the basis of peaceful coexistence. Differences in ideology and in the social systems of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. are not obstacles to the bilateral development of normal relations based on the principles of sovereignty, equality, noninterference in internal affairs and mutual advantage.

Second. The U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. attach major importance to preventing the development of situations capable of causing a dangerous exacerbation of their relations. Therefore, they will do their utmost to avoid military confrontations and to prevent the outbreak of nuclear war. They will always exercise restraint in their mutual relations and will be prepared to negotiate and settle differences by peaceful means. Discussions and negotiations on outstanding issues will be conducted in a spirit of reciprocity, mutual accommodation and mutual benefit.

Third. The Soviet Union and the United States have a special responsibility, as do other countries which are permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, to do everything in their power so that conflicts or situations will not arise which would serve to increase international tension. Accordingly, they will seek to promote conditions in which all countries will live in peace and security and will not be subject to outside interference in their internal affairs.

Fourth. The U.S.S.R. and U.S.A. intend to widen the juridical basis of their mutual relations and to exert the necessary effort so that bilateral agreements which they have concluded and multilateral treaties and agreements to which they are jointly parties are faithfully implemented.

Fifth. The U.S.S.R. and U.S.A. reaffirm their readiness to continue the practice of exchanging views on problems of mutual interest and, when necessary, to conduct such exchanges at the highest level, including meetings between leaders of the two countries.

The two governments welcome and will facilitate an increase in productive contacts between representatives of the legislative bodies of the two countries.

Sixth. The parties will continue their efforts to limit armaments on bilateral as well as on a multilateral basis. They will continue to make special efforts to limit strategic armaments. Whenever possible, they will conclude concrete agreements aimed at achieving these purposes.

The U.S.S.R. and U.S.A. regard as the ultimate objective of their efforts the achievement of general and complete disarmament and the establishment of an effective system of international security in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

Seventh. The U.S.S.R. and U.S.A. regard commercial and economic ties as an important and necessary element in the strengthening of their bilateral relations and thus will actively promote the growth of such ties. They will facilitate cooperation between the relevant organizations and enterprises of the two countries and the conclusion of appropriate agreements and contracts, including long-term ones.

The two countries will contribute to the improvement of maritime and air communications between them.

Eighth. The two sides consider it timely and useful to develop mutual contacts and cooperation in the fields of science and technology. Where suitable, the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. will conclude appropriate agreements dealing with concrete cooperation in these fields.

Ninth. The two sides reaffirm their intention to deepen cultural ties with one another and to encourage fuller familiarization with each other's cultural values. They will promote improved conditions for cultural exchanges and tourism.

Tenth. The U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. will seek to ensure that their ties and cooperation in all the above-mentioned fields and in any others in their mutual interest are built on a firm and long-term basis. To give a permanent character to these efforts, they will establish in all fields where this is feasible joint commissions or other joint bodies.

Eleventh. The U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. make no claim for themselves and would not recognize the claims of anyone else to any special rights or advantages in world affairs. They recognize the sovereign equality of all states.

The development of Soviet-American relations is not directed against third countries and their interests.

Twelfth. The basic principles set forth in this document do not affect any obligations with respect to other countries earlier assumed by the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A.

Endnotes

- 1 See, for example, Brezhnev's speech to the Twenty-fifth Party Congress, *Pravda*, 25 February 1976. The Soviets often assert policies were initiated by Lenin because it gives the policy greater legitimacy. For a scholarly examination of the source of the policy, see Franklyn Griffiths, "Origins of Peaceful Coexistence," *Survey*, January 1964, pp. 195-201.
- 2 V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works* (Moscow: Progress, 1972), vol. 29, p. 153.
- 3 Griffiths, "Origins of Peaceful Coexistence," p. 195.
- 4 *Pravda*, 30 November 1922.
- 5 J. V. Stalin, *Works* (Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1955), vol. 10, p. 296.
- 6 *Ibid.*, vol. 13, pp. 40-41.
- 7 The Brezhnev Doctrine was first expressed as such in a major article in *Pravda*, 26 December 1968, by Professor S. Kovalev, whose field is the history of materialism. H. Gordon Shilling points out in his book *Czechoslovakia's Interrupted Revolution* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), pp. 728-729, that the doctrine was not new. The Warsaw Letter described the events in Czechoslovakia as the "common affair" of all, claiming that all socialist countries had the duty to act in defense of the "common vital interests." Further, the Bratislava Declaration affirmed "the common international duty of all socialist countries to support, strengthen, and defend these socialist gains."
- 8 *Izvestia*, 25 February 1976.
- 9 E. Blinov and M. Dremmer, "A Time Tested Policy," *International Affairs* (Moscow), February 1971, p. 5.
- 10 *Pravda*, 6 October 1952.
- 11 *Ibid.*, 15 February 1976.
- 12 *Ibid.*
- 13 *Ibid.*
- 14 *Ibid.*
- 15 *Ibid.*
- 16 *Ibid.*, 23 January 1959.
- 17 *Ibid.*
- 18 *Izvestia*, 1 November 1959.
- 19 *Ibid.*
- 20 *Pravda*, 25 January 1961.

21. Ibid., 18 October 1961.

22. Ibid., 30 March 1966.

23. Ibid., 31 March 1971.

24. *Izvestia*, 25 February 1976.

25. *Pravda*, 3 November 1977.

26. See, for example, A.A. Sidorenko, *Nastupanie* [The Offensive] (Moscow: Military Publishing House, 1970), which is also available in English translation by the US Air Force (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office). The bulk of the articles in *Voenni Vestnik*, a monthly journal devoted to battalion-level tactics, assume a nuclear environment. For statistics on Soviet military spending, see "The Military Balance, 1977/78," *Air Force Magazine*, December 1977, p. 113.

27. CPSU Central Committee "Open Letter to All Party Organizations and All Communists of the Soviet Union," *Pravda*, 14 July 1963.

28. Statements like these are common in Soviet speeches and writings on international relations. See, for example, Brezhnev's speech at the Twenty-fifth Party Congress, in *Izvestia*, 25 February 1976. See, also, G. Arbatov, a member of the Central Committee, Director of the USA Institute and a leading Soviet commentator on the United States: "When one is confronted by the immense danger created by the accumulated arsenal of the most refined types of weapons of mass destruction, weapons that are being improved all the time, different reactions are also possible....The entire course of events suggests that in our age security can be ensured not by technological but by political means—through improvements of the international situation, detente, a sensible foreign policy, and restrictions on the arms race." ("Big Lie of Detente's Opponents," *Pravda*, 5 February 1977.)

29. *Pravda*, 25 February 1976. This idea was expressed more strongly in a book edited by Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs A.A. Gromyko: "Peaceful coexistence creates the most favorable conditions for mobilization of the masses in the struggle against imperialism, for a durable peace on earth. It serves the goal of strengthening the world socialist system, the expansion of the national liberation struggle of colonial and dependent countries and peoples, the widening of the class struggle of the proletariat of capitalist countries against the monopolistic bourgeoisie and the widening unity of all sections of the people around the proletariat. For these reasons peaceful coexistence of the two systems is a specific form of the class struggle of socialism and capitalism in the world arena, without turning to military means, to weapons." (*Mimoe Sosushchestvovanie—Leninskii Kurs Vneshnei Politiki Sovetskovo Soiuz* [Peaceful Coexistence—The Lenin Course of Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union] (Moscow: Institute of International Affairs, 1962), pp. 95-96. President Ford had a different view of the benefits the Soviets might derive: "I totally disagree with those who claim that detente spells more advantages for the Soviet Union and more disadvantages for the United States. I reckon that both the USSR and USA have gained from detente." (*L'Express*, 16-22 June 1975.)

30. "A Carefully Planned Soviet Bear Trap," *Washington Post*, 20 August 1978. For more detailed information on US-Soviet trade, see *Selected Trade and Economic Data of the Centrally Planned Economies*, published by the Industry and Trade Administration, January 1978; *East-West Trade Update: A Commercial Fact Sheet*

for *US Business*, Overseas Business Report 78-32, July 1978, published by the Industry and Trade Administration, and *Trade of the United States with Communist Countries in East Europe and Asia, 1975-1977*, Overseas Business Report 78-32, September 1978, published by the Office of Internal Economic Research

31. "Soviet Trade Needs More Western Credits," *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, 31 August 1977, p. 4 (Translation of an article by A. Dostal in *Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta*, no. 31, July 1977).

32. "Carefully Planned Soviet Bear Trap."

33. "Resolutions of the CPSU Central Committee of 31 January 1977 on the 60th Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution," *International Affairs*, March 1977, p. 10. The same line was evident as long ago as 1962: "The drastic change in the arrangement of forces in favor of socialism, the collapse of the colonial system, the growth of the worker and communist movement has exerted decisive influence on the situation of the world capitalist system. The world capitalist system has entered a new third stage in its general crises, of which the distinctive feature is that it appeared and is developing not in connection with war, but in a situation of a sharp change in the correlation of forces between the two world social systems—capitalist and communist—in favor of the latter" (Gromyko, ed., *Mirnoe Sotushchestvovanie*.)

34. *Pravda*, 25 February 1976.

35. "Problems of Military Detente in Europe," *International Affairs*, December 1975, p. 33.

36. *Ibid.*, June 1976, pp. 35-43. (Also published in *Survival*, vol. 18, November-December 1976.)

37. *RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon* (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978), pp. 603-606.

38. *Ibid.*, p. 876. For the 1974 figure on Jewish emigration, I am indebted to the Public Affairs Office, Bureau of European Affairs, US Department of State. Figures from the Soviet Jewry Research Bureau of the National Conference on Soviet Jewry differ slightly: approximately 16,000 emigres from 1968 to 1971, 31,903 in 1972, 34,933 in 1973, 20,695 in 1974, and 13,459 in 1975. The trend is the same.

39. *Izvestia*, 16 October 1974.

40. *Ibid.*, 18 January 1975.

41. *Pravda*, 25 February 1976.

42. Moscow, in fact, maintains that Soviet citizens do enjoy basic human rights. Brezhnev presented the official line on alleged "violations of human rights" in socialist countries when he spoke before the Sixteenth Congress of USSR Trade Unions: "What can be said on this score? In our country it is not forbidden to 'think differently' from the majority, to critically appraise various aspects of public life. We regard comrades who come out with valid criticism, who seek to help the cause, as conscientious critics, and we are grateful to them. We regard those whose criticism is mistaken as erring people.

It is another matter when several persons who have broken away from our society actively come out against the socialist system, take the path of anti-Soviet activity, break laws, and having no support within the country, turn abroad for support to the

imperialist centers of propaganda and intelligence subversion. Our people demand that such public figures, *if one may call them that*, be treated as opponents of socialism, as people acting against their own homeland, as accomplices and sometimes even agents of imperialism (*stormy, prolonged applause*) Naturally, we are taking and will continue to take measures against them as provided by our law [*prolonged applause*]

And let no one take offense here. The defense of the rights, freedoms and security of 260 million Soviet people against the actions of such renegades is not only our right but our sacred duty. [*applause*] It is our duty to the people who 60 years ago, under the leadership of the Party of Lenin, embarked on the path of the construction of socialism and communism. It is our duty to the people who, in defending the socialist homeland and their right to live in their own way, gave up 20 million lives in the great war against the fascist aggressors, gave them for the freedom and rights of the peoples, to the people who will never stray from their path! [*prolonged applause*]" (*Pravda*, 22 March 1977.)

Elsewhere the Soviets have maintained human rights also include the right to work, the right to an education, etc., rights that are denied to the West. See, for example, *Pravda*, 12 February 1977.

43. Ibid., 3 August 1977.

44. Ibid., 16 June 1977.

Chapter Eight

**Soviet Views of
Multipolarity and the
Emerging Balance of Power**

Nils H. Wessell

Although the worldviews dominating American foreign policy in the Nixon and Ford years have been modified by the Carter administration, a useful purpose may still be served by an examination of the assumptions underlying US policy between 1969 and 1977 and the Soviet assessments of them. American and Soviet foreign policies will necessarily continue to be shaped by many of the same underlying realities even if official rhetoric changes, old policies are abandoned and new ones inaugurated. Moreover, if the analytic framework of past US administrations has been inherently flawed, these shortcomings will increasingly stand out as time passes. In either case, the reaction of the Soviet Union to the conceptual framework draped over American foreign policy in the Kissinger years will serve to illuminate several fundamental aspects of Soviet thinking likely to survive the vicissitudes of the American political process.

Seen in this light, the sharp divergence in the philosophical foundations of the Nixon-Kissinger and Soviet worldviews acquires more than historical significance. The central theoretical concepts of the Nixon administration, multipolarity and the balance of power, have long been alien to Marxist (and Soviet) thinking.¹ Marxists have regarded the balance of power, with its traditional stress on the maintenance of an equilibrium in the international system, as fundamentally incompatible with the ceaseless change and conflict rooted in the dialectical view of history. Marxism presumes, of course, a sharp dichotomy between capitalist and socialist states.

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one that will ultimately give way not to a multipolar world of independent, sovereign national states but to a pattern of uniformly Communist societies. At the level of abstract futurology, national boundaries are seen as abruptly losing their meaning as the class conflict that is the motor of history disappears, taking with it the aggressive imperialism it generated. The driving force behind this global transformation is not the rivalry of individual nations but conflict between classes and between state systems representing contrary class interests. Moscow has been discomforted by the assumptions underlying American foreign policy in the mid-1970s, as the following commentary suggests:

Some bourgeois theoreticians (and also the Peking leaders), ignoring the factors engendered by the class nature of foreign policy...are ready to reduce practically the entire essence of foreign policy to playing on contradictions between states, blocs and groups of states. It has become a fashion in the West to discuss even some kind of "rules of the game" whose observance supposedly made it possible to avoid armed conflicts, while their violation led to wars.²

Then, in a reassertion of the essentially bipolar and class-based nature of world politics, the same writer added that "the principal tendencies of sociopolitical development are determined not by contradictions and interrelations between individual states, but by the development of the basic class antagonism of our epoch—between world socialism and world capitalism."³

In the Soviet Union the balance of power is associated with policies aimed at supporting the status quo. The concept is routinely assailed as reactionary and counterrevolutionary camouflage for an imperialist policy of dictating to small and medium-size states. While Kissinger may have viewed Metternich as the consummate practitioner of balance-of-power politics, Soviet writers on international relations identify that Austrian statesman as the man most responsible for suppressing national liberation movements in post-Congress Europe. Quoting Kissinger's observation in *A World Restored* that "Castlereagh and Metternich were statesmen of the equilibrium, seeking security in a balance of forces," one Soviet writer noted that Metternich's policy was designed to preserve the Hapsburg monarchy by repressing liberal and nationalist revolutions in Europe. Lest the contemporary significance of conceptions based on the balance of power escape his readers, the Soviet author reminded them that "the renovated, modernized variant of the 'balance of power'...is designed to

preserve the status quo not only in the international-political but, above all, in the social sphere, to maintain and strengthen reactionary change in the life of the people."⁴

Even the less ideologically charged concept of multipolarity, when treated as an American policy, has met with Soviet disapproval. American architects of a pentagonal global balance have been accused of "dividing the world into an arbitrary number of 'power centers'" in the fashion of the geopolitical school represented by Mackinder and Mahan.⁵ The imperialist strategies founded on the doctrine of multipolarity have been condemned for pitting some center of power against others and for aggravating the "dangerous rivalry between them in political, military, and economic fields."⁶ By contrast, the Soviet Union is said to advance an entirely different approach aimed at reducing international tensions. This approach, heralded under the familiar banner of "peaceful coexistence between states with different social systems," has been described as taking into account the interests of "all states, large or small, without exception." Unlike the doctrine of balancing multiple power centers, Soviet policy is said to exclude the use of force in international relations.

Such simplistic formulations aside, Soviet decisionmakers appear to accept, even welcome, the emergence of several (but not all) of the same trends anticipated by American concepts of multipolarity as a description of the emerging international system. Thus, the Soviet Union acknowledges that global power since the *Second World War* has become increasingly dispersed. No less an authority than Brezhnev acknowledged the growth of new power centers in the world. Speaking at the Twenty-fourth Party Congress, against a backdrop of trade and monetary instability in the West in spring 1971, he noted: "At the beginning of the 1970s, the basic centers of imperialist rivalry had become clearly defined: they are the USA, Western Europe (above all the six Common Market countries) and Japan. The economic and political competitive struggle among them is becoming increasingly acute."⁷

As one manifestation of intracapitalist "contradictions," the dispersal of power in the West is a development that Moscow clearly greets with approval, although the same phenomenon in relations among Communist parties (polycentrism) has scarcely been a source of similar satisfaction. Likewise, Soviet leaders could hardly have failed to welcome the retrenchment of American power implied by President Nixon's renewed stress on self-help by allies, although the practical consequences, such as the military strengthening of Iran, were not always anticipated.

In a similar vein, it is clear that the Soviet Union, like the United States, perceives a fundamental transformation taking place in the

international arena. The five powers identified by Nixon and Kissinger as holding the key to the future evolution of the international system also appear to rank as such in Moscow's estimation. Particularly before the 1973 oil embargo and price rises dramatized the strategic vulnerability of Japan and Western Europe, Soviet and American officials foresaw a long-range trend whereby Japan and Western Europe would become increasingly independent of the United States. But neither Moscow nor Washington expected major American allies to renounce their ties to the United States.

Moreover, authoritative Soviet and American writers appear to share the view that their countries will remain indefinitely in a class by themselves—superpowers by dint of superior political, economic, and military resources. Even Moscow's overall view of Soviet-American relations as embodying elements both of cooperation and conflict is broadly congruent with the expectations of the Nixon, Ford, and Carter administrations. Soviet leaders, like their counterparts in the United States, expect well-defined areas of cooperation and less clearly marked areas of conflict to characterize bilateral relations in the foreseeable future.

It is in regard to China that Soviet and American conceptions of the five-power world differ most markedly. The constructive role that Washington assigns to China in the new international milieu finds no echo in Moscow, where the growth of Chinese power arouses concern and alarm. Although Soviet spokesmen once held out hope that the post-Mao leadership would revert to policies less hostile to Soviet interests, China under its new leaders has remained a source of strategic rivalry along the Soviet-Chinese border, within the international Communist movement, and in areas of Third World tension. Moreover, while the United States has appeared resigned to the prospect of expanding Chinese influence in Asia, Moscow outspokenly opposes such a development.

Early Soviet Views of the Nixon Doctrine

Except for the incompatible roles assigned to China, Soviet and American conceptions in the early 1970s of the changing power balance could have accommodated each other without undue difficulty. Nevertheless, it was some time before Soviet leaders grasped the fact that US foreign policy had undergone a fundamental reappraisal in the first months of the Nixon administration. Moscow seemed to disbelieve that in the Nixon Doctrine US policymakers had written a prescription for less direct

American military engagement abroad—a long-standing Soviet objective. For some time, moreover, the Soviets appeared to underestimate the possibility, notwithstanding Willy Brandt's nascent *Ostpolitik*, that the principle of partnership might be translated into a general loosening of US alliance systems.

Despite the enunciation of the Guam Doctrine and its verbal commitment to lowering the global profile of the United States, Soviet spokesmen at first discounted the new formulas as rhetoric devoid of substance. They argued that the doctrine was designed merely to pacify a public grown weary of overseas commitments by camouflaging the true nature of US foreign policy. Georgii Arbatov, director of the USA and Canada Institute and a foreign affairs adviser to the Politburo, very probably reflected the high-level Soviet assessment when he contended in early 1971 that

during the period that has elapsed since Nixon came into the White House, it has become apparent that the basic premises on which the foreign policy course of the largest imperialist power traditionally has been based have remained unchanged. Anti-communism, opposition to progressive changes in the world, expansionist strivings—all these inherited features of the foreign policy of American imperialism—have been transmitted from one administration to the next. Thus, in a broad sense it is possible to speak of the invariability of the foreign policy strategy of the United States over a prolonged period.⁸

Accompanying this tendency to emphasize the continuity of American foreign policy objectives was an acknowledgment that the Nixon Doctrine represented a change in the way those objectives were to be pursued. This modification of the ways and means of pursuing Washington's former policy was welcomed by the Soviet Union, although the change was seen as representing only a more differentiated and flexible approach to the old policy of containment.

Until Nixon's visits to Peking and Moscow in the first half of 1972, the Soviet Union reacted from a similar perspective in evaluating the relations of the United States with its allies. The Nixon Doctrine's emphasis on "partnership" with allies ought to have been interpreted, according to Soviet writers, in the overall context of US attempts to achieve unchanged goals by cheaper methods. Arbatov, no doubt failing to foresee the irony of large-scale involvement of Cuban troops throughout Africa between 1975 and 1978, asserted that "the military heart of the Nixon Doctrine lies in transferring to other countries, insofar as possible, the waging of land wars, in forcing them, in other words, to deliver the basic

contingents of cannon fodder."⁹ Thus, in Asia, the United States was "pushing" Japan into the front line defending American interests in the region. Similarly, with respect to Western Europe, the Nixon Doctrine was designed "to build up the military potential of an 'Atlanticised' Western Europe so as to put it to even more active use in the fight against socialism."¹⁰ Arbatov and others made it clear then that insofar as the partnership principle was an essential underpinning of multipolarity, it would be opposed by Moscow. The Soviet view of this aspect of the Nixon Doctrine also reflected Moscow's concern at the time about the doctrine's practical implications for American policy in Vietnam. The importance of the link perceived by Moscow between the Nixon Doctrine and Vietnam was evident in the assertion that the doctrine was seeking to "attain the unattainable—to get out of Indochina and yet remain there at the same time" by "modifying the forms of the American presence in Southeast Asia through shifting bigger shares of the burden of US imperialism onto its allies and puppets."¹¹

Soviet spokesmen at first reacted in a similar fashion to Nixon's advocacy of improved relations with "former adversaries." While Nixon's declared intent to replace Soviet-American confrontation with negotiations was regarded as positive, Moscow made it clear that it was inclined to watch not what the Nixon administration said but what it did. Moscow asserted that the issues on which the United States was willing to negotiate were extremely limited. Arbatov, referring to Kissinger's "linkage politics," complained also that the United States continually attempted to link problems with one another, sometimes for domestic political purposes.

The changes in rhetoric and tactics reflected in Nixon's foreign policy, according to the early Soviet commentaries, were the result of an irresistible shift in the world balance of forces toward socialism. A senior research associate at the USA Institute observed: "Nixon has been forced to adapt American foreign policy to the changing ratio of forces in the world, to the new conditions that have been created as a result of the further weakening of the military-political and economic positions of the United States on the one hand, and the increase in the might of the Soviet Union and the entire socialist community...on the other."¹² Thus, Soviet observers viewed the proclamation of the Nixon Doctrine as an involuntary act forced on the United States by the pressure of international events, particularly the Vietnam War, which in turn exposed deep weaknesses in the American political and economic systems.

Soviet Views, 1972-76

Although Brezhnev took the opportunity at the Twenty-fourth Party Congress in spring 1971 to stress the Soviet Union's commitment to improving relations with "states, belonging to another social system," it was not until 1972 that, as a result of a combination of factors, the Soviets began to reassess American foreign policy. The Soviet policy of "normalizing relations" with West Germany had started to bear fruit with the Moscow and Warsaw treaties (1970) and the Four-Power Agreement on Berlin (1971). In Southeast Asia, the withdrawal of American forces as part of "Vietnamization" had been carried out under the broad aegis of the Guam Doctrine. Insofar as the partnership principle implied, or at least was consistent with, these trends, the Nixon Doctrine began to acquire new meaning for the Soviet Union.

The US "opening" to China provided reinforcement of another sort to Moscow's reappraisal of the Nixon Doctrine's significance. Nixon's visit to Peking in February 1972 had the effect of telling Soviet leaders that they could no longer rely on Sino-American hostility as a basic condition of the international system. The element of the Nixon-Kissinger foreign policy calling into play the China factor quickened Moscow's interest in improving relations with the United States. Appreciation by Soviet leaders of the new American diplomatic flexibility was probably not unrelated to their willingness to go forward with the May 1972 summit despite the US blockade of Haiphong and bombing of Hanoi in April. Gains accruing to the Soviet Union from the summit, including US recognition of its status as a strategic equal and the prospect of large-scale economic cooperation, gave positive incentive to reassess American policy. For the Soviets at the time, the Moscow accords seemed to open up the possibility of advantageous transfers of technology and vast purchases of grain to compensate for unpredictable harvests.

Not surprisingly, the summit was followed by a distinct shift in the tenor of authoritative Soviet assessments of US foreign policy. Moscow began to acknowledge that the assumptions underlying America's foreign policy had changed, although spokesmen continued to issue periodic warnings about the dangers of war. The son of the Soviet foreign minister professed to see "the most marked changes" in official American attitudes toward the Soviet Union and other Communist nations. In the view of Anatolii A. Gromyko, there had been "a radical turn toward improvement" in Soviet-American relations, a change "initiated in May 1972 when President Richard Nixon paid an official visit to Moscow."¹³ The

younger Gromyko, and others, began to express the view that substantial, even irreversible, progress had been made in areas "that can determine the state of international relations for many decades to come."¹⁴ The younger Gromyko claimed to perceive that as a result of the principle of negotiations with adversaries there had occurred a qualitative change in the relative importance of diplomacy compared with military force in the international system.

Moreover, Arbatov, in contrast to his earlier, highly critical statements, contended in mid-1974 that "both powers are striving to find and are successfully finding possibilities to bring closer their points of view on a growing number of problems and to act toward achieving mutually acceptable solutions of these problems." The new relations between the Soviet Union and the United States had "already gained a solid footing," Arbatov continued, "making it more and more difficult to turn them from this path."¹⁵ Capping the campaign on this theme, Brezhnev told the assembled guests at a state dinner during the June 1974 Soviet-American summit that "we believe the good things that have been achieved in Soviet-American relations during the past two years cannot be erased."¹⁶ Despite the postponement of Brezhnev's planned visit to the United States in 1975-76, because of differences over a SALT II accord, Soviet spokesmen continued to appraise positively the Ford-Kissinger foreign policy. In September 1975 Arbatov observed that since the 1972 summit, Soviet-American relations "have undergone changes that quite recently would have seemed incredible even to an optimist."¹⁷

Although Moscow continued to depict the shift in American foreign policy after 1972 as a largely involuntary accommodation to domestic and foreign pressures, new stress was placed on the role of "realistic and sober" political circles in the United States. To be sure, the familiar catalogue of American domestic ills was cited to explain public disenchantment in the United States with a global US foreign policy. But, after 1972, Moscow became less inclined to describe the Nixon Doctrine as merely a defensive response by the White House to public and congressional opposition to an interventionist foreign policy. The Soviet shift away from such explanations was evident in an official commentary at the time of Gerald Ford's succession to the Presidency: "the process of detente and the development of Soviet-US relations on the principles of peaceful coexistence are phenomena of an objective nature founded on the change in the alignment of forces in the world arena in favor of socialism, on the growing influence of the international workers movement and the people's national liberation struggle, and on the increasing share of realistically minded circles in determining the policy of Western states."¹⁸

Persistent reference to the changed correlation of forces and American weakness might be thought to indicate Moscow's belief that the United States, in an era of strategic parity and international retrenchment stemming from the Vietnam War, could be pressured into reneging on its international commitments generally. Such a conclusion, however, would misread the context in which Soviet foreign policymakers operate. Because of Chinese charges that the Soviet Union and the United States were engaged in a process of far-ranging collusion at the expense of other members of the international Communist movement, the Soviet leadership was eager to portray the policy of peaceful coexistence as one that had been forced on Washington. The Soviets thereby hoped to escape the implication that they were engaged in a cozy conspiracy with Washington to impose "superpower hegemony" over third parties. Spokesmen for the Brezhnev foreign policy of peaceful coexistence also used "American weakness" as a means of pushing hard-line opponents of the policy onto the defensive. Such unnamed critics, inclined to view Soviet detente policies as "revisionist" had aired the opinion that the US policy of detente was founded not on the sure ground of objective circumstances but on the easily reversed and subjective policy preferences of Richard Nixon, long a distrusted symbol of anticommunism in the Soviet Union. Thus, the citation of "objective" weaknesses as the motivating factor behind the foreign policy doctrines of the Nixon-Kissinger era served the purpose of justifying a policy of greater cooperation with the United States.

Rhetorical references to the growing power of the "socialist camp," moreover, were accompanied by expressions of respect for American power. Anatolii Gromyko noted that, by comparison with all other capitalist countries, the United States would be unique throughout the 1970s in its ability to pursue a global foreign policy.¹⁹ Such assessments were grounded in continued Soviet respect for American political will and military strength, both on the strategic and the conventional level. The cautious restraint with which the Soviet news media greeted the collapse of the Thieu regime in South Vietnam reflected a judgment of Moscow (not unanimous) that a low profile would advance Soviet interests around the globe more effectively than would a shift to military pressure and confrontation with the United States. Moreover, the Communist takeover/liberation of Cambodia, which led to the rocketing of the Soviet Embassy in Phnom Penh and the temporary expulsion of Soviet personnel from the country, drove home the lesson that even the victory of anti-American Communist forces in a given country would not necessarily promote Soviet interests. The bloody border war between Cambodia and Vietnam, both Communist states, has more recently underscored the point.

Nor were there any indications that Moscow expected Washington's military capabilities to decline to the extent that Soviet superiority would become acceptable to the United States. On the contrary, Soviet sources focused, for various reasons, on then Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger's "open" call for "an intensified arms race," his alleged attempt to exert pressure on the Soviet Union in the context of the strategic arms negotiations, and his supposed efforts to prevent political detente from being supplemented by military detente.²⁰

While such statements obviously served the propaganda function of justifying increased Soviet defense-spending and forward military deployments, they also suggested that chronically optimistic claims that the world "correlation of forces" was shifting in favor of "socialism" might not represent the collective perception of the Politburo. There is reason to believe that, despite self-confident assertions, Soviet leaders may have reached less optimistic conclusions than were politically desirable to admit. A confidential analysis, appearing in a journal produced by the dissident Marxist historian Roy Medvedev and circulated among high-level party and government officials in 1970, concluded that the overall position of the Soviet Union actually weakened in the 1960s. Three of the basic factors responsible for this decline have continued to operate since that time: (1) the Soviet Union's internal stagnation, *political as much as economic, which has led European and Third World left-wing movements to reject the USSR as a model of development, even more so as a central political authority*; (2) the Soviet lag in "capitalizing" on the "second industrial revolution" in electronics, computers, petrochemicals, and related technologies; and (3) the disintegration of the unity of the socialist camp as China and Albania broke away from the Moscow center, Yugoslavia reaffirmed its nonalignment, and Romania adopted a more independent stance. As the dissident Marxist journal summarized the demise of bipolarity:

No longer are there two camps opposing each other. The socialist camp is actually split. A new camp with China at its head has formed. An extremely complex situation exists in many regions of the globe. The USSR and the USA have accumulated a colossal arsenal of all kinds of weapons, above all atomic and nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery. And China is rapidly increasing its atomic potential. Contradictions are growing not only between socialist and capitalist countries but between the socialist countries themselves inside the former socialist camp.²¹

Notwithstanding the serious reverses suffered by the Soviet Union, this period also witnessed the attainment by Moscow of strategic parity with the United States. Thus, it was no exaggeration for the Soviets to claim that a fundamental change in the global balance, at least on the bilateral level, had occurred in their favor. Moreover, worldwide inflation and recession, which deepened in the wake of the Arab oil embargo and OPEC price increases, exacerbated political and economic instability in Western Europe. These conditions fueled a Soviet debate in 1975 over the global condition of capitalism. Although Soviet ideologists found fresh evidence for predicting the by then long-imminent collapse of capitalism, more serious Soviet analysts were inclined to take a less apocalyptic view.²² Domestic political turmoil in the West also stimulated a Soviet reappraisal of the "revolutionary situation" in the capitalist world.²³ Soviet leaders were not unmindful that economic distress could lead, and historically had led, to the coming to power not just of left-wing popular fronts but of right-wing reactionary forces hostile to the Soviet Union. In any event, the erosion of commitment to collective security across the southern expanse of Europe in 1974-75—from Portugal to Turkey—powerfully reinforced longstanding doubts in Moscow that in the foreseeable future Western Europe would acquire sufficient strength and unity to constitute the kind of new power center envisaged by Nixon and Kissinger.

Western Europe as a New Power Center

In the multipolar world envisaged by its heralds, Western Europe was to become a unified economic and political entity able to provide for its own defense, or at least for the major part of it. In a multipolar setting, the balance-of-power principle, with its stress on a fluid and self-adjusting equilibrium, implied a weakening if not the disappearance of West European reliance on the United States for security.

For Europe to play the role envisioned for it, however, three developments will have to take place: (1) significant progress toward European political integration; (2) assertion by a united Europe of independence from the United States in the manner of a "Third Force"; and (3) creation of a self-sufficient European defense community possessing its own strategic-nuclear deterrent.

The statements of Soviet officials and specialists reflect skepticism that any of the above trends will materialize in the next several years. In particular, Soviet analysts doubt that Western

Europe will soon attain a meaningful degree of political integration. Only in August 1973, when it promoted COMECON's (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) first (and unofficial) "feeler" to the EEC (European Economic Community), did the Soviet Union feel compelled to recognize the reality of the community. The slow pace of mutual contacts thereafter was not accelerated by the early-1975 failure of the first formal talks between the two economic blocs. Two and a half more years were required before the two sides established their first formal contacts (September 1977) and announced plans to negotiate an agreement on relations between the two blocs. COMECON's refusal to recognize the Common Market Commission as trade spokesman for its nine members suggests that the Soviet Union does not expect European political integration to progress at a rapid rate. Moreover, West European dependence on imported oil, and the political weakness stemming from it, has reinforced the low Soviet estimate of Western Europe's potential as a new power center in a multipolar system.

Although Moscow's expectations of Western Europe's emergence as an independent center of power are plainly circumscribed, Soviet preferences are more complex. With respect to the three trends cited above, one may speculate that Moscow would prefer (1) West European disunity, (2) West European independence from the United States, so long as the Federal Republic of Germany does not emerge dominant in Europe as a result, and (3) minimal West European defense capabilities and coordination. The problems facing Soviet leaders stem from the fact that their first preference is probably incompatible with the second, their second preference is contingent on the absence of what would be a likely concomitant of that preference, and their third preference probably precludes the second.

Only reluctantly recognizing the EEC as a reality, Moscow hopes that Western Europe will not attain a higher level of unity, even in the economic field. Soviet leaders are acutely aware, of course, that a unified Western Europe would pose a serious threat to Soviet influence in Eastern Europe. The leadership's concern has been apparent from its hostile reaction to the enlargement of EEC membership. Calls for greater EEC integration have also evoked displeasure in Moscow. The Soviet response to the report issued in January 1976 by Belgian Prime Minister Tindemans was characteristically critical. The Tindemans report, urging a renewed drive toward European integration in a host of areas, including defense policy, prompted a long Soviet commentary stressing the obstacles to such progress and the negative attitude of various West European capitals toward the proposals.²⁴ Similarly, when treating of US ties with Western Europe, Soviet spokesmen have long seized

upon signs of division in the Atlantic partnership and have played them up as developing contradictions for which capitalism has no cure. Moscow's hopes in this regard have been responsible for the emphasis that Soviet specialists have placed on fissures within the alliance. All the major West European countries—not just France—have been depicted as earnestly striving to modify the structure of NATO in order to reduce the leading role of the United States. The following analysis is not unrepresentative of Soviet treatments of NATO's internal policies during the last years of the Nixon administration: "Economic, military and political contradictions between its West European members, on the one hand, and the USA, on the other, have been growing with unprecedented force over a wide front. Here, the main motive force in the process is the determination on the part of the now stronger capitalist states on the continent of Europe...to change in their favour the very structure of the Atlantic system of relations and to deprive the USA of the role of what may be characterized as host and leader."²⁵

The United States, Moscow recognized, was concerned about the deterioration of its relations with Western Europe, but American concern was not portrayed as being reciprocated in West European capitals. Secretary of State Kissinger's invitation to the Europeans to formulate a new Atlantic Charter, it was accurately pointed out, received an extremely restrained response from Western Europe. Researchers at Moscow's prestigious Institute of World Economy and International Relations have noted that Western Europe and Japan increasingly have sought a greater measure of equality in their economic relations with the United States.²⁶ The consensus among Soviet scholars seems to be that, despite the severe impact of oil-price increases on Western Europe and Japan, the United States has lost considerable economic and political leverage over its chief allies in recent years.

Moscow's interest in the growth of West European independence from the United States was underscored by its reaction to possible US military intervention to assure Persian Gulf oil supplies. Early in 1975, *Izvestiia*, referring to Kissinger's veiled warning that the use of military force could not be excluded, stressed the vigorous opposition expressed by several West European capitals:

One also cannot help mentioning the reasoning of the USA's highest officials concerning the possibility of using troops to prevent the "strangulation" of the capitalist economy in the event of a new embargo on oil deliveries.... Whereas it is still possible that the offer of American leadership will be met with enthusiasm (though not by everyone) in Saigon or Seoul, another reaction may be confidently forecast in the other capitals of the "Western World."²⁷

Despite West European movement away from some US policies, Moscow did not expect the United States to let its influence in Western Europe decline precipitously. In the Soviet view, as the United States searched for ways to forestall such a decline, it would continue to rely on NATO as the most effective instrument of control available. In the late 1960s and early 1970s congressional pressure to reduce the number of US troops in Europe did not lead the Soviet Union to question the basic American commitment to NATO. Of great interest to the Soviet Union was the prospect that the Western European commitment to the alliance might flag:

The overall balance in US-European relations has been changing in favor of Western Europe—a new imperialist “power center” which is becoming increasingly stronger and which, while having a class content identical to that of the United States, tends to introduce a considerable element of uncertainty into Washington’s plans for the international structure. The interests of the new “power center” are becoming ever more pronounced and, far from being identical to those of the United States, are increasingly coming into conflict with the latter.²⁶

Moscow recognizes the commonality of interest, or at least the complementarity of self-interest, that is likely to maintain a substantial degree of cohesion in US-West European relations. One such interest applies to the US extended deterrent. In tacit recognition that strategic bipolarity may continue into the indefinite future, at least with respect to Europe, Soviet spokesmen candidly note that the West Europeans themselves favor retention of the US military presence in Europe and the American nuclear umbrella.²⁹ Moreover, with some exceptions, Soviet analysts show a keen appreciation for the constraints on Western Europe’s ability to go it alone in defense matters.

The Soviet Union has nevertheless been concerned to limit the defense potential of Germany, Britain, France, and any future European entity. In a unilateral statement appended to the interim agreement limiting strategic offensive arms (SALT I), the Soviet Union reserved the right to build additional SLBM submarines beyond the agreed limit should the NATO allies increase their existing submarine forces. Article 9 of the ABM Treaty, prohibiting transfer of ABM systems to third countries, represented a similar attempt to limit the strategic potential of American allies. Soviet pressure at the SALT II negotiations to limit the transfer of cruise missile technology reflects the same preoccupation. The Soviets have also warned against the creation of an independent defense

community in Western Europe, condemning such military integration as incompatible with the European force reduction talks.³⁰ Moreover, Soviet proposals at the Vienna talks for equal percentage reductions in the forces of all concerned countries would have had the effect of freezing European conventional military capabilities at levels below those of the superpowers. Even the recent acceptance by the USSR of the Western proposal for equal force ceilings has been crucially hedged by its apparent underestimation of the numbers of Warsaw Pact troops stationed in the area.

While Soviet analysts have also acknowledged instances of intra-European cooperation, including Anglo-French cooperation in producing the Jaguar military aircraft and Anglo-German-Dutch development of enriched uranium, the general practice for Soviet-bloc scholars has been to stress the limits of such cooperation in defense-related areas:

The process of transforming the EEC into an independent or at least autonomous center of military strength within the framework of the North Atlantic alliance is severely limited by Western Europe's lag behind the United States in military technology, by the insufficient level of integration of the EEC's economic potential, and finally by the absence of a system of cooperation in foreign policy capable of directing integrated armed forces. The creation of just such a system is pushing up against the deep differences of interest and of military status of the three leading states of the Community—England, France and the FRG.³¹

As this assessment suggests, the Soviet Union does not anticipate that European defense integration will soon fulfill the implicit requirements of genuine multipolarity. But Moscow expects that the gradual dispersal of power in the Western world will redound ultimately to its own benefit. The Soviet policy of peaceful coexistence has created an atmosphere in which the strains in America's relations with Western Europe have not yet prompted a reactive process of West European integration. So long as this remains the case, Moscow may find itself the beneficiary of rifts in the Western alliance without having to deal with a united Western Europe as a new power center.

Japan as a New Power Center

An evenly balanced multipolar world requires that Japan, like Western Europe, assume a larger and more independent role in the

international system. Unless the concept of multipolarity were reduced to purely economic criteria, Japan's substantial economic strength would have to be converted into military and political power. For Japan to take its appointed place in the scheme, it would be required to undertake a substantial program of conventional rearmament beyond the scope of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces as presently constituted. Moreover, if complete self-reliance is a precondition for Japan's emergence as one of five equal centers of power, Tokyo also would have to begin the process of acquiring an independent nuclear deterrent. Finally, a fluid pentapolar balance cannot be constructed unless Japan exercises a qualitatively new independence from the United States in foreign policy. From the vantage point of Moscow, only the last development would be welcome, and even it has the aspect of a double-edged sword since a movement by Japan away from the United States might be accompanied by a compensatory Japanese rapprochement with China as a means of offsetting Soviet influence. The recent negotiation of a treaty of friendship and cooperation between Japan and China, provoking a bitter Soviet denunciation, has made the possibility of a still deeper rapprochement more credible.

After the "Nixon shocks" in the summer of 1971, the Soviet Union portrayed US-Japanese relations in terms of American efforts to reverse the decline of its influence in Tokyo. Until the collapse of the Thieu regime in South Vietnam aroused anxieties among some Japanese leaders concerning the reliability of US security guarantees—apprehensions which Soviet analysts were quick to detect—Soviet commentaries played down the theme of whether the United States was likely to maintain, extend, or withdraw its "commitments" to Japan. Primary emphasis fell instead on the inability of the United States to maintain its "hegemony" over Japan as part of the non-Communist world. In recognition of a gradually growing multipolarity, the United States was depicted as continuing to fight a rearguard action against the erosion of its influence. In this view, Washington, while recognizing that it no longer had the leverage to impose decisions on Japan, nonetheless had demonstrated its intention to use all means at its disposal to exert pressure on Tokyo in pursuit of US interests. Consonant with this, the United States was said to have demanded "sharp increases in Japan's expenditures for support of puppet regimes and countries belonging to military blocs in Asia in order to remove this burden from its own shoulders."³² However, *Izvestiia* maintained, it was indisputable that Japan, "whose leaders cannot ignore the growing anti-American mass movement in the country, is striving gradually to free itself of American tutelage."³³

In the Soviet view, Tokyo's desire to play an international political

and economic role more independent of the United States has been primarily responsible for weakening US-Japanese ties. Soviet sources attribute Japan's expanding role to the growth in its economic strength compared to that of the United States. The Soviet press has regularly seized upon disputes over trade imbalances and monetary instability in order to play up the "contradictions" in US-Japanese relations. Soviet specialists in Asian affairs have concluded that the dominant trend in US-Japanese relations has been a growing conflict of interests, reflecting a "qualitative change" in the nature of those relations. They have noted, for example, that "the era of demonstrative displays of friendship" is over and that in many regions, such as Southeast Asia, the growth of Japanese exports has, economically speaking, "driven the United States into the background."³⁴

Despite the prospect of dividends from such misunderstandings as the so-called Nixon shocks, Soviet policymakers and their spokesmen expect that sources of rivalry in US-Japanese relations will be contained within certain limits. A prominent Soviet scholar has noted that several factors have "softened the impact and reduced the magnitude" of divisions between the United States and Japan. Among these factors have been (1) growing Soviet power which, Moscow recognizes, has deepened Japanese dependence on the United States as a counterweight; (2) intervention by the US and Japanese Governments to ameliorate economic disputes; and (3) the impact of the scientific-technological revolution in creating complementary markets in the two countries.³⁵ Thus, while economic and political disputes between Tokyo and Washington intensified in the late sixties and early seventies, there has been little indication that the Soviets, in anything but the long term, expect differences to result in the rupture of Japanese-American relations.

In fact, Soviet scholars in the mid-1970s acknowledged "a certain strengthening" of Japan's relations with the Atlantic Community, particularly on issues relating to energy and "North-South" economic relations. Japanese participation in the International Energy Agency, in the meeting of leaders from six major industrial countries at Rambouillet in late 1975, and in subsequent North-South negotiations was taken as a sign of the change.

Soviet spokesmen have balanced recognition of these developments with skepticism concerning the concept of "trilateralism," according to which Japan would be brought into a close relationship with the United States and Western Europe. West European apprehensions over a Japanese "export offensive" are seen in Moscow as a concrete indication that the West Europeans would not be so foolish as to invite the reorientation of Japanese exports from American markets to their own by broadening the

Atlantic Community to include Tokyo. In turn, elements of the Japanese leadership have been depicted as less than enthusiastic over the possibility that Japanese participation in such an expanded community might generally limit Tokyo's freedom of action in foreign policy and might even compel an increase in defense expenditures.³⁶

The Soviet Union, of course, appreciates that friction in US-Japanese relations opens up new opportunities for its own diplomatic maneuvers. But even the "Nixon shocks" failed to open the door wide enough for effective Soviet exploitation. Foreign Minister Gromyko managed to arrange an extended visit to Tokyo in January 1972, one month before Nixon's departure for Peking, but the continuing dispute over reversion of the Hokkaido offshore islands³⁷ blocked any significant improvement in Soviet-Japanese relations. Moscow evidently fears that reversion would have a domino effect, encouraging other claims on territories annexed as a result of World War II or earlier "unequal treaties." Particularly striking in this regard has been China's public support for the Japanese territorial claim. For its part, the Japanese Government is politically unable to concede the loss of the islands. (Even the Japanese Communist Party has gone on record in favor of reversion, provoking a denunciation by the CPSU.)³⁸ So long as the territorial issue remains unresolved, Soviet-Japanese relations will likely remain at an impasse. Moreover, Japan has been reluctant to invest in the development of Siberian oil and gas reserves without American participation. Japan has been cool toward participation, even on a trilateral basis, for fear of alienating Peking. (The Chinese claim part of the region proposed for development and have made known their opposition to oil pipeline projects that would enhance the Soviet Union's ability to maintain military forces along the Sino-Soviet border.) Thus, Moscow has had to face the fact that, despite increasing bilateral trade with Tokyo, Japan's growth as an economic power has not been accompanied, even in the economic realm, by a qualitative improvement in Soviet-Japanese relations.

Although the Soviet Union has sought to encourage Japan to drift away from its close relationship with the United States, it has vigorously opposed the attainment of military self-sufficiency that Japanese critics of the American security tie consider a necessary precondition for a more independent Japanese foreign policy. Soviet spokesmen universally refrain from explicitly acknowledging the linkage between the greater measure of military self-reliance and a more independent foreign policy. In fact, they deny outright that under conditions of detente Japan would have to rearm in order to pursue such a course. Soviet analyses of the sources of Japan's dependence on the United States, however,

implicitly argue the contrary: "the intimate military ties between the United States and Japan have also played a role [in lessening the impact of disagreements between the two countries]. Given the present disproportion in military potential between the United States and Japan, Tokyo must not forget for an instant its military dependence on the United States as it makes its various demands."³⁹

Despite the logical extrapolation that Japan ought to become self-reliant in matters of military security, Moscow clearly would like to forestall the translation of Japan's economic strength into military power. The Soviet press has regularly denounced those leaders of the Liberal Democratic Party who, Moscow asserts, are blocking ratification of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in order to keep open the nuclear option.⁴⁰ Moreover, the Soviet Union has continued to oppose vigorously any increase in Japan's conventional military capabilities, including any expansion in the size of the Japanese navy.⁴¹ Soviet leaders would prefer Japan to be nonnuclear and neutral, a condition conducive less to Japan's occupation of a place as one of five world centers of power than to the growth of Japan's ties with the Soviet Union at the expense of the United States.

Soviet preferences aside, it is not so clear whether Moscow believes Japan will in fact elect a course of nonnuclear neutralism. On the one hand, Soviet analysts have noted that Japan's "ruling circles" believe that at least in the nearest future Japan must achieve its aim by means of using its growing economic might and not by strength of arms.⁴² In line with this, Soviet specialists credit Japan's economic influence with giving Tokyo a "more solid" position in Southeast Asia today than during the Japanese military occupation of the region in World War II. Other constraints are seen also as inhibiting Japan from undertaking a larger military role in Asia in the medium-term future. Among these are the example of America's difficulties in translating military power into political power in Indochina, Japan's military capabilities, and the danger of rekindling dormant anti-Japanese sentiment in Asia, which might adversely affect Japan's economic interests.

On the other hand, the Soviet Union, closely monitoring Japan's defense-related programs, has often betrayed anxiety over Tokyo's military potential. Note was taken that Japanese defense-spending in the Fourth Five-Year Plan (1972-76) was double the amount under the previous plan. The organ of the Soviet Ministry of Defense, *Krasnaia Zvezda*, observing that the United States has encouraged Japan to shoulder a greater share of the burden for its own defense, reported with disapproval the announcement by the director-general of the Japanese National Defense Agency that, on

the expiration of the fourth defense plan in March 1976, "a new course" would be charted in defense policy.⁴³ Underscoring its uncertainty, the Soviet Union treats Japan's "nuclear allergy" as a changeable condition. Japan, it is pointed out, has a plutonium-production capability sufficient to manufacture forty atomic bombs annually, each with a yield comparable to that of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima. This production capability is matched, Soviet scholars note, by Japan's possession of the technical knowledge necessary to produce such weapons. By one Soviet estimate, Japanese leaders are laying the "material, moral, and political groundwork for Japan's emergence as a great military power in the international arena in the not too distant future, roughly in the 1980s."⁴⁴

This projection probably mirrors official concern that Japan's emergence as an economic superpower will sooner or later be followed by remilitarization, adoption of a regional defense role, and possible nuclearization. In short, it reflects a conviction that Japan may ultimately play the sort of role envisioned for it by the Nixon-Kissinger Doctrine (or at least by those who have sought to interpret the doctrine). The alternative that Moscow had held out to Japan was an Asian "collective security system" based on close relations with the Soviet Union, the nonuse of force, peaceful settlement of disputes, and broad economic cooperation. The Japanese Government showed slight interest in what it knew the Chinese conceived to be a proposed alliance directed against them. Nor was the Japanese Left more forthcoming. The Japanese Communist Party made solution of the territorial dispute a prerequisite for the collective security system, and the Socialist Party withdrew its support for the Soviet proposal after the visit to Peking of party leader Tomomi Narita in May 1975.⁴⁵ The Soviet project would seem to have a bleak future in any event. Only Iran, Afghanistan, and Mongolia have endorsed the scheme since Brezhnev first proposed it at the World Communist Conference in June 1969, a few months after the bloody clashes on the Sino-Soviet border.⁴⁶ By 1976, the Soviet Politburo had reportedly decided to jettison the collective security concept in the absence of notable support.

In sum, the Soviet view of Japan's future is marked by uncertainty and deep ambivalence. A larger Japanese role in the world is half-expected, and the possibility that Japan's emergence might be accompanied by improved Soviet-Japanese relations exerts considerable attraction, particularly as it plays upon Soviet aspirations for developing Siberia. On the other hand, the present situation is far from unsatisfactory, and the prospective growth of Japanese defense capabilities stirs Soviet anxiety. Moscow understands that once the "objective" factor of Japanese military

power were created, a new situation would obtain for the Soviet Union. If at that time the territorial or some other issue were to remain unresolved, it would take only a "subjective" decision by a nationalistic Japanese Government to rekindle traditional Russian concerns in Northeast Asia. Accordingly, the USSR would prefer a militarily weak, nonnuclear, and neutral Japan to the one seemingly called for by the Nixon Doctrine. Moscow, though, displays little confidence that this best-of-all-worlds will come to pass.

China as a New Power Center

China's future role in the emerging international system is critical for the viability of the Nixon-Kissinger Doctrine and similar conceptions which stress a lower US profile in Asia. China, in fact, is pivotal to the entire concept of multipolarity. A weak and fragmented China, or one allied with Moscow, perforce cannot serve as a counterweight to Soviet power and influence in Asia. Thus, either of the extreme futures sometimes posited for Sino-Soviet relations would probably require drastic revision of the assumptions on which US foreign policy has lately rested. The outbreak of a large-scale Sino-Soviet war undoubtedly would compel the United States to review its entire military role in Asia, a role recently on the decline. By the same token, the restoration (however unlikely) of the Sino-Soviet alliance relationship of the early 1950s would also shatter the balance-of-power framework underlying current US policies toward both countries. Short of this, an evolution of Sino-Soviet relations permitting Moscow to redeploy a significant portion of its military resources from the Chinese border to Europe might also be destabilizing for the global balance.

Consequently, Sino-Soviet relations and the Soviet estimate of their probable evolution are of critical importance. Although Soviet leaders do anticipate the growth of China's military and political power—an essential prerequisite for a pentapolar world—it is less apparent that the Soviet Union ultimately expects China to fulfill the role of a moderate state committed to avoid actions that would upset international stability and the Asian balance of power.

Soviet leaders held little hope of such moderation from the "Maoist clique"; but they nourished the chronic expectation that the Mao succession would open up new possibilities.⁴⁷ The Maoists, according to *Pravda*, "long regarded war as one of the primary means of achieving their political goals in the international arena."⁴⁸ The Soviet Union accused Mao of taking the side of reactionary

extremists in attacking Soviet-American detente and other tension-easing measures. In scoring the Maoists for their allegedly hegemonic ambitions and great-power pretensions, Moscow regularly implied that China was unwilling to respect solemn international treaties,⁴⁹ quite aside from tacit "rules of the game." Not surprisingly, Soviet writers even denounced Chinese foreign policy under Mao for its asserted "break with class, Marxist-Leninist positions."⁵⁰

After the death of Mao, the Soviet Union reduced the level of polemics with the Chinese in hope of encouraging pro-Soviet tendencies in Peking. By late spring 1977, however, Soviet patience had been exhausted. An authoritative statement in *Pravda* condemned Chinese militarism once again and cautioned the West against attempts to channel Chinese aggressiveness against the USSR.⁵¹

Such assertions, revealing the depth of Moscow's distrust of the Chinese, strongly suggest that Peking is anything but a likely candidate for the "responsible" role of a mature great power in the pentapolar balance anticipated by the multipolar worldview. On the other hand, some of the very Chinese actions that lead the Soviet Union to reject Peking as a stabilizing force in the world provide the basis for American expectations that China's emergence will promote global stability. Thus, China's alleged "break with Marxism-Leninism" (read: the Soviet Union) is actually a pre-condition for the pentapolar world. To the extent this break is accompanied by improved relations with the "imperialist" powers (above all, the United States), it advances the prospects for a multipolar environment. In a sense, then, Soviet denunciations of the Chinese tend to reinforce the impression that the global evolution expected by Nixon and Kissinger is taking place.

But, viewed from a strictly "objective" military perspective, China would seem to pose a rather modest military threat to the Soviet Union in the near term. As such, Peking would not seem to be the military counterweight to Soviet power that the Nixon-Kissinger concepts appear to require. Although Chinese nuclear capabilities have been growing, they pose only a small threat to the Soviet Union. The time required to prepare China's first-generation missiles for launch has been judged by some (but not all) Western analysts as so prolonged that the Soviet Union could with high confidence mount a preemptive, disarming strike against the Chinese missile forces. China might endeavor to contain a military conflict with the Soviet Union to the conventional level, but such an effort would probably fail. Soviet military doctrine places great stress on the early use of tactical-nuclear weapons, with which at least two Soviet divisions on the border have been equipped. Such

capabilities would be likely to more than offset Chinese advantages in military manpower except under conditions of partisan warfare—if, for instance, the Soviet Union were to seek to occupy large stretches of Chinese territory. Except for this eventuality, then, the Soviet Union has no reason to fear China as a military superpower so long as only extant and near-term capabilities are examined.

The Soviet estimate of China's future international role, however, is not based on purely objective factors; nor is it based exclusively on developments anticipated for the immediate future. Above all, Soviet analysts have focused on the long-term capabilities and hostile intentions of their Chinese adversary. Passing over Soviet military programs, they have maintained that the Chinese are seeking to intensify the arms race and that they are spending more than one-third of their budget for military purposes.⁵² Moscow has charged that the Chinese leadership is "militarizing the country and creating a situation of war hysteria under the false cry of a threat from the North" in order to "intimidate the population of their country with a spectre of a non-existent 'threat.'"⁵³

According to Moscow, the Chinese are playing *realpolitik* of a particularly dangerous kind as they attempt to hide behind a mass of Marxist-Leninist verbiage in support of developing nations and in opposition to "superpower" ambitions. The Soviet Union warns that nations, rather than accepting Chinese statements at face value, ought to beware of fanning international tensions. Chinese opposition to detente in Europe and to improved relations between Japan and the Soviet Union is explained in Moscow as a tactic to undermine the unity of the world socialist system. The Soviets argued in advance of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe that when participants agreed to such principles as the inviolability of existing borders, this would be "tantamount to an international condemnation of the Maoists' adventurist line."⁵⁴ Moreover, the alleged Soviet threat to China is dismissed as a fiction designed to deflect attention from the demands of the Chinese population for improved living standards. Published Soviet commentaries have discreetly ignored the Chinese obsession with the Soviet strategic threat and with the possibility of a "surgical strike" against China's nuclear forces and R&D complexes.

Thus, China's role in the international system is not seen by the Soviet Union as it has been visualized, or idealized, in the Nixon-Kissinger Doctrine. China is not viewed as one of the five major powers conducting a "rational" and essentially constructive foreign policy. Instead, China is seen as a threat to international stability, driven to dominate the smaller nations on its periphery, intent on becoming a nuclear superpower, and unalterably opposed to the Soviet Union.

A Troubling Reality

Despite the importance of ideologically reinforced perceptions, it would be mistaken to assume that the commitment of the Soviet leadership to Marxism-Leninism or Soviet ideology might somehow preclude Moscow's acceptance of a new international system founded implicitly on the balance of power and multiple centers of power. Without attempting to answer definitively the hoary question of the role played by ideology in the Soviet policymaking process, one may note George Kennan's observation that the problem is less with the actual content of the ideology than with the absolute value attached to it. Soviet ideology no doubt will remain sufficiently flexible to accommodate the most inescapable alterations of the external environment, including any trend toward multipolarity (however uneven) and a balance of power. But the ideology, even while changing, will produce new rigidities as the result of continued demands for conformity; and such demands give rise to cynicism with respect to the ideology, a condition that already afflicts even the departments of the Central Committee Secretariat, the highest level of administrative authority in the Soviet Union.⁵⁵

In this milieu, ideological rhetoric serves less as a guide to action than as a means of legitimizing the party's rule and its interpretation of the Soviet national interest. Accordingly, Soviet leaders can be expected to accept and even welcome the objective reality of increasingly dispersed power in the non-Communist world. There is no sign, though, that Soviet observers anticipate Japan or Western Europe will soon emerge as full-fledged power centers capable of rivaling the superpowers in global influence. Nor do the Soviets desire such a development. The two indispensable ingredients for such an evolution—a European nuclear force (EUNUFOR) and a rearmed Japan—have long evoked heated Soviet opposition.

Soviet ploys for the redistribution of global power have thus far been confined to the realms of politics and economics. The growth in the economic strength of Western Europe and Japan vis-a-vis the United States in the past two decades, despite the temporary reversal of this trend after the onset of the energy crisis, has aroused hopes in Moscow that the cohesion of their political and security relationships will deteriorate. Furthermore, the dependence of the non-Communist industrialized world on oil-producing states has held out the promise of undermining the strength of other major power centers and aggravating relations among them at the same time. It must be recognized, however, that the transfer of financial resources to oil producers from oil consumers promises to create

entirely new concentrations of power in regions where Moscow has sought to increase its influence. Thus, for example, Iran's emergence as a significant military power in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean may result in a net loss of influence for the Soviet Union in that region. A multipolar world, even one that is imperfectly balanced, will harbor difficulties for the Soviet Union.

As these considerations suggest, the Soviet view of multipolarity in a balance-of-power world is deeply ambivalent. The Soviets have been eager to witness—and, where possible, promote—the drift of American allies away from close relations with the United States. On the other hand, Moscow vigorously opposes the acquisition by such increasingly independent actors of the wherewithal to establish themselves as centers of power equal to the Soviet Union. Moscow has thus pursued policies aimed at driving a wedge between Washington and allied capitals, while itself maintaining a low profile. Thus far, the policy of peaceful coexistence has succeeded, albeit gradually, in nurturing a climate of relaxation that encourages drift in Western Europe without spurring political integration or renewed commitment to institutions of collective security.

As to China, Moscow sees no virtue whatsoever in multipolarity. In the Chinese context, multipolarity spells schism in the international Communist movement and a military threat to the security of Siberia, the Soviet Far East and, indeed, the entire Soviet Union. Moreover, China, unlike Japan and Western Europe, threatens to pose a considerable strategic-nuclear threat in the decade ahead. Again, unlike the other two posited centers of power, China is a country where the Soviet Union seems to have exhausted its political opportunities to check the growth of a strategic rival. Only a dangerous Soviet "surgical strike" or a unilateral decision in Peking to curtail its strategic-weapons program can halt this development. Even in the unlikely event that Mao's successors choose to improve relations with the Soviet Union, there is little reason to suppose that Moscow will ever be able to take China's strategic power for granted. In this respect, the Nixon-Kissinger vision of a multipolar world has already become a troubling reality in Moscow.

Endnotes

1. The task of deriving Soviet beliefs from published materials admittedly is hazardous. One danger is that of attributing views to a Soviet leadership that is simplistically perceived as monolithic. The reader should be aware that a degree of

over-simplification underlies any analysis purporting to reflect "Moscow's" worldview. Such statements will obscure rather than elucidate the divergent interests of competing bureaucracies. Despite sometimes important differences in the tone and emphasis of Soviet commentaries, it is my belief that the Soviet view of the emerging international system is sufficiently coherent that, with the exercise of appropriate caution, limited generalizations can be made.

The writings of Soviet scholars and quasi-academics have been treated here as broadly reflecting the views of Soviet officials. This treatment, not entirely satisfactory, is made necessary by the relative paucity of official statements concerning such essentially Western concepts as multipolarity and the balance of power. This procedure may be justifiable since even slight deviations from official thinking are usually criticized vigorously after their publication (if not suppressed beforehand). If reports by recent Soviet emigres are to be believed concerning the marked disinclination of the top Soviet leadership to think conceptually, the greatest danger in this approach may lie in attributing any views of a conceptual nature to Soviet leaders.

2. Sh. Sanakoyev, "The World Today: Problems of the Correlation of Forces," *International Affairs* (Moscow), no. 11, 1974, p. 43.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid., p. 44.

5. A.A. Karenin, "Doktrina 'balansa sil' i sovremennyi mir" [The Doctrine of the "Balance of Power" and the Contemporary World], *Voprosy filosofii* [Questions of Philosophy], no. 9, 1973, p. 34.

6. V. Kelin, "Opasnye Kontseptsii" [Dangerous Concepts], *Izvestia*, 24 February 1975.

7. "Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 24th Congress of the CPSU," delivered by L.I. Brezhnev, 30 March 1971; trans. in *Current Soviet Policies*, vol. 6 ("The Documentary Record of the 24th Congress of the CPSU"), p. 10. The tripolar imperialist framework is further developed by Otto Reingold, "Nekotorye cherty sovremennogo krizisa ekonomiki kapitalizma" [Some Features of the Contemporary Crisis of Capitalism], *Kommunist*, no. 7, 1974, pp. 106-115.

8. "Doktrina Niksona: deklaratsii i real'nost'" [The "Nixon Doctrine": Declarations and Reality], *SShA: ekonomika, politika, ideologiya* [USA: Economics, Politics, Ideology], no. 2, 1971; trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), *Daily Report* (Soviet Union), 5 March 1971, p. A2. (Hereafter cited as "The Nixon Doctrine.")

9. Ibid., p. A28.

10. V. Schein, "Nato: The Price of Mature Partnership," *International Affairs*, no. 2, 1972, p. 54.

11. V. Kuzmin, "The Guam Doctrine—Old Objectives, New Techniques," *Ibid.*, no. 12, 1971, p. 32.

12. "The Nixon Doctrine," p. 47.

13. Anatolii A. Gromyko and Andrei Kokoshin, "US Foreign Policy Strategy for the 1970s," *International Affairs*, no. 10, 1973, p. 69.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 70.
15. *Izvestia*, 13 July 1974; trans. in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press (CDSP)* 7 August 1974.
16. *Pravda*, 28 June 1974 (CDSP, 24 July 1974).
17. *Izvestia*, 4 September 1975 (CDSP, 1 October 1975).
18. *Nedelia*, 12-18 August 1974; trans. in FBIS, *Daily Report (Soviet Union)*, 22 August 1974, p. B3.
19. Gromyko and Kokoshin, "US Foreign Policy Strategy...." p. 73.
20. *Pravda*, 14 February 1974 (CDSP, 13 March 1974). Schlesinger's removal as defense secretary was clearly welcomed in the Soviet capital (*Pravda*, 16 November 1975.)
21. A.R., "Zametki po nekotorym voprosam vneshnei politiko SSSR" [Observations on Some Questions of the Foreign Policy of the USSR], *Politicheskii dnevnik* [Political Diary], no. 67, pp. 15-24, copyright by The Alexander Herzen Foundation, Amsterdam. A summary in English can be found in Hannes Adomeit, *Soviet Risk-Taking and Crisis Behavior: From Confrontation to Coexistence* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, *Adelphi Paper* no. 101, 1973), pp. 35-36.
22. By August 1975, the journal of Moscow's Institute of World Economy and International Relations concluded that the deepest point of the recession had been reached and left behind. See "Tendentsii razvitiia kapitalisticheskoi ekonomiki v 1975 g." [Trends of Capitalist Economic Development in 1975], *Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia* [World Economy and International Relations], no. 9, 1975, pp. 15-17. For a Soviet view that Western economic problems were cyclical (rather than terminal), see V. Aboltin, "Ekonomicheskii krizis v mire kapitalizma. rasshiriat' ramki analiza" [The Economic Crisis in the World of Capitalism. Widen the Framework of Analysis], *ibid.*, no. 6, 1975, pp. 67-69. For a Soviet view that the West was confronted not with a "raw materials crisis" but only with sharp price increases likely to slow, see (also no. 6, 1975) T. Belous, "Imet li mesto syr'evoi krizis?" [Is There a Raw Materials Crisis Taking Place?], pp. 89-90. By the Twenty-fifth Party Congress, in February 1976, Brezhnev was downplaying the possible collapse of capitalism, "which still has considerable reserves."
23. A militant line was advanced by K. Zardov, *Pravda*, 6 August 1975 (CDSP, 27 August 1975).
24. V. Lavrionov, "puti i tupiki' evropeiskogo stroitel'stva" [European Construction: Paths and Dead Ends], *Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia*, no. 8, 1976, p. 51.
25. S. Madzajewski, "The Arrangement of Forces in the Capitalist Camp," *International Affairs*, no. 12, 1973, p. 12.
26. "Problemy obshchego krizisa kapitalizma" [Problems of the General Crisis of

Capitalism], *Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia*, no. 10, 1974, p. 77.

27. A. Bovin, "Facets of Detente," 6 February 1975 (CDSP, 5 March 1975, p. 11).

28. Y. Davydov, "USA-Western Europe: A 'New Relationship,'" *International Affairs*, no. 1, 1974, p. 41.

29. Ibid., p. 38.

30. M. Mikhailov, "Evrope—kodeks mira" [A Code of Peace for Europe], *Izvestia*, 17 January 1974.

31. S. Madzoevskii (probably the same individual as the Madzowiecki cited in n. 25. above), D. Mel'nikov and Lu Rubinskii, "O politicheskikh aspektakh zapadnoevropeiskii integratsii" [On the Political Aspects of Western Europe Integration], *Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia*, no. 9, 1974, p. 58.

32. D. Petrov, "Japan in Quest of a New Course," *ibid.*, no. 9, 1973; trans. in *International Journal of Politics*, Winter 1973-74, p. 100.

33. 6 September 1972 (CDSP, 4 October 1972, p. 22).

34. Petrov, "Japan in Quest of a New Course," pp. 100, 104.

35. Ibid., p. 104.

36. A. Utkin, "'Atlantizm' i Iaponiia" ["Atlanticism" and Japan], *Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia*, no. 6, 1976, p. 62.

37. The Soviet Union refers to these islands as the "Southern Kuriles" to emphasize their being part of the Kurile Islands, which Japan formally gave up in the San Francisco peace treaty. Moscow has evidenced willingness to return the smallest of the islands (Shikotan and the Habomais) if and when it signs a long-delayed peace treaty with Japan. But the Soviets have refused to consider reversion of the two largest islands (Etorofu and Kunashiri).

38. *Pravda*, 12 June 1977.

39. Petrov, "Japan in Quest of a New Course," p. 104.

40. Radio Moscow, 12 March 1975; trans. in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Soviet Union), 13 March 1975, p. M1.

41. V. Vinogradov, "According to the Pentagon's Recipes," *Krasnaia Zvezda*, 6 March 1975; trans. in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Soviet Union), 12 March 1975, p. M1.

42. D. Petrov, *Iaponiia v mirovoi politike* [Japan in World Politics] (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia," 1973), p. 62.

43. Vinogradov, "According to the Pentagon's Recipes," 6 March 1975.

44. Petrov, *Iaponiia v mirovoi politike*, p. 70.

45. Terry McNeill, "Another Nail in the Coffin of Collective Security," *Radio Liberty*

Research, 23 May 1975, and J.C. Kun, "Peking, Moscow and the Problem of Asian Security," *Radio Free Europe Research* (no. 2133, n.d.).

46. "Asian Collective Security," *Radio Liberty Dispatch*, 10 June 1974.

47. For an example, see "Speech of Comrade L.I. Brezhnev," *Pravda*, 7 October 1974, p. 3.

48. *Ibid.*, 26 August 1973 (CDSP, 19 September 1973).

49. Specifically, the treaties of Aigun (1858) and Peking (1860), which demarcated the Russo-Chinese border. While the Chinese have claimed that the treaties were "unequal," the Soviets have argued that these treaties restored only part of the territory Russia lost to China by the "unequal" treaties of Nerchinsk (1689) and Kyakhta (1728), (L.B. Beskrovny, S.L. Tikhvinsky and V.M. Khvostov, "On the History of the Formation of the Russo-Chinese Border," *International Affairs*, no. 7, 1972, pp. 13-18.)

50. *Pravda*, 26 August 1973 (CDSP, 19 September 1973).

51. I. Aleksandrov, "Pekin: kurs na sryv mezhdunarodnoi razriadki pod prikrytiem anitsovetizma" [Peking: A Policy of Frustrating International Relaxation Under the Cover of Anti-Sovietism], 14 May 1977.

52. *Pravda*, 26 August 1973 (CDSP, 19 September 1973).

53. "Politika Maoistov i deistvitel'nost'" [The Policies of the Maoists and Reality], *Kommunist*, no. 12, 1973, p. 91; trans. in *International Journal of Politics*, Winter 1973-74, p. 57.

54. V.I. Petukhov, "Problemy Evropy i politika Pekina" [Europe's Problems and Peking's Politics], *Problemy dal'nego vostoka* [Problems of the Far East], no. 2, 1973, p. 162; trans. in *International Journal of Politics*, Winter 1973-74, pp. 82-83.

55. A former Central Committee troubleshooter recently described the situation at high levels of the party: "In the Soviet Union...every citizen has to profess beliefs stipulated by the state—I mean, of course, the doctrine of Marxism-Leninism. Many Party officials are not Marxists at all, and this promotes hypocrisy on a nation-wide scale. Non-Marxists have to associate and work with other people, so they are obliged to conceal their views and real motivation. For this reason the first and most important quality a Party worker must have is the ability to indulge in sophistry and produce a well-argued lie." (A Pravdin [pseudonym], "Inside the CPSU Central Committee," *Survey*, August 1974, p. 101.)

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